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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to rehabilitate the reasonableness of Hick’s religious 
pluralism by disclosing the deep structure of his philosophical system. To realize this 
aim, this dissertation will introduce a new philosophical method of reliabilism, which 
is proposed by Ernest Sosa and emphasizes total balance and historical maturation. 
As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophical system is disclosed 
to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with the 
philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. Instead of emphasizing one of them, 
this dissertation will propose to read these different components of Hick’s 
philosophical system as forming a total worldview, which are complementary with 
each other.  
Also, this dissertation will situate Hick’s philosophy in the history of philosophy 
of religion (e.g. pre-analytical paradigms of British Idealism and Critical Realism, 
and analytical paradigms of Logical Positivism, neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy, and 
Reformed Epistemology). Hick’s project will be discussed as a recovery of a pre-
analytical worldview from within analytical contexts.  
As Hick’s central philosophical works, this dissertation will focus on Faith and 
Knowledge and An Interpretation of Religion. Faith and Knowledge has not been 
examined in detail in past literature. But Hick’s arguments about personhood, 
Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume in An Interpretation of Religion originates in Faith and 
Knowledge (both the first edition and the second edition). A correct understanding of 
Hick’s religious pluralism in An Interpretation of Religion is impossible without a 
detailed examination of Faith and Knowledge. 
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Introduction 
 
 
   The philosophy of John Hick has been accepted as a typical position in the field of 
philosophy of religion in the English-speaking world, especially with regard to the 
problem of religious diversity. However, Hick’s position has generated considerable 
critical response.1 This study will aim to clarify hidden philosophical methods that these 
critiques of Hick have been presupposing and propose an alternative philosophical method 
of reliabilism that is more appropriate to understand the contribution Hick makes to the 
philosophy of religion.  
Therefore, the aim of this study is twofold. The first is a rehabilitation of Hick’s 
philosophy against key criticisms. To realize this aim, this study will introduce a new 
philosophical method of reliabilism, which emphasizes total balance and historical 
maturation. As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophical system is 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2000, pp. 24-29 and 45-52. S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion, 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995, pp. 13-43. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of 
Religious Experience, Ithaca and London; Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 27-28, and 264-66. 
Alvin Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ in The Philosophical Challenge 
of Religious Diversity, ed. Kevin Meeker & Philip Quinn, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 
pp. 172-92. John Milbank, ‘The End of Dialogue,’ in The Future of Love: Essays in Political 
Theology, Eugene, Oregon: CACADE Books, 2009, pp. 279-300. David Cheetham, Ways of 
Meeting and the Theology of Religions, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 39-60.  
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disclosed to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with 
philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. Instead of emphasizing one of them, this 
dissertation will propose to read these different components of Hick’s philosophical 
system as forming a total worldview, which are complementary with each other.  
Second, this study will situate Hick’s philosophy in the history of philosophy of 
religion. Various phases of Hick’s philosophy can be understood as responses to his 
contemporary situations (e.g. the ‘theology and falsification’ debate, neo-Wittgensteinian 
philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology). However, the central insight of Hick’s 
philosophy can be understood to be inherited from a pre-analytical paradigm, which had 
been almost wholly neglected in the latter half of twentieth century philosophical thinking. 
For example, in Faith and Knowledge2, one can find an influence from British Idealism 
                                                 
2 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge, 
First Edition, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.  
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(through Norman Kemp Smith3 and John Oman, etc.4). In An Interpretation of Religion5, 
                                                 
3 ‘The philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge the influence of Kant, received through 
Kemp Smith at Edinburgh.’ See John Hick, An Autobiography, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
2002, p. 115.  
Under the influence from Edward Caird and John Watson, Norman Kemp Smith defines Kant’s 
position as ‘objective idealism’ and situates Kant in the traditions of ‘Lotze, Sigwart, Green, Bradley, 
Bosanquet, Jones and Dewey.’ See Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure 
Reason’, London: Macmillan and Co., 1923, pp. l, 36, and 274. See also Edward Caird, The Critical 
Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1889. John Watson, The Philosophy of 
Kant Explained, Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1908. Norman Kemp Smith, Prolegomena to an 
Idealist Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1924.  
   In various phases of his philosophy, Hick is also influenced by Kemp Smith’s interpretation of 
Hume: ‘we thus come to rest in something like the ‘natural belief’ that Hume – according to Norman 
Kemp Smith’s interpretation … – adumbrated.’ See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: 
Human Responses to the Transcendent, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1989, p. 213. See also Hick, 
Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 124-25. John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, 
London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 110. Hick, An Autobiography, p. 314. John Hick, The New Frontier 
of Religion and Science, New York: Palgrave, 2006, pp. 128-29. 
4 ‘Although I shall not refer to Oman’s discussions in detail, either by way of exposition or of 
criticism, those who are acquainted with The Natural and the Supernatural (1931) will find in the 
present essay an attempt to work out Oman’s basic standpoint in relation to the very different world 
of contemporary philosophy.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix. The same 
passage can be found in the second edition. See John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, 
London: Macmillan, 1967, p. 7. The influence of Oman is more obvious in the first edition, but it 
develops into systematic unity in the second edition. See also Hick, An Autobiography, pp. 84-85, 
and 115. John Hick, ‘A Voyage Round John Oman,’ in John Oman: New Perspectives. ed. Adam 
Hood, Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2012. John Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1931. Gavin D’Costa, John Hick’s Theology of Religions: A Critical 
Evaluation, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987, pp. 9-10.  
   In Faith and Knowledge, Hick also mentions other philosophers within the tradition of British 
Idealism. See James Ward, Essays in Philosophy: with a Memoir by Olwen Ward Campbell, W. R. 
Sorley and G. F. Stout (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927. John Laird, 
Knowledge, Belief and Opinion, London: D. Appleton & Co, 1930. John Passmore, A Hundred 
Years of Philosophy, London: Duckworth, 1957, pp. 46-70. 
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one can find a further additional influence from Critical Realism (mainly through Roy 
Wood Sellars but also through Arthur Lovejoy, etc.6 ). This study will sort out these 
complicated relations and clarify the historical development of the philosophy of religion 
which Hick presupposes when he constructs his own position.  
   This introduction will first illustrate three fields of research to which Hick’s philosophy 
can be related (philosophy of religion, epistemology, and Christian Theology). The first 
field is the analytical philosophy of religion and three different paradigms can be found in 
the field: the ‘theology and falsification’ debate7 (this position will be methodologically 
                                                 
5 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press, 1989. Second Edition in 2004.  
6 ‘The kind of religious realism that I shall advocate takes full account of the subjective contribution 
to all awareness. It is thus analogous to the epistemological ‘critical realism’ which emerged in the 
first half of the present century, and particularly to the type developed by R. W. Sellars, Arthur 
Lovejoy, A. K. Rogers and J. B. Pratt (as distinguished from the somewhat different type developed 
by George Santayana, Durant Drake and C. A. Strong).’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 
174. See also Roy Wood Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of 
Knowledge, Forgotton Books, 2012 (Originally published in 1916 by Rand McNally & Company). 
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism: An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930. George Santayana, Reason and Religion, New York: 
Charles Scriner’s Sons, 1905. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, pp. 281-98.  
7  For example, Antony Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification,’ in New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology, ed. A. G. N. Flew and A. C. MacIntyre, London, 1955, pp. 96-98. R. M. Hare, ‘Theology 
and Falsification,’ in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 99-102. Basil Mitchell, ‘Theology 
and Falsification,’ in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 103-05.  
Richard Swinburne developed this broadly foundationalist direction and provided an epistemic 
justification for the existence of God. Hick uses Swinburne’s argument to support his position in An 
Interpretation of Religion. See Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214.  
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categorised as foundationalism), neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy8 (this position will be 
methodologically categorised as coherentism), and Reformed Epistemology 9  (this 
position will be methodologically categorised as reliabilism, but the version of Ernest Sosa 
will be proposed as an alternative position). The philosophy of Hick is related to each of 
these three paradigms. But, among these three paradigms, the philosophy of Hick has often 
been discussed in relation to the previous two paradigms. On the contrary, this study 
suggests reading the philosophy of Hick as more akin to the last paradigm of Reformed 
Epistemology 10 . Furthermore, not only Reformed Epistemology, but also the pre-
                                                 
8 For example, John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965. Peter 
Winch, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ in Ethics and Action, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1972. D. Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. D. Z. 
Phillips, Belief, Change and Forms of Life, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1986. 
Furthermore, Hick relates these Neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers with Don Cupitt under the 
category of Non-Realism. See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 198-201. Don Cupitt, Taking 
Leave of God, London: SCM Press, and New York: Crossroad, 1980.  
9 For example, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds), Faith and Rationality, Notre Dame 
and London: Notre Dame University Press, 1983. William P. Alston, Perceiving God. Alvin 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
10 Hick points out a similarity between his own theory on the nature of religious belief and that of 
William Alston: ‘we have worked along parallel lines, though in different styles, he presenting his 
argument in the rigorous logical form favoured by many today, particularly in the States, and I more 
in the tradition of the English empiricists, Lock, Berkeley and Hume and, in the twentieth century, 
Russell and others. But we have in fact presented what is at root essentially the same defence of the 
rational permissibility of religious belief.’ See Hick, An Autobiography, p. 314.  
With more subtle conditions, Hick also points out a similarity between his discussion and the 
one by Alvin Plantinga. See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 229. John Hick, Dialogues in 
the Philosophy of Religion, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 6-7. 
In relation to the nature of religious belief, Hick defends William James’ ‘the will to believe’ as 
well as Thomas Aquinas’s ‘the virtue of faith’, Richard Swinburne’s ‘the principle of credulity,’ and 
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analytical traditions of British Idealism and Critical Realism are also important to 
understand the philosophy of Hick. This point will be discussed later with the basic 
framework for the reading of Hick.  
The second field is epistemology. A revival of epistemology in contemporary 
philosophy can be understood as a paradigm shift from the philosophy of language 
(methodological coherentism) to the philosophy of knowledge (methodological 
reliabilism). In the field of epistemology, reliabilism played an important role in the 
paradigm shift and the positions of Ernest Sosa 11  and Alvin Plantinga 12  can be 
understood as typical positions of reliabilism. One can see a parallel phenomenon in the 
field of the philosophy of religion and the one in epistemology. This study will apply the 
method of Sosa’s reliabilism to the textual reading of Hick. This study will be mainly 
related with these two fields of research (philosophy of religion and epistemology), but 
                                                 
Norman Kemp Smith’s interpretation of Hume’s ‘natural belief’. See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 
First Edition, pp. 48-57. Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, pp. 19-20. John Hick, 
Arguments for the Existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1970, pp. 101-20. Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, pp. 158-59, and 213-14. See also, William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, 
New York, 1897, pp. 1-31, and 63-110. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II/II, Q. 1, art. 1 and 
art. 4. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and 
Central Doctrines, London: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 543-66. Swinburne, The Existence of God, p. 
254.  
11  See Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective 
Knowledge, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: 
Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
12 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: the Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, and 
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
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another field of research (Christian Theology) is also important.  
The third field is Christian Theology. Hick mentioned a number of proponents of 
philosophical theology13 (e.g. F. R. Tennant14 and William Temple15). For the purposes 
of this study, another two movements of theology are important for the problem of 
religious diversity. Post-Liberal Theology, which can be typically represented by George 
Lindbeck16, and Radical Orthodoxy, which can be typically represented by John Milbank17, 
can be understood as two typical opponents to the philosophical method developed by 
John Hick specifically about the problem of religious diversity. A systematic presentation 
of the problems formulated by Gavin D’Costa18 and S. Mark Heim19 became possible 
on the background of these broad theological atmospheres.  
                                                 
13 Hick distinguishes philosophy of religion from philosophical theology: ‘philosophy of religion 
is … not a branch of theology (meaning by “theology” the systematic formulation of religious 
beliefs), but a branch of philosophy.’ See John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, First Edition, 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 1.  
14 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930.  
15 William Temple, Nature, Man and God, London: Macmillan, 1934.  
16 See George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: the Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 
Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984.  
17 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990. John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997. John Milbank, ‘The End of Dialogue’. John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The 
Representation of Being and the Representation of the People, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.  
18 Gavin D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism: the Challenge of Other Religions, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986. Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity.  
19 S. Mark Heim, Salvations. S. Mark Heim, The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of 
Religious Ends, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001.  
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Secondly, this introduction will describe the basic framework for the reading of Hick. 
The main difficulty for the interpretation of Hick is that Hick provides a lot of different – 
even apparently contradictory – standpoints, and so different standpoints have been 
emphasized by different interpreters. For example, when Hick discusses ‘eschatological 
verification’, Hick provides a cognitive standpoint.20 However, when Hick discusses the 
mythical interpretation of religion, Hick provides a non-cognitive standpoint.21 These two 
standpoints are different and even contradictory.22 Not only these two standpoints, but a 
number of other mutually-contradictory standpoints are present in Hick’s philosophy. 
                                                 
20 See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, pp. 169-99. John Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 
London: Collins, 1976, pp. 450-66. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 172-89.  
21 See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 343-61. John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, 
London: SCM Press, 1993. Sarah Coakley defends Hick’s mythical interpretation of religion: 
‘neither ‘liberal’ nor ‘conservative’ opponents showed any cognizance of the wealth of illuminating 
literature from cognate social science subjects on the nature and significance of ‘myth’.’ See Sarah 
Coakley, Christ Without Absolutes: A Study of the Christology of Ernst Troeltsch, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 196. 
22 Sumner B. Twiss argues that Hick’s theory has both ‘cognitive’ and ‘non-cognitive’ aspects and 
its multi-dimensional character requires the examination which is apart from one-sided readings. 
See Sumner B. Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His 
Critics,’ in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 70, No. 4, The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 533-
68.  
According to Yujin Nagasawa, John Hick, on the one hand, maintains that reality consists of 
two distinct types of entities – the physical and the mental – and, on the other hand, Hick maintains 
that there is a single indivisible whole. Nagasawa suggests ‘to reconcile this apparent tension 
between the dualistic and monistic elements in Hick’s metaphysical system by proposing a unique 
form of pantheistic or panentheistic monism.’ See Yujin Nagasawa, ‘John Hick’s Pan(en)theistic 
Monism,’ in Religious Pluralism and the Modern World: An Ongoing Engagement with John Hick, 
ed. Sharada Sugirtharajah, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 176-89.  
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Because of this multi-dimensional character of Hick’s philosophy, it has generated a lot of 
critical responses.  
For example, Alvin Plantinga sees Hick as advancing a non-cognitive, neo-
Wittgensteinian position23 , while Gavin D’Costa sees Hick as developing a cognitive 
meta-theory and a non-evidentialist position24 . This study will propose reliabilism as a 
method for the systematic reading of the mutually-contradictory standpoints of Hick’s 
philosophy. As the result of the application of the method of reliabilism, this study will 
emphasize the standpoint of cosmic optimism as the central standpoint of Hick25. Cosmic 
                                                 
23 As an example of a neo-Wittgensteinian position, Plantinga quotes the argument of Hick about 
cultural context: ‘Someone born to Buddhist parents in Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, 
someone born to Muslim parents in Saudi Arabia to be a Muslim, someone born to Christian parents 
in Mexico to be a Christian, and so on.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2, quoted in 
Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ in The Philosophical Challenge of 
Religious Diversity, p. 187. See also Peter Byrne, ‘John Hick’s Philosophy of World Religions,’ 
Scottish Journal of Theology 35, 1982, pp. 289-301. Peter Byrne, God and Realism, Aldershot, 
Hants: Ashgate, 2003. Paul Griffiths and Delmas Lewis, ‘On Grading Religions, Seeking Truth, 
and Being Nice to People – A Reply to Professor Hick,’ in Religious Studies 19, 1983, pp. 75-80. 
Paul Griffiths, Problems of Religious Diversity, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. David Basinger, 
Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Assessment, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. 
24 As an example of non-evidential pragmatic position, D’Costa quotes the argument of Hick about 
myth: ‘the truth of a myth is a practical truthfulness; a true myth is one which rightly relates us to a 
reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological terms.’ D’Costa argues that the non-
evidential pragmatic position violates the cognitive contents of religion. See Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, p. 248, quoted in D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 26. See also 
George A. Netland, ‘Professor Hick on Religious Pluralism,’ in Religious Studies 22, 1986, pp. 249-
61. Richard Corliss, ‘Redemption and the Divine Realities: A Study of Hick and an Alternative,’ 
Religious Studies 22, 1986, pp. 235-48. 
25 S. Mark Heim argues that the central intention of Hick is the inclusion of both the cognitive and 
the non-cognitive particularities within a common total reality. This understanding of Hick can be 
10 
 
optimism can be understood as a cosmic version of mysticism, which is distinguished from 
an individual version of mysticism that is theorized by George Lindbeck as the 
experiential-expressive standpoint26. This study will trace the origin of Cosmic Optimism 
back into Norman Kemp Smith and John Oman’s British Idealism and Roy Wood Sellars’ 
Critical Realism. 
Regarding the works of Hick, this study will focus on more philosophical and more 
systematic works of Hick rather than more theological and more particular works of Hick. 
In The Universe of Faiths: A Critical Study of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism, 
Christopher Sinkinson suggests that ‘the seeds of his pluralism were already shown in his 
theory of knowledge, and … there has never been a radical change in Hick’s theological 
framework. Certainly, various theological beliefs have undergone revision but these were 
only ever peripheral to his basic philosophical commitment.’27 Then, Sinkinson points out 
the importance of Faith and Knowledge to understand Hick’s religious pluralism: ‘‘‘Hick 
notes in his preface to the 1966 second edition of Faith and Knowledge that despite the 
revision he has made to his work, the book remains ‘an exposition of the view of faith 
which seemed to me, and still seems to me, most adequate.’ In 1988 there was a reissue of 
the second edition in which Hick wrote a new preface. Here he continues to maintain that 
                                                 
understood as cosmic optimism. See S. Mark Heim, Salvations, pp. 15-23.  
26 See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, chapter 2.  
27 Christopher Sinkinson, The Universe of Faith: A Critical Study of John Hick’s Religious 
Pluralism, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001, p. 25.  
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the work is foundational to everything else he has written and notes that his subsequent 
writings ‘proceeded in a natural trajectory from the [earlier] epistemology’ … ‘the theology, 
whether old or new, does not affect the basic epistemological argument’.’’’28  
On the basis of Sinkinson’s suggestion, this study will give special attention to Faith 
and Knowledge from the early period and An Interpretation of Religion from the late 
period. Faith and Knowledge has not been examined in detail in past literature. But Hick’s 
arguments about personhood, Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume in An Interpretation of 
Religion originate in Faith and Knowledge (both the first edition and the second edition). 
A correct understanding of Hick’s religious pluralism in An Interpretation of Religion is 
impossible without a detailed examination of Faith and Knowledge.  
There are a number of other crucially important books of Hick’s own (Philosophy of 
Religion29 , Evil and the God of Love30 , Christianity at the Centre31 , Arguments for the 
Existence of God32, God and the Universe of Faith33, Death and Eternal Life34, God has 
                                                 
28 Christopher Sinkinson, The Universe of Faith, p. 25. The quotation is from Hick, Faith and 
Knowledge, preface to the second edition, and Hick, Faith and Knowledge, preface to the reissue 
of the second edition.  
29 John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Second Edition in 
1973. Third Edition in 1983. Fourth Edition in 1990.  
30 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, London: Macmillan, 1966. Second Edition 
in 1977.  
31 John Hick, Christianity at the Centre, London: Macmillan, 1968. 
32 John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, London: Macmillan, 1970. 
33 John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, London: Fount/Collins, 1977.  
34 John Hick, Death and Eternal Life, London: Collins, 1976. 
12 
 
Many Names35, Problems of Religious Pluralism36, Disputed Questions in Theology and 
the Philosophy of Religion37, The Metaphor of God Incarnate38, The Rainbow of Faiths39, 
The Fifth Dimension40, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion41, An Autobiography42, 
The New Frontier of Religion and Science43, Who or What is God?44, and Between Faith 
and Doubt45). Different versions of these books show constant changes of Hick’s position 
and each provides uniquely important arguments. As a basic principle, all of these books 
will be discussed with their relation to Faith and Knowledge and An Interpretation of 
Religion. There are also a number of books Hick edited46 and Hick’s independent papers 
which were presented on various occasions. Some of them also include crucially important 
arguments (for example, different versions of Classical and Contemporary Readings in 
                                                 
35 John Hick, God has Many Names: Britain's New Religious Pluralism, London: Macmillan, 
1980. 
36 John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, London: Macmillan, 1985. 
37 John Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, London: Macmillan, 
1993.  
38 John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, London: SCM Press, 1993. Second Edition in 2005.  
39 John Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, London: SCM Press, 1995. 
40 John Hick, The Fifth Dimension, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1999.  
41 John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, New York: Palgrave, 2001.  
42 John Hick, An Autobiography, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002.  
43 John Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, New York: Palgrave, 2006.  
44 John Hick, Who or What is God?, London: SCM Press, 2008.  
45 John Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, New York: Palgrave, 2010.  
46  For example, Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick, London: Macmillan, 1964. The 
Existence of God, ed. John Hick, London: Macmillan, 1964. Truth and Dialogue in World 
Religions: Conflicting Truth Claims, ed. John Hick, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974. 
Christianity and other Religions, ed. John Hick and B. Hebblethwaite, Glasgow: Fount, 1980.  
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the Philosophy of Religion 47  are very good materials for knowing Hick’s own 
understanding of his contemporary situation of the philosophy of religion, and independent 
papers such as ‘A Voyage Round John Oman’ provide a unique information for knowing 
Hick’s own understanding of his background). However, where a similar argument can be 
found in Hick’s own book, this study will focus on the argument in his own book rather 
than the one in his edited books or independent papers on various occasions. This is 
because one of the central aims of this study is the analysis of the internal structure of 
Hick’s whole philosophy rather than how Hick’s independent response was stimulated by 
external situations. Therefore, for example, this study will focus on The Metaphor of God 
Incarnate rather than The Myth of God Incarnate.48  
   Lastly, this introduction will provide an outline of the argument in each chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, First Edition, ed. John 
Hick, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Classical and Contemporary Readings in the 
Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition, ed. John Hick, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition, ed. John 
Hick, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990. 
48 The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick, London: SCM Press, 1977. Hick himself says that 
Hick’s own Metaphor is better than the original Myth, because the former is ‘by the same author 
and so is able to present a sustained argument’. See Hick, An Autobiography, p. 237.  
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Related Fields of Research 
 
 
I. THREE PARADIGMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
   A landmark in the development of analytical philosophy of religion is a collection of 
essays entitled New Essays in Philosophical Theology (first published in 1955). Logical 
Positivism, launched into the English-speaking world by Bertrand Russell49 and A. J. 
Ayer50 from 1910s to 1930s, was rapidly fading in Britain in the 1950s. However, after 
the influence of Logical Positivism with its strident polemic against the cognitive content 
of religious claims, some philosophers in Britain took up philosophy of religion in a way 
that forced others to take notice. Influenced by Karl Popper’s falsificationism51, Antony 
Flew presented a parable that challenged theists to state the conditions under which they 
would give up their belief, using a principle of Logical Positivism that unless one can do 
so, one does not have a belief with any cognitive content. R. M. Hare and Basil Mitchell 
responded with their own parables of the situation of the Christian, and John Wisdom 
                                                 
49 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in 
Philosophy, London: Open Court, 1914.  
50 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1936. 
51  Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, 1959. (Originally 
published in 1934.) 
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independently developed his own parable. Faith and Knowledge (first published in 1957) 
can be understood in this context of ‘theology and falsification’ debate.52 Hick continues 
to pay attention to the cognitive content of religious claims and Hick’s ‘eschatological 
verification’ is an example of this line of argument. Even in An Interpretation of Religion 
(first published in 1989), Hick still keeps his defence of the principle of eschatological 
verification.53  
   The emphasis on language, which had a cognitive influence on Logical Positivism, 
had another effect towards a non-cognitive direction in the field of philosophy of religion, 
and neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion can be seen as the typical non-cognitive 
position. What has been called ‘neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion’ became a 
recognizable phenomenon in the 1950s and 1960s due to the work of several writers – 
principally John Wisdom, Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, and D. Z. Phillips – and they rejected 
the idea that a religious belief has cognitive content. Instead, they suggested that a religious 
belief must be seen as a ‘language game’, tied to a particular ‘form of life’, and its language 
is confessional rather than referential.54 Because of its confessional character, a religious 
                                                 
52 Hick, ‘The Logic of Faith,’ in Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 134-63. See also, Hick, 
Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 5-6. Chester Gillis, A Question of Final Belief: John 
Hick’s Pluralistic Theory of Salvation, London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 54-59. David Cheetham, 
John Hick: A Critical Introduction and Reflection, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 20-36, and 138-
39.  
53 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 178-80.  
54 ‘There is no question of a general justification of religious belief, of giving religion a ‘sound 
foundation’. If the philosopher wishes to give an account of religious belief he must begin with the 
contexts in which these concepts have their life.’ See Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 27.  
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belief is not something that should be proved but it should be just accepted as it is. Not 
only in the context of Logical Positivism, Hick’s Faith and Knowledge (especially its 
second edition in 1966) can also be understood in this context of neo-Wittgensteinianism. 
Hick’s neo-Wittgensteinian direction can be found in his argument about ‘experiencing-
as’.55 Hick continues to keep his neo-Wittgensteinian argument of ‘experiencing-as’ in An 
Interpretation of Religion.56  
   Another influential landmark in the development of analytical philosophy of religion 
is a collection of essays titled Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (first 
published in 1983). After the trend of Logical Positivism and neo-Wittgensteinian 
philosophy, Calvinist philosophers who came to be known as Reformed Epistemologists 
presented an argument that religious belief in God can be entirely rational even in the 
absence of propositional evidence that had been required by Logical Positivism as the 
                                                 
55  Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, pp. 141-44. See also Hick, Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion, pp. 4-5. Gillis, A Question of Final Belief, pp. 52-54, and 59-67. Cheetham, 
John Hick, pp. 10-16.  
56 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 140-42. Also, in An Interpretation of Religion, Hick uses 
another Wittgensteinian concept of ‘Religion as a Family-Resemblance concept’. See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, pp. 3-4. 
Furthermore, Hick mentions Steven Katz when he points out that experience and linguistic 
interpretation cannot be separated: ‘all conscious experience is interpretive in the sense that it has 
specific meaning for us in virtue of the concepts which function in the process by which it is brought 
to consciousness. I am thus in agreement at this point with Steven Katz in his influential paper 
‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 169. See 
also Steven Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 22-74.  
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cognitive content of religious claims. Both neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers and 
Reformed Epistemologists are against the evidentialist orientation of Logical Positivism, 
but the difference is that neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers have a non-realist orientation 
and defend faith as linguistic grammar, whereas Reformed Epistemologists have a realist 
orientation and defend faith as epistemic rationality. Reformed Epistemology uses 
philosophy of knowledge instead of philosophy of language and this change in the 
philosophy of religion is rooted in the change in epistemology. The philosophy of John 
Hick has not been discussed in relation to this trend of the revival of epistemology, but this 
study suggests that the complexity and subtlety of Hick’s philosophy can truly be revealed 
in the context of this trend of the revival of epistemology.57  
 
 
II. FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE  
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 
   These paradigm changes in the field of the philosophy of religion are related to a 
change of trend in analytical philosophy in general and it can be summarized as a move 
from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of knowledge. The rise of analytical 
philosophy in the beginning of the 20th century was connected with the emphasis on 
                                                 
57 See, for example, Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 6-7.  
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language and the influence of its main contributors (Wittgenstein58, Quine59, and Sellars60) 
resulted in the neglect of the importance of epistemology. Because of the intermediary 
nature of language, these philosophers had an inclination to doubt any direct relationship 
with reality. Instead of a direct relationship with reality, these philosophers emphasized a 
context within which a particular knowledge is situated. According to these philosophers, 
knowledge cannot be independent and the meaning of knowledge is always determined 
by its context. Therefore, all knowledge depends on further knowledge for its status, and 
this argument presupposes methodological coherentism61.  
The theory of reliabilism was proposed to restore direct relationship with reality and 
what reliabilism offered to recover through direct relationship with reality was the specific 
nature of knowledge, which reliabilism calls ‘reliability of knowledge’. According to 
reliabilism, there are a lot of different kinds of knowledge and each kind of knowledge has 
its own reliability. The idea of reliability distinguishes reliabilist epistemology from 
                                                 
58  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958. 
59  Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953.  
60 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1997. 
61 ‘What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for 
holding a belief except another belief. Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the request for a ground or 
source of justification of another ilk.’ See Donald Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge’, in Dieter Henrich, ed., Kant oder Hegel?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983, p. 426, quoted 
in Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 108. 
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classical epistemology. According to classical epistemology exemplified by Descartes or 
Hume, one knows only what is indubitable and what can be deductively proven from the 
indubitable. Therefore, Descartes’s rationalism presupposes a universality of rational 
intuition as its ultimate premise and Hume’s empiricism presupposes a universality of 
inference and experience. Reliabilism gives up the universality of knowledge and instead 
focuses on the partial reliability of knowledge. Therefore, according to reliabilism, one 
does not need to choose among rational intuition, inference, and experience. All of these 
have a qualitatively different reliability and one can use not only perfectly reliable rational 
intuition but also inference, experience, memory, testimony, introspection … etc.62  
Ernest Sosa and Alvin Plantinga can be seen as typical representatives of reliabilism. 
However, the methods of Sosa and Plantinga have different orientations. Sosa emphasizes 
the second-order balance among different specific kinds of knowledge. According to Sosa, 
knowledge has its meaning only as a balance between different specific kinds of reliable 
knowledge. Therefore, a particular kind of knowledge cannot be separated from other 
kinds of knowledge.63 On the contrary, Plantinga emphasizes a specific reliability of 
knowledge. According to Plantinga, knowledge has its meaning only within a particular 
                                                 
62 This explanation of reliabilism largely depends on that put forward by John Greco. See John 
Greco, ‘Introduction: Motivations for Sosa’s Epistemology,’ in Ernest Sosa and his Critics, ed. John 
Greco, Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. xv-xvi.  
63 ‘Reliabilism requires for the epistemic justification of belief that it be formed by a process reliable 
in an environment normal for the formation of such belief … Every bit of knowledge still lies atop 
a pyramid of knowledge. But the building requirements for pyramids are now less stringent.’ See 
Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 89.  
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environment. Therefore, Plantinga denies the relevance of second-order balance, and 
instead prioritises the clarification of the specific reliability of knowledge. To develop the 
specificity of the reliability of knowledge, Plantinga invents new concepts of proper 
function and proper basicality. Belief in God, according to Plantinga, could count as 
knowledge if it was produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties.64 Furthermore, 
belief in God can be properly basic with respect to warrant and one may hold a warranted 
belief about God not on the evidential basis of other propositions, but grounded on or 
occasioned by an appropriate experience.65 
This study suggests that the method of reliabilism developed by Ernest Sosa can be 
used in an original way to rehabilitate Hick’s philosophy in contemporary context.  
 
 
III. PARADIGM SHIFTS IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY  
   To understand the background of John Hick’s philosophy, it is necessary to understand 
not only the philosophy of religion and epistemology, but also Christian Theology. This 
                                                 
64 ‘A belief has warrant for you only if your cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, working 
the way it ought to work, in producing and sustaining it.’ See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper 
Function, p. 4.  
65 ‘In the typical case … Christian belief is immediate; it is formed in the basic way. It doesn’t 
proceed by way of an argument from, for example, the reliability of Scripture or the church … My 
Christian belief can have warrant, and warrant sufficient for knowledge, even if I don’t know of and 
cannot make a good historical case for the reliability of the biblical writers or for what they teach.’ 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 259. The italics is in the original.  
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study can examine Christian Theology only in its relation to Hick and his philosophy of 
religion. But one can still find a broad similarity between the paradigm shift in philosophy 
and the one in Christian Theology, even though there is no direct correspondence.  
  According to Hick, ‘during the closing years of the nineteenth century, and during the 
twentieth century as it has thus far elapsed, there has been an abundant stream of thought 
in the Irenaean tradition.’66 In the earlier works of this Irenaean tradition67 , there is an 
influence of the dominant and pervasive idea of the nineteenth century, the concept of 
evolution or development taking place in all life. The idea of evolution is reflected in British 
theology of that period, in the conception of the created order, centring upon man, as 
moving towards a divinely appointed end. There is also, in many of the British works of 
the later years of the reign of Queen Victoria and the expansive Edwardian period, an air 
of optimism which contrasts sharply the more pessimistic outlook of so many of the 
writings produced during and after the First World War. Thereafter a new note of 
                                                 
66 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, p. 242.  
67 Among the ‘Irenaean tradition’, Hick mentions Nicholas Berdyaev, Alexander Campbell Fraser, 
Alexander Balmain Bruce, Robert Flint, Henry Drummond, James Martineau, James Iverach, A. S. 
Pringle-Pattison, Leonard Hodgson, J. S. Whale, H. H. Farmer, D. S. Cairns, Oliver Chase Quick, 
Nels F. S. Ferré, Charles E. Raven, Geddes Macgregor, and Hugh Montefiore. See Hick, Evil and 
the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 242-61.  
Eric McKimmon categorizes Alexander Campbell Fraser as Scottish Realist in the tradition of 
William Hamilton and categorizes A. S. Pringle-Pattison as Personal Idealist. See Eric McKimmon, 
‘Oman and Scottish Philosophical Traditions,’ in John Oman: New Perspectives, p. 99-101, 108-
114. See also Alexander Campbell Fraser, Philosophy of Theism, Edinburgh: William Blackwood 
& Sons, 1895-96. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1917.  
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pessimism in the position of Protestant Neo-Orthodoxy was heard, in Europe above all 
from Karl Barth, in the United States from Reinhold Niebuhr, and in Britain from Peter 
Taylor Forsyth.68  
   Therefore, there is a difference between evolutional/optimistic theologies in the 
nineteenth century (regarding the nineteenth century as a cultural epoch that ended in 
1914) and their twentieth century pessimistic successors. 69  According to Hick, his 
theological position belongs to the former one of evolutional and optimistic theology and 
F. R. Tennant and William Temple can be seen as typical exponents of the Irenaean 
tradition in the twentieth century.70 Under the influence from James Ward71, etc., Tennant 
says, in Philosophical Theology, that the human being is still in process of being created 
as a free moral being: ‘moral goodness cannot be created as such … It is the outcome of 
freedom, and has to be acquired or achieved by creatures. We cannot imagine a living 
world, in which truly ethical values are to be actualized, save as an evolutionary cosmos 
                                                 
68 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 242-43, and 246-50. See also Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936-. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, London: Nisbet & Co, 1941-43. Peter Taylor 
Forsyth, The Justification of God, London: Duckworth, 1916.  
69 About the paradigm shift in Christian theology during the First World War, see Otto Piper, Recent 
Developments in German Protestantism, London: S.C.M. Press, 1934, pp. 40-47.  
70 See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 250-55, and 261. See also Hick, Classical 
and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, First Edition, p. 478.  
71 ‘Many books and articles have … been drawn upon; but in outstanding degree, the Psychological 
Principles of the late Prof. J. Ward.’ See Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. vi.  
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in which free agents live and learn, make choices and build characters.’72 Under the 
influence of Edward Caird73, etc., Temple says, in Nature, Man and God, that the divine 
Being and the divine communication are known in a single apprehension which is the 
awareness of God as acting self-revealingly towards us, and the revelation consists in the 
self-revealing actions from within events in human history: ‘there is no imparting of truth 
as the intellect apprehends truth, but there is event and appreciation; and in the coincidence 
of these the revelation consists.’74 Temple says that the events are always in themselves 
ambiguous, capable of being seen either simply as natural happenings or as happenings 
through which God is acting towards us.75 When the revelatory events are seen and 
responded to as divine actions, the human being exists in a conscious relation to, and with 
knowledge of, God: and this total occurrence is revelation. According to Hick, both 
Tennant and Temple stress ‘the idea that divine creativity is still at work in relation to man 
and drawing him towards a perfection not yet realized.’76 
   In addition to Hick’s understanding of the history of Christian theology as the move 
                                                 
72 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, p. 185, quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First 
Edition, p. 251.  
73 Temple names his position as ‘Dialectical Realism’ and says that his position ‘is almost identical 
with such an Idealism as that of Edward Caird or of Bernard Bosanquet.’ See Temple, Nature, Man 
and God, p. 498. See also Robert Craig, Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple, London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1963, pp. 10-11.  
74 Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 314, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, 
p. 28. See also Hick, Faith and Knowedge, First Edition, pp. xv-xvi.  
75 Here one can find an origin of Hick’s concept of ‘religious ambiguity of the universe’. 
76 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, p. 245.  
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from Irenaean tradition to Neo-Orthodoxy, two other movements of more recent Christian 
theology are important for the purpose of the present study: Post-Liberal theology and 
Radical Orthodoxy. Instead of the popularity of Neo-Orthodoxy until around 1940s and 
1950s among American universities, what has been called ‘Post-Liberal Theology’ 
became a recognizable phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s with the publications of Hans 
Frei’s The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative77 in 1974 and George Lindbeck’s The Nature of 
Doctrine in 1984.78 However, the relation between Neo-Orthodoxy and Post-Liberal 
theology is not simple. On the one hand, Neo-Orthodoxy and Post-Liberal theology share 
a rejection of an individual type of liberalism such as the one of Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
On the other hand, from the view of religious pluralism, Neo-Orthodox theologians have 
an orientation towards a more exclusive/conservative position, and Post-Liberal 
theologians have an orientation towards a more pluralist/liberal position.79 Therefore, it is 
better to understand Post-Liberal theology as a recovery of a narrative type of liberalism 
after Neo-Orthodoxy’s criticism of an individual type of liberalism, and the method used 
for the recovery of the narrative type of liberalism is Wittgensteinian philosophy of 
                                                 
77 Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974.  
78 See Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 1-56. There are a number of other proponents and advocates of Post-
Liberal theology. See also David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1979. Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, San Antonio: Trinity 
University Press, 1985. Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus, London: SCM Press, 
1986. 
79 See, for example, Paul F. Knitter, Theologies of Religions, Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 2002, 
pp. 23-26, 178-185.  
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language.  
According to George Lindbeck, the innovation introduced by Neo-Orthodox 
theologians such as Karl Barth lies in its rejection of subjective individualism that is 
implicit in the method of liberal theologians such as Schleiermacher.80 What Barth offered, 
instead of individualism, was an emphasis on narrative, and Lindbeck connects the 
influence from Barth with his understanding of Wittgenstein: ‘Karl Barth’s exegetical 
emphasis on narrative has been at second hand a chief source of my notion of 
intratextuality as an appropriate way of doing theology in a fashion consistent with a 
cultural-linguistic understanding of religion.’81  
Lindbeck’s understanding of Wittgenstein is explicit in his understanding of ‘cultural-
linguistic’ understanding of religion: ‘a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or 
linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought.’82 Lindbeck 
proposes that it is the words and images that are given by religion that give shape to 
religious thought and convictions. Without religious words, we would not have religious 
experience: ‘just as a language (or ‘language game,’ to use Wittgenstein’s phrase) is 
correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both cognitive and behavioral 
                                                 
80 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 24.  
81 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 135. About the narrative theology of Barth, see also David 
Ford, Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the Theological Method of Karl Barth in the 
Church Dogmatics, Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1981.  
82 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33.  
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dimensions, so it is also in the case of a religious tradition.’83 Therefore, an individual 
identity is not individual at all, but is determined by the communal and religious worldview 
that we are born into. Given this understanding of cultural language in general and religious 
language in particular, Lindbeck suggests that there is nothing that can be truly declared 
‘common’ to all religions. 
A recent development of religious pluralism which emphasises diversity rather than 
identity (e.g. Gavin D’Costa, S. Mark Heim, and etc.) can be understood from the context 
of this broadly post-liberal atmostphere which emphasises diversity of linguistic grammar 
rather than identity of religious experience.84  
Instead of the popularity of Post-Liberal Theology around 1970s and 1980s among 
American universities, what has been called ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ became a recognizable 
phenomenon in British universities during the 1990s and 2000s with the publications of 
John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory85 in 1990 and Catherine Pickstock’s After 
                                                 
83 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33.  
84  See Paul F. Knitter, Theologies of Religions, pp. 173-237. See also William A. Christian, 
Oppositions of Religious Doctrines: a Study in the Logic of Dialogue Among Religions, London: 
Macmillan, 1972. John B. Cobb, Transforming Christianity and the World: a Way Beyond 
Absolutism and Relativism, ed. Paul F. Knitter, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1999. James L. Fredericks, 
Faith among Faiths: Christian Theology and Non-Christian Religions, New York: Paulist Press, 
1999.  
85 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 
John Milbank argues that the method of Lindbeck is ‘settled simply by recourse to a more exact 
reading of preceding practices and narratives’ and it remains ‘merely safeguarding what is properly 
implicit in the narrative’. What is lacking in the method of Lindbeck is the ‘breaking out of this 
frame to project a new one through the temporal course of event.’ In this sense, according to Milbank, 
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Writing86  in 1998.87  From the perspective of this study, Radical Orthodoxy can be 
understood under the characteristic of a rejection of individual liberalism, overcoming of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, a defence of cosmic ontology, and a tendency 
towards Christian exclusivism.  
Regarding the rejection of individual liberalism, John Milbank agrees with Lindbeck. 
Milbank argues with a slightly political orientation that modern philosophy created the 
idea of the individual that is independent from society: ‘‘unrestricted’ private property, 
‘absolute sovereignty’ and ‘active right’, which compose the ‘pure-power’ object of the 
new politics, are all the emanations of a new anthropology which begins with human 
persons as individuals and yet defines their individuality essentialistically, as ‘will’ or 
‘capacity’ or ‘impulse to self-preservation’.’ 88  According to Milbank, individual 
liberalism, invented by modern philosophy, suggests that society is not real and there are 
                                                 
the method of Lindbeck has only a paradigmatic setting and it lacks syntagmatic development: 
‘because he [Lindbeck] fails to see the tension in any narrative between the assumption of a 
paradigmatic setting, and the unfolding of a syntagmatic development, he proceeds to graft the 
paradigmatic function inappropriately onto the narrative structures as such.’ See John Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 383 and 
386. 
86 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: on the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998.  
87 There are a number of other proponents and advocates of Radical Orthodoxy. See Graham Ward, 
Cities of God, London: Routledge, 2000. Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion, London: 
Routledge, 2005. Conor Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and 
Creationists Both Get it Wrong, Grand Rapids, Mich.; Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2010. 
88 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 14.  
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only individuals who happen to coalesce in certain contingent ways and harbor different 
desires, needs, skills and the like, in pursuing their own self-interest which is not linked in 
any necessary way to the collective interest of society. 
About Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, Radical Orthodoxy has an ambiguous 
attitude. For example, Conor Cunningham accepts some aspects of Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language. But, because of its weakness (which limits itself within first-order 
description), he proposes to complement it with metaphysical realism (which acts as 
second-order explanation and gives actuality and specificity to first-order language): 
‘Wittgenstein is obliged to refuse philosophy the right to posit an objective reality, since it 
must not speak from a place ‘before’ description … A reality would provide a ‘place’, 
logically speaking, outside language, even though the concept is developed from within 
language.’89 According to Cunningham, the first-order philosophy of language must be 
complemented by the second-order realism.90 
                                                 
89 Conor Cunningham, ‘Language: Wittgenstein after theology,’ in Radical Orthodoxy: a New 
Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, London: Routledge, 1999, 
p.73.  
90  This understanding of the second-order realism is practically connected with Radical 
Orthodoxy’s understanding of Christian theology, which does not have its own special subject 
matter, but it’s much more a question of the way in which Christian theology makes a difference to 
everything. See Nicholas Lash, ‘Ideology, Metaphor and Analogy,’ in Theology on the Way to 
Emmaus, p. 95-120. See also, ‘Radical Orthodoxy: A Conversation,’ in The Radical Orthodoxy 
Reader, ed. John Milbank and Simon Oliver, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 30. Furthermore, about 
the complementation of first-order Wittgensteinian philosophy of language with the second-order 
metaphysical realism, see David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, pp. 167-75.  
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What Milbank proposes, instead of the individualist anthropology and Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language, is the Augustinian ontology of Mediaeval Christendom. The 
Augustinian ontology is characterized by ‘1 Micro/macro cosmic isomorphism; 2 the non-
subordination of either part to whole or whole to part; 3 the presence of the whole in every 
part; and 4 positioning within an indefinite shifting sequence rather than a fixed totality.’91 
Also, as a defence of the Augustinian idea of cosmos, Catherine Pickstock argues that the 
totality of cosmos is not something that is added to the rest of the world but it is the total 
series of worldly interactions: ‘for Augustine the entire cosmos itself is not a total ‘thing’ 
to which one could accord a size, even a maximum size. On the contrary, it is rather an 
assemblage of all the relations that it encompasses, in such a way that since there is nothing 
else with which it can be compared or to which it is related, it cannot in itself be accorded 
a size, measure, or rhythmic modulation.’92 
                                                 
91 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 409.  
92 Catherine Pickstock, ‘Music: Soul, City, and Cosmos after Augustine,’ in Radical Orthodoxy: a 
New Theology, p. 247. 
   These understandings of cosmic ontology by Milbank and Pickstock are influenced by Henri 
de Lubac. According to De Lubac, one can only specify human nature with reference to its 
supernatural end, and the human nature is only fully defined when it is referred to certain privileged 
historical events and images. See Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary 
Sheed, New York: Crossroad, 1998. See also John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 219-
220. Conor Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea, pp. 407-10. 
   The same relation between the natural and the supernatural can also be seen in the works of Eric 
Voegelin, see John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the 
Representation of the People, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013, p. 6. See also Eric Voegelin, Order 
and History, Baton Rouge and London: Lousiana University Press, 1954-74. 
30 
 
Furthermore, as the works of Graham Ward show, the movement of Radical 
Orthodoxy is not ignorant of the diversity of religions: ‘the uncompromising assertion of 
Christianity will be matched by similar assertions from other faiths, other theological 
practices. And as long as each resists the fear of encountering the other and the different 
within itself, and the fear also of welcoming the stranger who is now the neighbor, then 
these communities will not cultivate but transfigure their resistance identities. Neither will 
they reify and fossilize the truth that is shared and dynamic among them.’93 However, 
most of the works of Radical Orthodoxy are limited within an exclusively Christian, or 
broadly ‘Catholic’, perspective and a religiously pluralist perspective is yet to come.94 
To rehabilitate the reasonableness of John Hick’s philosophy, this study has illustrated 
an original intellectual mapping and introduced a new division of four periods in the 
history of philosophy and Christian theology (in the case of philosophy, (1) British 
                                                 
93 Graham Ward, True Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 153. See also William Cavanaugh, ‘A 
Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the Nation State,’ 
in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, pp. 314-37.  
Furthermore, under the influence from David Burrell, John Milbank offers a defence of Al 
Ghazali, Sourawardi, Ibn Arabi, and Mulla Sadra in Islamic tradition, who are ‘in potential harmony 
with the metaphysics of the Church Fathers, Aquinas, and the ‘Dominican’ legacy.’ See Milbank, 
Beyond Secular Order, p. 14. See also David Burrell, Faith and Freedom: an Interfaith Perspective, 
Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. 
94 See John Milbank, ‘The End of Dialogue,’ in The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology, 
Eugene, Oregon: CASCADE Books, 2009, pp. 279-300.  
David Cheetham rightly points out that a weakness of Radical Orthodoxy is to limit its position 
within an exclusively Christian perspective. Cheetham compares John Hick and John Milbank, and 
proposes to read each from each other’s position. See Cheetham, Ways of Meeting and the Theology 
of Religions, pp. 39-60. 
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Idealism/American Critical Realism, (2) Logical Positivism, (3) Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language, (4) Reliabilism, and in the case of Christian theology, (1) what 
Hick calls ‘Irenaean’ tradition (2) Neo-Orthodoxy, (3)Post-Liberal theology, and 
(4)Radical Orthodoxy). The illustration of these four periods is not the only possible 
explanation of the development of philosophy and theology, and other illustrations must 
be possible as well. However, to rehabilitate Hick’s intentions in a contemporary context, 
this study tentatively proposes to use the illustration of four periods.  
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A Framework for the Reading of John Hick 
 
 
   In ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His 
Critics,’ Sumner B. Twiss pointed out the multi-dimensional nature of Hick’s philosophy.95 
Twiss says that he ‘has a rather favorable view of Hick’s theory and its prospects; this is in 
large part due to my belief that Hick’s theory constitutes a rich organic web of more than 
one theoretical strand, giving it considerable resilience and subtlety in dealing with difficult 
philosophical challenges.’96  
   Twiss points out that, in the very basement of Hick’s theory, there is a striking tension. 
On the one hand, Hick’s theory ‘adheres to a Wittgensteinian view of religious language 
and belief, which is usually understood to conceive of divine reality as internally related to 
practices and to construe religious discourse as grammatical rather than referential.’97 On 
the other hand, Hick’s theory ‘adheres to the view that religious language and belief are 
properly understood as presupposing an independent and ontologically real ultimate 
                                                 
95 Sumner B. Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His 
Critics,’ in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 533-68. See also Cheetham, John Hick, pp. 
16-20, and 132-169. 
96 Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,’ p. 534.  
97 Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,’ p. 535. 
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divine.’98 Twiss says that Hick’s account of religious pluralism is composed from at least 
two different theoretical threads – cultural-linguistic and propositional-realist, respectively. 
Furthermore, Twiss also says that a number of others may be present as well: ‘the 
tendency to regard religious language and doctrine as metaphoric and mythic and to see 
all religions as expressions of a common core experience or soteriological orientation is 
suggestive of what Lindbeck would call an experiential-expressive thread, while the final 
development of a pragmatic epistemology of religious belief is reminiscent of William 
James and suggestive of a pragmatic theory of religion. And, of course, there is no denying 
the fact that Hick’s ontological postulate reflects a Kantian thread.’99 As a result of the 
multi-dimensional nature of Hick’s philosophy, Twiss recommends ‘to examine Hick’s 
theory apart from one-sided readings in order to be in a position to appreciate and assess 
the function, effect, and significance of its multidimensional theoretical strands.’ 100 
According to Twiss, when one looks at the actual arguments and the crucial points of 
theoretical tension in Hick’s account, one finds that Hick’s views fare pretty well and are 
not in any obvious way implausible. 
This multi-dimensional character of Hick’s philosophy is also pointed out by 
Christopher Sinkinson: ‘Hick makes eclectic use of his sources, and cannot thus be labelled 
as the follower of any one school of thought. Where helpful, he draws upon Kant or 
                                                 
98 Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,’ p. 535.  
99 Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,’ p. 538.  
100 Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,’ p. 539.  
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Wittgenstein or Hume or Ayer in order to advance his work.’101 However, in spite of the 
recognition of the multi-dimensionality, Sinkinson understands Hick mainly as Kantian: 
‘yet I think it can be easily shown that the mature statement Hick gives of his position is 
strikingly similar to that of Kant.’102 
Like Sinkinson, other critics of Hick also focus on Kantian aspect of Hick’s philosophy. 
Paul R. Eddy understands Hick mainly as neo-Kantian (‘Hick’s neo-Kantian subjectivist 
moment ultimately undermines his religious realism’103), and Gerard Loughlin criticizes 
Hick’s use of Kantian distinction of noumenon and phenomena (‘if religious pluralism is 
a tentative theory, a piece of philosophical speculation, and not something which arises out 
of the dynamics of the Christian life, it must be unacceptable to Christian theology as 
reflective attention to that life. It simply is not credible to suppose that Christian theology 
could advocate abandoning divine revelation in favour of a theoretical postulate – Hick’s 
noumenal Real.’104)  
This study recognizes the importance of Kantian aspect of Hick’s philosophy and will 
examine the validity of Kantian position. However, this study will mainly follow the 
direction of Twiss’s argument and, on the basis of Twiss’s argument, this study suggests 
                                                 
101 Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths, p. 84.  
102 Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths, p. 84.  
103 Paul R. Eddy, ‘Religious Pluralism and the Divine: Another look at John Hick’s Neo-Kantian 
Proposal’, in Religious Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1994, p. 493.  
104 Gerard Loughlin, ‘Noumenon and Phenomena,’ in Religious Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1987, pp. 
493-508.   
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that the multi-dimensional nature of Hick’s philosophy can also be understood from 
situations within which Hick’s philosophy is contextualized. In response to the movement 
of Logical Positivism, Hick takes a cognitive position and provides a theory of 
eschatological verification. In response to the movement of neo-Wittgensteinian 
philosophy, Hick takes a contextual position and provides an argument about 
experiencing-as. Hick later adds an argument of mythical interpretation of religion and this 
argument can be understood as a non-cognitive standpoint. For example, D’Costa 
interprets Hick’s philosophy as a non-cognitive position which prioritises the mythical 
interpretation of religion.105 However, this non-cognitive interpretation contradicts Hick’s 
defence of the cognitive standpoint of eschatological verification and the contextual 
argument of ‘experiencing-as’. Even in his later position Hick keeps his cognitive 
standpoint and contextual standpoint as well as non-cognitive standpoint.  
   To interpret appropriately the multi-dimensional nature of Hick’s philosophy, this 
study uses a method of reliabilism which focuses on the balance among different kinds of 
particular standpoints. Furthermore, as a result of the method of reliabilism, this study pays 
a special attention to Hick’s standpoint of cosmic optimism. The idea of cosmic optimism 
can be understood as a kind of cosmic mysticism which can be clarified by making a 
comparison with individual mysticism. A typical example of individual mysticism can be 
                                                 
105 ‘It [Hick’s mythologizing hermeneutic] seems to ignore or deny the really difficult conflicting 
truth claims by, in effect, reducing them to sameness: i.e., they are all mythological assertions.’ See 
D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 27.  
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found in George Lindbeck’s explanation of the experiential-expressive standpoint. What 
is important to understand in this approach is that it presupposes an individual viewpoint. 
According to Lindbeck, ‘thinkers of this tradition all locate ultimately significant contact 
with whatever is finally important to religion in the prereflective experiential depths of the 
self and regard the public or outer features of religion as expressive and evocative 
objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of internal experience.’ 106  What is 
presupposed in this explanation of the experiential-expressive standpoint is a situation that 
an individual has a contact with reality and the individual experience is located within the 
internal part of the self because experience cannot be objectified and in this sense it is 
beyond cognitivity. As Lindbeck argues, this experiential-expressive standpoint is a 
modern invention which was made against a cognitive-propositional approach to religion, 
and both of them presuppose an individual viewpoint: ‘this pattern was already well 
established in American Protestantism by the nineteenth century, but in the past both 
conservative and liberals generally thought of the search for individual religious meaning 
as taking place within the capacious confines of the many varieties of Christianity.’107 
According to Lindbeck, the traditions of religious thought and practice into which 
Westerners are most likely to be socialized conceals from them the social origins of their 
conviction that religion is a highly private and individual matter. 
   On the contrary, Hick’s approach presupposes a cosmic viewpoint. For example, Hick 
                                                 
106 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 21.  
107 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 22. 
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speaks of ‘religious ambiguity of the universe.’108 Hick uses the concept of ambiguity in 
a good sense. This is because ambiguity has a connotation of the creative and 
transformative power of the universe. This ambiguity can be understood as the parallel to 
what Hick regards as epistemic distance109  in the field of Christian theology. The 
limitation on the ability of the human being does not limit the creative power of the divine 
nature. On the contrary, the limitation of the human being can truly be creative by being a 
part of the whole reality. The limitation of the human being is more likely a condition to 
manifest the creativity of divine reality.110 
                                                 
108 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 73.  
109 In Evil and the God of Love, Hick argues that the human being is not allowed to know God 
directly. Therefore, the human being is open to both a theistic and a naturalistic interpretation of the 
universe: ‘it [the universe] is systematically ambiguous, capable of being interpreted either 
theistically or naturalistically.’ However, this epistemic distance of the human being from God does 
not limit the creative and transformative power of the Creator, but it shows that the human being is 
part of divine providence: ‘in order for man to be endowed with the freedom in relation to God that 
is essential if he is to come to his Creator in uncompelled faith and love, he must be initially set at 
an epistemic ‘distance’ from that Creator … This means that the sinfulness from which man is being 
redeemed, and the human suffering which flows from that sinfulness, have in their own paradoxical 
way a place within the divine providence.’ See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 
373 and 323.  
110 ‘God’s self-revealing actions are accordingly always so mediated through the events of our 
temporal experience that men only become aware of the divine presence by interpreting and 
responding to these events in the way which we call religious faith.’ ‘Events which can be 
experienced as having a purely natural significance are experienced by the religious mind as having 
also and at the same time religious significance and as mediating the presence and activity of God.’ 
Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, pp. 104-105, and 111.  
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   Hick draws on many philosophers/theologians (Kant111, Irenaeus112, Aquinas113, etc.) 
                                                 
111 ‘I was deeply influenced by Kemp Smith … He was one of the last of the Idealist philosophers 
and also a major interpreter of Kant … It was through him that I realized the immense importance 
of Kant … I have retained from Kant what today I identify as ‘critical realism’ – the view that there 
is a world, indeed a universe, out there existing independently of us, but that we can only know it in 
the forms provided by our human perceptual apparatus and conceptual systems.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, pp. 66-69.  
112 ‘Man, a created and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated 
God … man making progress day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is, approximating 
to the uncreated One.’ See Irenaeus, ‘Against Heresies’, 4. 38. 3, in The Writings of Irenaeus, Trans. 
Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut, London: Hamilton & Co, 1869, p. 44, quoted in Hick, Evil 
and the God of Love, p. 219.  
According to Gustaf Wingren, modern interpreters of Irenaeus (H. H. Wendt, Adolf von 
Harnack, and R. R. M. Hitchcock) had pointed out two mutually-contradictory lines of thought in 
Irenaeus, describing the one as apologetic and the other as moralistic: ‘the theology of Irenaeus has 
two distinctive characteristics: first, the whole of his theology is marked by his contrast between 
God and the Devil, and the ceaselessly raging conflict between the two powers, a conflict which is 
fought out in the midst of our humanity; and second, this humanity, independently of the conflict 
we have mentioned, is continually in process of change, developing and altering its form, but never 
remaining in the same fixed pattern.’ Because of this duality, Irenaeus had been accused of being 
inconsistent. However, according to Wingren, these two contradictory lines are united in the concept 
of man growing like a child: ‘the unity which unites the two parts consists of the concept of child 
and the concept of growth.’ See Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical 
Theology of Irenaeus, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959, pp. 27 and 104. See also Hick, Evil and the 
God of Love, First Edition, p. 221.  
113 ‘Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower.’ See Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, II/II, Q. I, art. 2. ‘God … as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, 
yet our intellect knows Him according to diverse conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in 
Himself.’ See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part I, Q. 13, art. 12. See also Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, pp. 241 and 247. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, p. 43. Hick, The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 163. Hick, Who or What is God?, p. 10. F. C. Copleston, 
Aquinas, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955, pp. 131-155. 
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and makes use of many concepts (‘two types of faith’114 from Martin Buber, ‘the vale of 
soul-making’115 from John Keats, ‘religious ambiguity of the universe’116 from William 
Temple, ‘identity of ethics and soteriology’117 and ‘levels of meanings,’118 from John 
Macmurray, etc.) to develop his central position. What is noteworthy among them is John 
Oman’s British Idealism and Roy Wood Sellars’ Critical Realism. After the publication of 
An Interpretation of Religion, Hick begins to mention Aquinas to explain his central 
position.119 But Hick does not connect his reading of Aquinas with the contemporary 
academic situation, and therefore it looks weak and underdeveloped.  
British Idealism was an influential movement in Britain from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth century120 and John Oman came at the end of the dominance 
of British Idealism under the influence of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, etc.121. John Hick 
                                                 
114 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, pp. ix-xix.  
115 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 289-297.  
116 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 73-128.  
117 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 299-315.  
118 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, pp. 140-142.  
119 See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 236-249. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, pp. 77-90, 
144-154. Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, pp. 162-171. Hick, Who or What is God?, 
pp. 1-13.  
120 See W. J. Mander, British Idealism: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 1-37. 
Norman Kemp Smith defines Idealism as a position that ‘spiritual values have a determining voice 
in the ordering of the Universe,’ and ‘what is most truly distinctive in Idealism is its central 
contention, that spiritual values can be credited as operating on a more than planetary, that is, on a 
cosmic scale.’ See Kemp Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 1 and 4. 
121 See Stephen Bevans, John Oman and his Doctrine of God, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, p. 35-40. See also Eric McKimmon, ‘Oman and Scottish Philosophical Traditions,’ in 
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inherited three aspects of his philosophy of religion from Oman’s The Natural and the 
Supernatural: ‘the apprehension of the supernatural in and through the natural,’122 ‘the 
relation between religion and environment,’ 123  and ‘a comprehensive religious 
interpretation of religion.’124  
One of the central arguments that Oman developed in The Natural and the 
Supernatural is the relation between the Natural and the Supernatural. According to Oman, 
there is no independent realm of the Supernatural, which is separated from the realm of the 
Natural. On the contrary, Oman says, the Supernatural can be seen only within the Natural 
as a reconciliation of every different phenomenon in the natural world: ‘what determines 
their faith is not a theory of the Supernatural, but an attitude towards the Natural, as a sphere 
in which a victory of deeper meaning than the visible and of more abiding purpose than 
the fleeting can be won … The revelation of the Supernatural was by reconciliation to the 
Natural: and this was made possible by realizing in the Natural the meaning and purpose 
of the Supernatural.’125 Therefore, the Supernatural is perceived when the natural world, 
within which different individuals are following different values, meanings and purposes, 
becomes open to its ultimate value, meaning and purpose. The Supernatural is not the 
                                                 
John Oman: New Perspectives, p. 108-13.  
122 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
123 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
124 Hick, An Autobiography, p. 84. See also Hick, ‘A Voyage Round John Oman,’ pp. 163-71.  
125 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 448, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 130.  
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designation of a world beyond this world; it is, rather, this natural world seen inclusively 
and as having a new evaluation made of its total significance.126  
Oman develops the relation between the Natural and the Supernatural into an 
epistemology of environment. According to Oman, the Supernatural is known only 
through the entire natural context and hence has no separate locus of its own which can be 
known independently of the natural environment: ‘knowing is not knowledge as an effect 
of an unknown external cause, but is knowledge as we so interpret that our meaning is the 
actual meaning of our environment.’127 Oman says that a human being’s environment 
stands over against the human being and is known only as it crosses into one’s mind as 
meaning, and the interpretation of that meaning is the outcome of one’s engagement with 
the environment.128 What must be made clear is that Oman is not suggesting that religious 
awareness is a response to any special object, but rather is constituted by a special type of 
awareness of all objects taken as a whole. Oman’s epistemology of the environment can 
be designated as inclusive in the sense that the acknowledgement of the Supernatural is 
one’s total engagement with the whole environment. Therefore, a role for religion lies in a 
belief that ‘a human being’s environment is other and greater than it seems, that 
                                                 
126 See Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 69-73. See also Thomas A. Langford, ‘The 
Theological Methodology of John Oman and H. H. Farmer,’ in Religious Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
1966, pp. 229-240.  
127 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 175, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 166.  
128 ‘Our knowledge cannot be a purely mental creation; and it cannot be a mere effect of an outward 
cause.’ See Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 110.  
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interpreting the natural, but extending behind or beyond or above it, is the Supernatural, as 
a larger environment to which men must relate themselves through the activities.’129 
Oman further develops the relation between the Natural and the Supernatural into a 
systematic account of world religions. 130  According to Hick, Oman had some 
misunderstandings of world religions, but ‘Oman’s formulation of the idea of epistemic 
distance (not his phrase) bridges the gap between the theistic and non-theistic religions in 
that the same principle applies to both equally.’131 Hick says that within each of the great 
non-theistic traditions, as within the monotheisms, deliberate effort is required. The 
supernatural environment, whether experienced as a personal God or a transpersonal 
Reality, is always and everywhere there to be accessed, but is not forced upon our 
consciousness.132  
                                                 
129  Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 182. See also Oman, The Natural and the 
Supernatural, pp. 58-9.  
130 See Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 346-471.  
131 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 144. Hick quotes Oman’s words: ‘the 
peculiarity of the supernatural environment is that we cannot enter it except as we see and choose it 
as our own.’ See Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 309.  
132 With an additional influence from John Macmurray, John Oman’s other more theological aspect, 
the personalist aspect in Grace and Personality, changed its form into Hick’s inter-relational idea of 
ethics in the whole system of Hick’s philosophy: ‘one is personal in virtue of one’s participation in 
an interacting community of persons’. See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 144-151. See 
also John Oman, Grace and Personality, London: Collins Fontana: Association Press, 1917.  
According to Hick, ‘the philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge … a trace of John 
Macmurray of Edinburgh in his distinguishing of the natural, the ethical, and the divine.’ See Hick, 
An Autobiography, p. 115. See also John Macmurray, The Self as Agent: Volume I of The Form of 
the Personal, London: Faber and Faber, 1957. John Macmurray, Persons in Relation: Volume II of 
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   Critical Realism was an influential movement in America around the 1920s and 
1930s133 and its first formulation can be seen in Sellars’ first book in 1916, Critical 
Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge 134 , and its mature 
formulation can be seen in his book in 1932, The Philosophy of Physical Realism135 and 
a collection of Sellars’s papers, Principles of Emergent Realism: Philosophical Essays136. 
A large part of Sellars’ thinking and writing has been devoted to a theory of perception137 
and John Hick pays special attention to three aspects of Sellars’ theory of perception.  
   First, critical realism differs ‘from naïve realism’.138 However, according to Sellars, 
critical realism is not simply against naïve realism. Sellars says that naïve realism is based 
on plain man’s belief that physical things are there before one perceives them and they 
remain there afterwards. Although this uncritical and unreflective view stands in need of 
revision, Sellars insists that its essentially realistic character must not be violated in revising 
it. The task of the theory of knowledge is so to refine naïve realism that it will be 
philosophically justifiable. For critical realism, as for naïve realism, ‘it is the external object 
                                                 
the Form of the Personal, London: Faber and Faber, 1961. 
133 See John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, pp. 281-98.  
134 Roy Wood Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge, 
Forgotten Books, 2012.  
135 Roy Wood Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, New York: Macmillan, 1932.  
136 Roy Wood Sellars, Principles of Emergent Realism: Philosophical Essays, St. Louis: W. H. 
Green, 1970. 
137 See Norman Paul Melchert, Realism, Materialism, and the Mind: The Philosophy of Roy Wood 
Sellars, Springfield: Illinois, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968.  
138 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174.  
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which is known, and not the idea of the object.’139 
Second, critical realism takes ‘account of the conceptual and interpretive element 
within sense perception’.140 According to Sellars, perceiving is not only a simple and 
direct affair, but also ‘an interpretative operation in which sensa are taken up into a direct 
characterization of external things.’141 Sellars develops his criticism of naïve realism to 
show that perception is not only an ‘event in which things directly reveal themselves,’142 
but also is a process in which various factors, both external and internal to the perceiver, 
mediate between the object and the perceiver. According to Sellars, both external things 
and innate ideas are elements of the process of perception, and neither is an exclusive 
constituent.143 If this is so, whatever one may say about the independence of the physical 
thing, one can no longer talk about it as common to many perceivers. There may be a 
correspondence between the percepts of different perceivers, but different perceivers do 
not see the same thing. Through the process of perception, the minds of different perceivers 
continue to clarify the objects in terms of different interpretations: ‘when a satisfactory 
perceptual experience is delayed because of uncertainty, the percipient focuses on the 
object, trying to get clues for a satisfying interpretation.’144  
                                                 
139 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. v. The italics is in the original. 
140 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174. 
141 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 64.  
142 Sellars, Critical Realism, p. 12.  
143 See Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy, New York: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1952, p. 293-5.  
144 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 69.  
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   Third, ‘sense perception is a complexly mediated awareness of the physical world.’145 
According to Sellars, there are various levels of knowing, some of which are unconscious 
and implicit, while others are conscious and explicit. The problem of knowledge arises in 
connection with the conscious and explicit, yet the unconscious and implicit indicate the 
organic setting or matrix of knowledge-claims, and thereby reveals the presupposed 
antecedents of cognition. Sellars asserts that this implicit knowing is the foundation out of 
which explicit knowing grows in a natural fashion, and without which the fact of knowing 
‘would be as mysterious and non-natural as innate ideas and supernatural revelation.’146 
Throughout these discussions of knowledge, Sellars moves towards the recognition that 
all knowledge is appropriate as totality rather than absolute as exclusivity. At different 
levels of knowing, the various types of predicates that one uses are discussed to be 
appropriate to the disclosure of characteristics of the object.147 
Even though there are some differences of style, both John Oman’s British Idealism 
and Roy Wood Sellars’ Critical Realism have an orientation towards the organic unity of 
the world, which has been criticized and neglected in analytic traditions in the latter half of 
twentieth century. In these two pre-analytical traditions, one can find an origin for Hick’s 
cosmic optimism and his orientation towards totality as a second-order theory. During the 
                                                 
145 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174. 
146 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p.87.  
147 See Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy, New York: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1952, p. 296-7. 
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later period of his life, Hick also developed his reading of Aquinas which can be found in 
his book, The New Frontier of Religion and Science148, and in his paper ‘Who and What 
is God?’149. 
   In the beginning of the argument, Hick rejects the concept of God found in critics of 
Christianity such as Richard Dawkins and Antony Flew (before converting to deism).150 
According to Hick, Christians in most churches believe in God, who is distinguished from 
the natural world as ‘an active all-powerful force who is motivated by a limitless love, 
tempered by justice, and who has knowledge and wisdom infinitely surpassing our own’151. 
God can and does perform miracles, in the sense of making things happen which would 
not otherwise have happened, and preventing things from happening which otherwise 
would have happened. Hick says that a problem of this idea of divine intervention is that 
it led many to atheism. For example, Antony Flew says that ‘we see a child dying of 
inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but 
his Heavenly Father reveals no sign of concern.’152 What is presupposed in this concept 
of divine intervention (for both a certain kind of Christianity and atheism) is that there is a 
divine realm on the one hand, and there is another natural realm on the other hand. 
                                                 
148 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, pp. 162-171. 
149 Hick, Who and What is God?, pp. 1-13.  
150 Hick, Who or What is God?, pp. ix, and 1-4. See also Antony Flew, There Is a God: How the 
World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind, New York: HarperOne, 2008. 
151 Hick, Who or What is God?, p. 1.  
152 Antony Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification,’ in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 98-
99.  
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According to this concept, God intervenes in the natural world from another world of 
divinity.  
   Then, Hick argues that a large number of Christian theologians and mystics had a 
different concept of God, i.e. the concept of divine ineffability: ‘within Christianity we find 
the divine ineffability affirmed by both the great orthodox theologians and the mystics.’153 
Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, 
Martin Luther, and St. John of the Cross had the concept of divine ineffability. Hick says 
that ‘the divine ineffability does not entail that the ultimate reality, which we are calling 
God, is an empty blank, but rather that God’s inner nature is beyond the range of our 
human condition.’154 However, Hick again warns Christians that this concept of divine 
ineffability should not be understood as an independent realm. If such is the case, ‘only 
those attributes that the theologians regards as desirable are treated’155 and God becomes 
the projection of a certain group of people.  
   Finally, Hick quotes Aquinas (‘things known are in the knower according to the mode 
of the knower’156) and says that we are aware of anything, not as it is in itself unobserved, 
but always and necessarily as it appears to beings with our particular cognitive equipment. 
And, according to Hick, in the case of religious awareness, the mode of the knower differs 
                                                 
153 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 165.  
154 Hick, Who or What is God?, p. 6.  
155 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 169.  
156 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II/II, Q. I, art. 2, quoted in Hick, Who or What is God?, 
p. 10.  
48 
 
from one religious tradition to another. Therefore, the ultimate reality of which the 
religions speak, and which we refer to as God, is being differently responded to in historical 
forms of life within the different religions. When these different religions are taken as a 
whole, each religion becomes ‘responsive and not purely projective,’157 because the 
elements of contingency and unpredictability become seen from the point of view of a 
creative purpose. Therefore, divine creativity must not be seen as special interventions 
from another world, but must be seen as a process of evolution from within this world.158  
   Not only cosmic optimism (originating from John Oman’s British Idealism, Roy 
Wood Sellars’ Critical Idealism, and Hick’s reading of Aquinas), but Hick also defended 
an epistemology of religious belief (William James’ ‘the will to believe,’ Thomas Aquinas’ 
                                                 
157 Hick, Who and What is God?, p. 11.  
158 Hick, Who and What is God?, p. 3. At the time of Evil and the God of Love (both in the first and 
the second edition), Hick has a static image of the Neo-Platonic tradition including Augustine and 
Aquinas under the category of ‘the principle of plenitude’ (the phrase of Arthur O. Lovejoy). But 
after the publication of An Interpretation of Religion, while still keeping the understanding of 
Augustinian-Calvinist theodicy as having a static and deterministic attitude, Hick changes his 
understanding of Neo-Platonism as a more dynamic and mystical tradition and includes it as a part 
of his cosmic optimism. See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 76-87, and 96-113. 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 238. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, pp. 144-51. 
   Also, Hick sometimes mentions persons in the British tradition (e.g. Ralph Cudworth, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, and F. H. Bradley) to support his argument. See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, pp. 83 and 185. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 36 and 370. Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 191.  
   In contrast, Hick shows a critical attitude to a pre-determined understanding of the nature of God 
in Anselm, Leibniz, and Charles Hartshorne. See, Hick, Evil and the God of Love, First Edition, pp. 
85-88. Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, pp. 68-97.  
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‘the virtue of faith’, Richard Swinburne’s ‘the principle of credulity’, and Norman Kemp 
Smith’s interpretation of Hume’s ‘natural belief’), and this epistemology can be 
understood as complementary to his cosmic optimism. It’s basic formulation can be seen 
in the statement that ‘it is rational to base beliefs on our experience, except when we have 
positive reasons not to,’159 and Hick situates this epistemology in the history of philosophy 
in The New Frontier of Religion and Science.  
   According to Hick, his epistemology of religious belief can be situated within the 
British empiricist tradition of David Hume and G. E. Moore as against the one of John 
Locke and George Berkeley.160 According to Hick, the arguments of Locke and Berkeley 
had an orientation towards solipsism, the idea that everything and everyone of which I am 
aware exists only in my mind. Hume radically changed the terms of the discussion by 
claiming that one believes in the reality of the external world simply because it is one’s 
nature to do so and not as a result of, or justified by, philosophical arguments.161 To trust 
                                                 
159 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 6. There is another statement of the same 
position: ‘belief in God is not properly based on philosophical arguments but on the religious 
person’s experience of God’s presence, or of being in God’s presence.’ See Hick, An Autobiography, 
p. 314.  
160 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, pp. 127-130.  
161 ‘Nature has not left this to [our] choice, and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great 
importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What 
causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But ‘tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or 
not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.’ See Hume, Treatise of 
Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section ii, ed. Selby-Bigge, 1896, p. 187, quoted in Kemp Smith, 
The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 449, and Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 
128.  
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our senses is a matter of what can be called natural belief, or pre-philosophical common 
sense. Likewise, G. E. Moore insisted that we know many things that we cannot prove.162 
Moore insisted, as also did his contemporary Ludwig Wittgenstein, the ordinary 
knowledge that we all share, and express in the ordinary language that we have in common, 
neither needs nor is able to be backed up by philosophical arguments. Hume and Moore 
could formulate the implicit principle by which one lives all the time. This is that one 
accepts what appears to be there as being there, except when one has reason to doubt it.  
On the basis of these historical classifications (four periods in both philosophy and 
Christian theology) and philosophical clarifications (cosmic optimism, influenced by 
British Idealism and Critical Realism, and an epistemology of religious belief), this study 
will propose that, as a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophy can have 
a new meaning as a system composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, 
combined with philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume.  
                                                 
Kemp Smith points out ‘a theistic view of Nature’ in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. See 
Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 564. See also John Milbank, ‘What Lacks is 
Feeling: Hume versus Kant and Habermas’, in Faithful Reading: New Essays in Theology in 
Honour of Fergus Kerr, OP, ed. Simon Oliver, Karen Kilby, and Thomas O’Loughlin, London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, pp. 88-92. 
162 ‘I know, with certainty … [that] There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. 
This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not 
without undergoing changes … [T]he earth has existed also for many years before my body was 
born …’ See G. E. Moore, ‘A Defense of Common Sense,’ in Contemporary British Philosophy, 
Series 2, ed. J. H. Muirhead, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925, quoted in Hick, The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science, p.129.  
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In his philosophy of personhood, Hick derives the existence of God from the 
contradictory relation between the actuality of a person and the possibility of other 
persons.163 In his reading of Wittgenstein, Hick understands religion as cultural and 
linguistic tradition.164 In his reading of Kant, Hick understands religion as developing 
toward the ultimate end.165 In his reading of Hume, Hick understands religion as the 
environment which secures the existence of the world.166 These different components of 
                                                 
163 Hick explains his philosophy of personhood in Faith and Knowledge, and develops it in An 
Interpretation of Religion. Its basic line of argument will be discussed in An Outline of the 
Argument.  
164 In An Interpretation of Religion, according to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Hick 
understands religions as cultural and linguistic traditions which have remembrances like a family: 
‘it is … illuminating to see the different traditions, movements and ideologies whose religious 
character is either generally agreed or responsibly debated, not as exemplifying a common 
essence, but as forming a complex continuum of remembrances and differences analogous to 
those found within a family.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 4.  
165 In An Interpretation of Religion, according to Kant’s philosophy of temporality, Hick 
understands Kantian categories as developing towards the ultimate reality in the ultimate future: 
the pure categories or pure concepts of the understanding (for example, substance) are 
schematized in terms of temporality to produce the more concrete categories which are exhibited 
in our actual experience of the world (Thus, for example, the pure concept of substance is 
schematized as the more concrete idea of an object enduring through time).’ 
Furthermore, Hick argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language can be understood as a 
spatial, embodied aspect of culture, and Kant’s philosophy of temporality is understood as a linear, 
progressive aspect of development. These two aspects are taken to be complementary: ‘the 
particularizing factor (corresponding, in its function, to time in the schematisation of the Kantian 
categories) is the range of human cultures, actualizing different though overlapping aspects of our 
immensely complex human potentiality for awareness of the transcendent.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, pp. 243 and 245.  
166 In An Interpretation of Religion, according to Hume’s philosophy of common sense, Hick 
explains Hume’s natural belief as the ultimate security of the very basis of reality: ‘we are so 
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Hick’s philosophical system (Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, and philosophies of 
Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume) are complementary with each other, and form an organic 
worldview as a whole.  
The 1st and the 2nd chapters of this dissertation will prepare the method of reliabilism, 
and then the rest of the chapters will gradually disclose the deep structure of Hick’s 
philosophical system by examining each of the different components.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
constituted that we cannot help believing and living in terms of the objective reality of the 
perceived world. We may be able to suspend our conviction during brief moments of 
philosophical enthusiasm; but natural belief … will soon reassert itself.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 213. 
Hume’s natural belief secures the very basic environment to Wittgenstein’s cultural and 
linguistic traditions and Kant’s development towards the ultimate reality. Therefore, Hume’s 
philosophy can be understood as a further complementation to Wittgenstein’s and Kant’s 
philosophies.  
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An Outline of the Argument 
 
 
The 1st chapter will introduce the method of reliabilism. From a philosophical 
viewpoint, what are accepted as the standard methods of the theory of religious pluralism 
can be divided into two different groups: foundationalism and coherentism. The method 
of John Hick is commonly understood as a typical foundationalism and the one of George 
Lindbeck is commonly understood as a typical coherentism. However, there is a third 
method of reliabilism, which proposes a model of knowledge as a coherent balance of 
plural foundations. This study proposes to understand the religious pluralism of Hick from 
the new method of reliabilism. 
The 2nd chapter will clarify philosophical presuppositions hidden in the critics of Hick. 
On the one hand, there is a group of Reformed Epistemologists such as William Alston 
and Alvin Plantinga. From a reliabilist viewpoint, the method of Reformed Epistemology 
is a weak foundationalism. On the other hand, there is a group of ‘theologians of religions’ 
such as Gavin D’Costa and S. Mark Heim. The method of these theologians of religions 
can be understood as coherentism. As an alternative to these positions, this chapter will 
offer the reliabilist ethics of normality, and further examines the characteristic of reliabilism 
as having both stabilizing and creating processes. 
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   The 3rd chapter will focus on Hick’s reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. 
In Faith and Knowledge the relation between language and reality is examined by using 
the concept of two types of faith: epistemological faith as cognition and ontological faith 
as trust. On the basis of the linguistic standpoint given by epistemological faith as cognition, 
Hick adds the necessity of a holistic standpoint given by ontological faith as trust. In An 
Interpretation of Religion, Hick understands religion as cultural and linguistic tradition, 
and Hick develops the relation between language and reality into a contrast between the 
non-realism of D. Z. Phillips and the critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars.  
   The 4th chapter will focus on Hick’s own philosophy of personhood. In Faith and 
Knowledge, Hick discusses William James and John Henry Newman as examples of a 
position which centres on epistemological faith as cognition. In contrast, Hick discusses a 
necessity of ontological faith as trust through a contradictory relation between a person and 
other persons. First, the world has actuality only for a particular person. Second, there are 
other persons, who are living in the world from incomparably different perspectives. It 
possibly means that there are a lot of incomparably different worlds, which are 
corresponding to incomparably different persons just like oneself. Finally, the natural belief 
to trust the actual world is required in spite of the possibility of multiple worlds. On the 
basis of the natural belief, one can naturally act and react with other persons who are also 
the centres of the universe, just like oneself. This is the basic line of argument given by 
Hick’s philosophy of personhood. In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick’s philosophy of 
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personhood will be developed into cosmic optimism. 
   The 5th chapter will focus on Hick’s reading of Kant’s philosophy of temporality. 
Hick’s reading of Kant is influenced by British Idealism especially through Norman Kemp 
Smith. In Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, Kemp Smith offers to read 
Kant’s philosophy as a relation between a person’s actuality, the other person’s possibility, 
and the world’s necessity. This inter-personal relation can also be understood as historical 
progress of a person as well as humanity in general toward the ultimate reality. However, 
Kant’s philosophy of temporality does not provide the reason why the ultimate reality is 
available here and now. Therefore, Kant’s philosophy of temporality is complemented by 
Oman’s philosophy of environment (expounded in The Natural and The Supernatural) 
and Hume’s philosophy of common sense. On the basis of these arguments, the system of 
An Interpretation of Religion will further be disclosed to be composed of Hick’s own 
philosophy of personhood, combined with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Kant’s 
philosophy of temporality, and Hume’s philosophy of common sense. These standpoints 
as a whole can be understood as an organic worldview, which can also be understood, from 
a reliabilist viewpoint, as a coherent balance of plural foundations with both stabilizing 
and creating processes. 
The 6th chapter will discuss Hick’s reading of Hume’s philosophy of common sense. 
In his reading of Hume, Hick proposes to understand religion as the very basic 
environment, which secures the existence of the world shared among ordinary people here 
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and now. This reading of Hume exemplifies a stabilizing aspect of Hick’s philosophy. 
Then, this chapter will also discuss Hick’s philosophy of history contained in his 
theological works. The theological works exemplify a creating aspect of Hick’s 
philosophy.  
   The conclusion will summarise the whole argument. The introduction of reliabilism 
discloses Hick’s central position as his philosophy of personhood combined with 
philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant and Hume. Also, the conclusion organizes the whole 
argument in a chronological order.  
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Chapter 1.  
 
A METHODOLOGICAL PREPARATION  
Hermeneutics and Reliabilism 
 
 
   John Hick’s work on the philosophy of religion has generated considerable critical 
responses. One of the most explicit and pointed criticisms of the hermeneutical adequacy 
of Hick’s theory is that advanced by Gavin D’Costa. D’Costa argues in a nutshell that 
Hick’s theory is simply inadequate as a general theory about religions precisely because it 
fails to take them on their own terms and reduces their central views and concepts to 
understandings and terms unacceptable to the traditions themselves: ‘it seems to ignore or 
deny the really difficult conflicting truth claims by, in effect, reducing them to 
sameness.’167 This objection by D’Costa is a fair statement of a common reaction to 
Hick’s primary methodological position.  
   This common reaction – often regarded as a decisive objection to Hick’s theory – in 
fact hides its own philosophical presuppositions and it, in turn, leads to a crucial 
misunderstanding about the structure and development of Hick’s theory. This chapter aims 
                                                 
167 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 27.  
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to clarify the philosophical presuppositions of D’Costa and to find an adequate 
philosophical method for understanding the subtlety of Hick’s theory. The first section of 
this chapter examines the characteristic of the common reaction to Hick’s theory. First, 
D’Costa’s interpretation of Hick’s hermeneutics will be examined as one of the common 
reactions to Hick’s theory. Then, an alternative hermeneutics of George Lindbeck will be 
illustrated as another influential approach to religious pluralism. Lastly, the two approaches 
– the common understanding of Hick and an alternative position of Lindbeck – will be 
grasped as contrasting approaches and their hidden philosophical presuppositions will be 
uncovered through an examination of their positions. The second section will turn to the 
field of philosophy of knowledge to clarify philosophical methodologies hidden behind 
the approaches of religious pluralism. First, a method of foundationalism will be illustrated 
and the religious implications will be examined. Then, a method of coherentism will be 
illustrated and the religious implications will be examined. Lastly, a method of reliabilism 
will be illustrated as a reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism. The third 
section will discuss different versions of reliabilism. First, the reliabilism of Alvin I. 
Goldman will be examined as a first systematic position. Then, the reliabilism of Alvin 
Plantinga will be examined as an intervention to the field. Finally, the reliabilism of Ernest 
Sosa will be examined as the most appropriate position to be used as a method to 
understand the subtlety of the structure and development of Hick’s theory.  
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1.  
Two Conflicting Hermeneutics 
 
 
I. AN INTERPRETATION OF JOHN HICK’S HERMENEUTICS 
One of the strongest voices warning of the dangers of Hick’s project is Gavin 
D’Costa.168 His criticism of Hick’s project is that Hick’s central concern to develop a 
meta-theory of religions and a non-evidentialist pragmatic position on religious belief often 
leads to neglecting to take their positions on their own terms and reduces their central views 
and concepts to understanding and terms unacceptable to the traditions themselves. In 
order to grasp this criticism accurately, this section first presents what Hick is saying about 
the hermeneutics of religions: can a premise of a ‘common core’ do justice to the self-
understanding of traditions that seemingly see themselves as believing quite different 
things about the universe and as pursuing quite different ends relative to these beliefs? 
Then D’Costa’s criticism of Hick will be analyzed in some detail.  
   In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick begins the construction of his theory by 
comparing and contrasting two views of religion and religious diversity – the standard 
view and an alternative revisionist view – both of which share the idea that religions are 
                                                 
168 See D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp. 24-29, and 45-52. 
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soteriological in aim, structure, and function but which diverge in interpreting the meaning 
of the diversity of religions.169 The standard view conceives of religions as counterpoised 
rival systems of belief and practice whereby each system claims to have exclusive access 
to ultimate truth as well as the sole means of authentic salvation: ‘each has come … to 
regard itself as uniquely superior to the others.’170  The alternative revisionist view 
proposed and adopted by Hick, in contrast, sees religions as essentially related ‘family’ 
(rather than rival ‘strangers’) that are concerned with the same vital process of moral and 
spiritual transformation (from ego- to reality-orientation) taking different forms in diverse 
cultural and historical settings: ‘each of the world religions comes … to see itself as one 
among many.’171 Particular religions, under this view, are working towards the same goal 
of human transformation in a mutually complementary rather than antagonistic way.  
   It is important to realize that this revisionist conception entails a thesis stronger than a 
more modest claim about a structural aim and pattern common to religions, for it 
incorporates the notion that the same transformational process takes ‘such widely different 
forms and is interpreted in such widely different ways.’ 172  This is a claim about 
substantive identity or overlap among diverse religious traditions, amounting to the 
adoption of a ‘common core’ or ‘unity’ theory of religious pluralism, involving the claim 
                                                 
169 About Hick’s revisionist conception of religion, see Sumner B. Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of 
Religious Pluralism,’ pp. 540-45.  
170 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2.  
171 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2. 
172 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 5.  
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of an underlying literal unity of some sort among all religions. The revisionist view, then, 
embodies a rather substantial thesis about the nature of the world’s religions, for it is, after 
all, a rather short step from claiming ‘the same transformational process’ among different 
religions to claiming that these religions in fact refer in some important ways to the ‘same 
ultimate reality.’ 
It is not surprising to find critics challenging the propriety of this initial hermeneutical 
move of Hick’s theory, for with the revisionist conception Hick is taken considerably far 
in a particular theoretical direction – towards the transcendental unity of all religions. One 
immediate and pressing issue for these critics concerns precisely the adequacy of this move, 
especially considering the fact that its soteriological thesis seems to contradict the self-
understanding of traditions about what they believe and practice. The issue is only made 
more exigent when one considers that, while many historians of religions might be willing 
to admit structural compatibility in regard to cross-traditional soteriological aims, practices, 
and concepts, few seem willing to say that the data permits them to draw the conclusion 
of essential sameness or identity in soteriology cross-traditionally. Most are likely to point 
to large differences in concept and practice that are in turn linked to equally large 
differences in meaning and reference. Thus, at the very outset of Hick’s theory one needs 
to record the serious – and some would say, decisive – reservation that it appears to 
overlook or discount what the religions might say about how to understand properly 
religious beliefs and practices cross traditionally.  
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It is precisely this initial hermeneutical move of Hick’s theory that prompts D’Costa’s 
objection to the adequacy of Hick’s theory. D’Costa suggests that a second-order theory 
such as Hick’s must develop an account that can accommodate traditions’ own orthodox 
understandings of doctrines, beliefs, and concepts without reinterpreting or reducing these 
into other categories. With regard to the specific case at hand – soteriology – D’Costa 
argues that, in adopting ‘the common soteriological goal’173, Hick’s theory is conceptually 
compelled to ignore or reinterpret the key soteriological concepts of various traditions in 
the form of minimizing their differences and claiming that they constitute one essential 
process (transition from self-centredness to Reality-centredness) taking place in different 
contexts: ‘this tendency toward essentialism in the theology of religions ironically hastens 
the closure of dialogue.’174 Indeed, D’Costa even goes so far as to say that ‘there are no 
traditions or positions that are self-evident or neutral’175. According to D’Costa, one can 
never crawl out of one’s own cultural, religious framework. One always views the other 
from one’s own given perspective. 
At the very least, it appears to be D’Costa’s contention that Hick’s revisionist approach 
to religious diversity is unable to accommodate adequately the various soteriological 
claims internal to traditions as these claims are understood within the traditions themselves. 
Hick’s approach is, in short, hermeneutically deficient in its handling of first-order 
                                                 
173 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 26.  
174 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 43.  
175 D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, p. 46.  
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religious traditions and their complexity. This fairly represents one of D’Costa’s major 
objections to Hick’s revisionist conception.  
 
 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE HERMENEUTICS OF GEORGE LINDBECK 
   Before turning to correct D’Costa’s misunderstanding about the structure and 
development of Hick’s theory, this chapter will illustrate an alternative hermeneutics 
proposed by George Lindbeck to make a contrast with the philosophical presuppositions 
of D’Costa and to find an adequate philosophical method for understanding the subtlety 
of Hick’s theory.  
Lindbeck was one of the first scholars to state his ‘growing dissatisfaction with the 
usual ways of thinking about those norms of communal belief and action’176 and his 
conviction that the usual theories in these areas are inadequate to account for a strange but 
undeniable fact of broad agreement on many doctrinal issues by representative 
intellectuals and ecumenicists of historically contrary traditions.  
For example, Lindbeck rejects ‘an inner experience of God common to all human 
beings and all religions.’177 There has been a theory which emphasizes the experiential 
aspects of religion, and ‘interprets doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols 
                                                 
176 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 7. See also Knitter, Theologies of Religions, pp. 178-85.  
177 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 40.  
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of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations.’178 This approach often emphasizes 
the priority of experience over language. In some forms, this approach may consider 
diverse and even contradictory discursive formulations among different religions as 
divergent expressions of the same universal experience of the transcendent or divine reality. 
Lindbeck rejects this option of a universalist hermeneutics which presupposes the same 
experience of the same reality because he wants a theory of religion and doctrine which 
can accommodate doctrinal reconciliation without admitting that one or the other parties 
to reconciliation simply capitulated to the claims of the other. 
Lindbeck contends that his concern can best be explained by what he calls a ‘cultural-
linguistic’ approach to religion:  
 
A religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium 
that shapes the entirety of life and thought.179 
 
Lindbeck proposes that it’s the words and images that are given by religion that give shape 
to religious thought and convictions. Words enable someone to have thoughts in the first 
                                                 
178 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 16. As examples of the experiential-expressive standpoint, 
Lindbeck mentions Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade. See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 16. 
179 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33. According to Lindbeck, the roots of the cultural-
linguistic approach go back on the cultural side to Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, and on the linguistic 
side to Wittgenstein, but it is only rarely and recently that it has become a programmatic approach 
to the study of religion, as for instance, in the philosopher Peter Winch and the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz. As other examples of the cultural-linguistic standpoint, Lindbeck mentions Peter 
Berger, Ninian Smart, and William Christian. See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 20. 
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place. Without religious words, one would not have religious feelings. As Lindbeck puts 
it, it is required first to have ‘external words’180 given by religion and culture before having 
internal words in minds and hearts. The religious language received from the culture 
makes and shapes the very religious experience. Without language, experience is not 
possible at all. It is language that gives experience its particular form. 
   Therefore, an individual identity is not individual at all, but is determined by the 
communal and religious worldview that one is born into. One’s religious identity is not 
only, not primarily, a matter of one’s individual choosing and determination; one’s choices 
are given to one, specified for one, by the religious family one is part of: ‘like a culture or 
language, it [religion] is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of 
individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities.’181  
Given this understanding of cultural language in general and religious language in 
particular, it is evident why Lindbeck is wary of an initial hermeneutical decision to inquire 
what all the religions have in common. Lindbeck suggests that there is nothing that can be 
truly declared ‘common’ to all religions. If one’s language creates one’s world, and if one’s 
language is mutually different, then one’s world will be different with each other, with no 
common ground between them: ‘unlike other perspectives, this approach [the cultural-
linguistic] proposes no common framework.’182 For those who take language and culture 
                                                 
180 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 34.  
181 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33.  
182 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 49.  
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seriously, it’s impossible, or at the least very difficult, to imagine that there is a ‘single 
generic or universal experiential essence’183 within all the different religions. There can be 
no experiential core because the experiences that religion evokes or moulds are as varied 
as the interpretive schemes they embody. Adherents of different religions do not diversely 
thematize the same experience, rather they have different experiences. Religious words 
and religious experience can be understood and are ‘true’ only within the given texts or 
language system of the particular religion. Every religion, Lindbeck observes, offers a 
‘totally comprehensive framework, a universal perspective’184 from which the followers 
of the religion understand everything. Everything fits into that framework, but the 
framework cannot, by definition, be fit into any other framework. If every religion offers 
a perspective that embraces everything and can’t be embraced by a more ultimate 
perspective, then that means no religion will allow itself to be embraced or explained by 
another.  
His approach to other religious neighbours is, Lindbeck holds, the best possible 
foundation for whatever further dialogue might take place. Because it doesn’t presume to 
know what makes each religion tick, it can approach all religions as ‘simply different and 
can proceed to explore their agreements and disagreements without necessarily engaging 
in the invidious comparisons that the assumption of a common experiential core makes so 
                                                 
183 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 23.  
184 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 49.  
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tempting.’185 Lindbeck concludes that even though his position does not produce the same 
‘enthusiasm and warm fellow-feelings’ for dialogue, ‘it does not exclude the development 
of powerful theological rationales for sober and practically efficacious commitment to 
interreligious discussion and dialogue.’186 
 
 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE CONFLICT 
   What D’Costa and Lindbeck share as their philosophical presupposition is the idea that 
there are two kinds of possible approaches to the hermeneutics of religions. On the one 
hand, an approach takes a view that different forms of religious language and belief are 
understood as indicating the same independent and real ultimate divine. This view aims to 
develop a second-order theory to find a common core of religion. On the other hand, 
                                                 
185 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 55.  
186 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 55. In An Interpretation of Religion, John Hick provides a 
multi-dimensional reading of George Lindbeck’s position. According to Hick, Lindbeck treats 
religion as a vast complex of propositions and says that religion is true to the extent that ‘its 
objectives are interiorized and exercised by groups and individuals in such a way as to conform 
them in some measure in the various dimensions of their existence to the ultimate reality and 
goodness that lies at the heart of things.’ According to Hick, there is a certain overlap of conclusions 
between Hick’s and Lindbeck’s, even though Lindbeck’s conceptual system is different from the 
one of Hick. See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 51, quoted in Hick, An Interpretation of 
Religion, pp. 360-61. See also Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 183-84.  
Sue Patterson points out a fundamentally contradictory character of Lindbeck’s The Nature of 
Doctrine, which has both theistic realist and cultural-linguist orientations. See Sue Patterson, Realist 
Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 36-37. 
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another approach takes a view that religious language and belief is understood to conceive 
of divine reality as internally related to practices and to construe religious discourse as 
grammatical rather than referential. This view gives up developing a second-order theory 
and limits the aim to correct recognition of various first-order theories. Both D’Costa and 
Lindbeck assume these two approaches are incompatible, and to put these approaches into 
one coherent view that does justice to each and to the fact of the diversity of religions is 
impossible. It’s a matter of choice and if one view is taken, the other view has to be given 
up.  
   Even though their positions and the subject matter of their criticism are slightly 
different, what underlies their argument as a philosophical presupposition is quite similar. 
D’Costa criticizes John Hick that his approach to religious diversity is unable to 
accommodate adequately the various soteriological claims internal to traditions as these 
claims are understood within the tradition itself. Here D’Costa’s central concern is that 
Hick finds an essence of soteriology from all religions and uses the idea of soteriology as 
a second-order theory to explain the first-order theory of all religions. But such kind of 
promotion of an essence leads it’s proponents to neglect, or even violate, the fact of 
diversity.  
George Lindbeck criticizes as a past approach that it considers diverse and even 
contradictory discursive formulations among different religions as divergent expressions 
of the same universal experience of the transcendent reality. Here Lindbeck’s central 
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concern is that the past approach finds a common core of the experience of transcendent 
reality among all religions and uses the idea of the experience of transcendent reality as a 
second-order theory to explain the first-order theory of all religions. But religions are so 
diverse that there is no existing common ground between them.  
   What they criticize as past approaches has a philosophical presupposition: to find a 
common ground among various positions and impose it on all positions in the name of 
universality. What both D’Costa and Lindbeck refuse is to find the common ground, and 
instead emphasize the incommensurability of one religious worldview with another. 
D’Costa argues that there are no traditions or positions that are self-evident or neutral. All 
religions start from each absolute truth from which they view other religions. Not to admit, 
or be aware of, this is to set up a version of universal truth and lay it on others. Lindbeck 
proposes that it’s the linguistic framework that gives shape to individual experience. 
Religious experience can be understood only within the given language system of the 
particular religion. Every religion offers a totally comprehensive framework from which 
the followers of the religion understand everything. What D’Costa and Lindbeck share as 
their reaction to this past approach is that there is no common ground which can be applied 
to every position and a position can have the meaning only within the comprehensive 
framework of a particular religion.  
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2.  
Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Reliabilism 
 
 
I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGION 
As has been discussed in the previous sections, these conflicting approaches to 
religious diversity hide a philosophical presupposition behind their arguments. This 
chapter will turn to the field of ‘philosophy of knowledge’ to clarify the origin of their 
conflict and to find a philosophical way of reconciliation between the two approaches.  
To clarify the nature of different views on knowledge, Ernest Sosa categorized three 
philosophical positions as ‘foundationalism’, ‘coherentism’, and ‘reliabilism’.187 Ernest 
Sosa explained ‘reliabilism’ as a possible way of reconciliation between the two radically 
different positions of ‘foundationalism’ and ’coherentism’. This method of ‘reliabilism’ 
can be seen as a preparatory methodology to formulate a third way to these conflicting 
approaches to religious diversity. 
The central idea of foundationalism is that all knowledge is founded on what is 
ultimately given. There are ‘rational’ and ‘empirical’ foundationalists:  
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Foundationalism postulates foundations for knowledge – even if they disagree in their 
respective foundations, and disagree on how to erect a superstructure.188  
 
For the rationalist, only rational intuition can give a secure foundation, and only deduction 
can build further knowledge of superstructure on that foundation. Here, the model of 
knowledge is the axiomatic system, with its self-evident axioms and its theorems derived 
through logical deduction. For example, Descartes sketched in his Meditations a strategy 
for rationally founding all knowledge: ‘no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful 
seems fit to be called knowledge.’189 For Descartes, what is obvious is what one knows 
by intuition, what is clear and distinct, what is indubitable and credible with no fear of error. 
Thus for Descartes basic knowledge is always an infallible belief in an indubitable truth. 
All other knowledge must stand on that basis through deductive proof.  
For their part, empiricists accept not only foundations by rational intuition but also 
foundations by sensory experience. Empiricism thus becomes more liberal than 
rationalism in two respects: first, it accepts a broader foundation, provided not only by 
rational intuition but also by sensory experience; second, it admits not only deductive 
reasoning but also inductive reasoning. Hume divided all of human knowledge into two 
categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact.190 Mathematical and logical propositions 
                                                 
188 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective , p. 1.  
189  Descartes, ‘Second Set of Replies,’ in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. II, 
p. 101, quoted in Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, p. 128.  
190 See Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section IV, Part I.  
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are examples of the first, while propositions involving some contingent observation of the 
world are examples of the second. Hume admits ‘two levels of thought: the level of 
philosophical critical thinking which can offer us no assurances against skepticism; and 
the level of everyday thinking are completely overridden and suppressed … by an 
inescapable natural commitment to belief: to believe in the existence of the body and 
inductively based expectations.’191  
These two different types of classical foundationalists – rational and empirical – can 
be seen as presupposing the same philosophical methodology. Because both of them admit 
a particular foundational knowledge which grounds all the other kinds of knowledge, even 
though the empiricist like Hume admits a broader range of foundations. The empiricist can 
be seen to reject radical foundationalism but retain some more moderate form of 
foundationalism.192 
Even though his respective foundation is different from the one of Descartes, the 
philosophical methodology presupposed behind the approach of John Hick can also be 
grasped as a type of ‘foundationalist’. This is because Hick admits an underlying common 
core which can be found within all the religious traditions. The common core is a 
foundation, and a set of differential responses by different religious traditions is a set of 
                                                 
191 Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985, pp. 12-13, quoted in Sosa, Reflective Knowledge, pp. 45-46.  
192 For a contemporary version of foundationalism, see, for example, Roderick M. Chisholm, 
Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 
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different branches of a superstructure built on the foundation. There are various kinds of 
relations between these different religious traditions, but all of these relations go back to 
one ultimate reality. This ultimate reality has a special status, and the foundation is 
supported by none of the different cultural and religious traditions while supporting them 
all.  
This corresponds to the criticisms given by Gavin D’Costa to John Hick. D’Costa’s 
central concern was that Hick is so convinced that some kind of common ground is 
necessary that he cannot open his mind to the possibility that religions are so diverse that 
there is no existing common ground between them. Hick makes up an artificial 
construction of an ultimate ground and imposes its particular viewpoint on all the others in 
the name of universality.  
 
 
II. COHERENTISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGION 
An alternative to the position of ‘foundationalism’ is ‘coherentism.’ The ‘coherentist’ 
rejects the notion of foundation in favour of the one that one’s body of knowledge is a raft 
that floats free of any anchor or tie. Donald Davidson’s ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge’ argues both against foundation and in favour of coherence. An allegedly 
foundationalist idea, that of ‘confrontation between what we believe and reality’ is first 
argued to be ‘absurd’, thus opening the way for coherentism, subsequently offered as the 
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alternative:  
 
What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a 
reason for holding a belief except another belief. Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the 
request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk.193  
 
According to ‘coherentism’ what justifies belief is not that it can be an infallible belief with 
an indubitable object, nor that it has been proved deductively on such a basis, but that it 
can cohere with a comprehensive system of beliefs.194 
George Lindbeck can be seen as a type of ‘coherentist’. This is because Lindbeck 
rejects the search for a common ground that makes all religions valid. He suggests that 
there is nothing that can be truly declared common to all religions. Instead, he understands 
religion as a kind of cultural and linguistic framework. Each cultural and linguistic 
framework is coherent only within each framework and does not have another foundation 
outside the framework. A religious experience has a meaning only within a particular 
cultural and linguistic framework that one is born into. One’s religious identity is not a 
matter of individual choice, but is given to one by the cultural and linguistic family one is 
part of.  
                                                 
193 Donald Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Dieter Henrich, Ed., Kant 
oder Hegel?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983, p. 426, quoted in Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 108.  
194 About other versions of coherentism, see, for example, Quine’s From a Logical Point of View, 
Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, and Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
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A coherence theory of knowledge can be summarized as a view according to which 
there are no basic or foundational beliefs and at least the primary basis for justification is 
the fact that such beliefs fit together and support each other in a variety of complicated 
ways, thus forming a coherent system of beliefs, or perhaps more than one such system. 
This pure kind of coherentism is faced with obvious objections. While it is quite plausible 
that coherence is one element in justification, it is implausible that it is the whole cause of 
justification.  
The idea that justification depends solely on the internal coherence of a system of 
beliefs seems to entail that such justification requires no contact with or input from the 
world outside that system of beliefs. It means that a relation among beliefs that involves 
no contact with the world yields a reason for thinking that the beliefs in question correctly 
describe that world. Then, if the coherentist justification has to do only with the internal 
relations between the members of a system of beliefs, it seems possible in principle to 
invent indefinitely many alternative and conflicting such systems in a purely arbitrary way, 
while still making each of them entirely coherent. But it surely cannot be the case that all 
such systems are thereby justified in the sense of there being good reason for thinking that 
their component beliefs are true and there is obviously no possible way to select among 
them on purely coherentist ground. There seems to be no clear reason in general to think 
that the coherence of a system of beliefs makes it likely that the component beliefs are true 
in the realist sense of corresponding with independent reality, thus making it impossible to 
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understand how coherence can be the basis for justification.195  
Largely for the reasons just noted, it is difficult to seriously advocate a pure coherence 
theory of justification, one in which the coherence of a set of beliefs is claimed to be by 
itself sufficient for justification. There is, first, a claim that an account of justification that 
depends entirely on coherence will have the absurd consequence that contingent, 
seemingly empirical beliefs might be justified in the absence of any sort of informational 
input from the extra-conceptual world that they attempt to describe. This would seem to 
mean in turn that the truth of those beliefs, if they happened to be true, could only be 
accidental in relation to that world, and thus that there could be no genuine reason to think 
that they are true.  
The second objection is that even given a relatively demanding conception of 
coherence, there will still be indefinitely many different possible systems of beliefs in 
relation to any given subject area, each as internally coherent as others. Thus, the members 
of each of these systems will seemingly be on a par as regards justification according to a 
coherentist view.  
When George Lindbeck proposed the cultural-linguistic approach to religion, it also 
has these coherentist kind of problems. It is one thing to see religion as the perspective 
from which one always views everything else; it is quite another to announce that one is 
                                                 
195 See, for example, Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 108-30. See also Knitter, Theologies of 
Religions, pp. 224-37.   
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stuck in that perspective or that the perspective can never change.196 If one takes seriously 
the incommensurability between one religion and another, then it seems that every 
religious person is confined only to his/her own religion. That means, first, that whatever 
appears within one framework is the truth for the framework, and it can’t be questioned by 
another framework for the simple fact that it doesn’t belong to the framework. This implies 
that whatever is declared to be truth for a religion is true only because it is declared as such 
in the religion. Any accidental statement can be a truth for a religion and thus no genuine 
reason is required to be a truth for a religion. Second, many different religious systems are 
equally and internally coherent as others and there can be no relation or communication 
between them. It is impossible to truly talk with and understand another person from 
another religion or tradition, for one can see only what appears on one’s own religious or 
cultural framework. What is beyond a framework is beyond their understanding and 
consideration.  
 
 
III. A METHOD OF RELIABILISM 
    Ernest Sosa proposes the alternative of ‘reliabilism’ as a reconciliation between the 
radically different standpoints of ‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherentism’:  
 
                                                 
196 Paul Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions, p. 224.  
78 
 
Reliabilism requires for the epistemic justification of belief that it be formed by a process 
reliable in an environment normal for the formation of such belief.197  
 
‘Reliabilism’ can be seen as a weak kind of ‘foundationalism’. Every bit of knowledge still 
lies as a foundation of knowledge. But the requirements for the building are now less 
stringent. A belief may now join the base not only through perfectly reliable rational 
intuition but also through the diverse foundations of introspection, perception, memory, 
and so on. And one may now erect a superstructure on such a basis not only by deduction 
but also by induction, both enumerative and hypothetical or explanatory.  
    Rationalism can be viewed as a special case of ‘reliabilism’.198 What Descartes 
requires for knowledge and requires of acceptable sources of knowledge is indeed perfect 
reliability. It is assumed that reason puts us directly and infallibly in touch with certain 
truths from one’s particular perspective and then enables us to reach many other truths, 
again infallibly, through deductive proof. ‘Reliabilism’ grants the narrow scope of perfect 
knowledge, and turns to imperfect but reliable knowledge. This would allow admitting 
sources of knowledge less than infallible. To reconcile the differing reliability of plural 
foundations, equilibrial coherence is required for the formation of an integrated perspective.  
    What is reliable relative to one scope of application may be unreliable relative to 
another, however, which raises the question of the proper scope relative to which one ought 
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to evaluate the likes of observation, memory, reason, and so on. This reflection recalls a 
theme about the relation between truth and inquiry and about the basic seat of inquiry. This 
is because ‘ideally rational inquiry may rather be defined as what would thus lead us to 
the truth’.199 There is no infallible assurance that an appropriate community is realizable 
on earth. It seems best to take a broad historical perspective and to require only that one 
has cognitive faculties well suited to further the progress of rational inquiry beyond one’s 
present stage towards that future ideal stage in which one would have the whole truth, or 
at least a close approximation.  
   What could have been revealed from the examination of ‘reliabilism’ is that both 
‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherentism’ are extreme on the nature of knowledge, and it is 
reasonable enough to take the reliabilist position as an appropriate view. The method of 
‘reliabilism’ can be understood as the combination of two radically different kinds of 
inquiry: (1) an inquiry based on the difference of plural foundations, and (2) an inquiry 
based on the historical process to form a coherent perspective among different foundations. 
The coherent perspective is not to form a foundational basis, but to negotiate an appropriate 
balance among different reliabilities of plural foundations. What are required for the 
appropriate negotiation are the radically different two standpoints of plural foundations 
and a coherent perspective. If one of them is neglected, then ‘reliabilism’ loses its intention. 
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3.  
Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge 
 
 
I. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN 
Before directly turning to an examination of the philosophical position of John Hick, 
it is necessary to explain why Ernest Sosa’s version of ‘reliabilism’ is more suitable to 
apply to the problem of religious diversity than other versions. ‘Reliabilism’ has been a 
growing field since Alvin I. Goldman applied it in a systematic manner to the field of ‘the 
philosophy of knowledge’200 . After the systematization of Goldman, Alvin Plantinga 
intervened in the field with his new interpretation of ‘reliabilism’ 201 . Therefore, if 
‘reliabilism’ will be applied to the religious problem, just to mention Ernest Sosa without 
mentioning Goldman and Plantinga cannot avoid a reproach of intentional neglect. Not 
only Ernest Sosa, but also Alvin I. Goldman and Alvin Plantinga have contributed to the 
development of ‘reliabilism’ in the field of philosophy of knowledge. So this chapter will 
explain why the vision of Ernest Sosa is more suitable to apply to the problem of religious 
                                                 
200 See Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1986. See also D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973. 
201 See Plantinga, Warrant: the Current Debate, and Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. 
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diversity than others.  
Alvin I. Goldman is one of the first philosophers who theorized ‘reliabilism’ in a 
systematic manner. Due to an influence from its initial inspirational field of ‘analytical 
theory of logic’, Goldman understands ‘reliabilism’ as a multiplication of foundations and 
keeps its normative role. Goldman inherits an understanding that a unique field of 
‘reliabilism’ is a normative discipline of ‘philosophical theorizing about knowledge’: ‘the 
evaluation of epistemic procedures, methods, processes, or arrangements must appeal to 
truth-conduciveness, and objective standards of assessment.’202 This is the reason why 
Goldman thinks empirical science is relevant to assessing which beliefs count as 
knowledge and to crafting epistemic norms to guide belief formation so that it yields 
knowledge. A reliabilist understanding of empirical science works as a normative 
discipline to guide other fields of research and consequently the personal and social action 
of human beings.  
Goldman divides the philosophy of knowledge into two parts: individual epistemology 
and social epistemology. Individual epistemology needs help from cognitive sciences: 
‘cognitive science tries to delineate the architecture of the human mind-brain, and an 
understanding of this architecture is essential for primary epistemology.’ 203  Social 
epistemology needs help from various social sciences and humanities: ‘[the social sciences 
and humanities] jointly provide models, facts, and insights into social systems of science, 
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learning, and culture.’204  By the help of these empirical sciences, the philosophy of 
knowledge justifies ‘which practices have a comparatively favorable impact on 
knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance.’205 Individual epistemology asks this 
question for nonsocial practices and it provides how individuals should acquire and weigh 
evidence; social epistemology asks it for social practices and it provides the norms 
governing the social mechanisms that inculcate belief. 
   The revival of epistemology in contemporary analytical philosophy became possible 
only with the innovational method proposed by Goldman. It is Goldman who first 
provided a systematic analysis of plural foundations of knowledge (such as perception, 
memory, representation, internal codes, deductive reasoning, and probability judgment in 
individual epistemology, and testimony, argumentation, communication, and regulation in 
social epistemology), and the plurality of knowledge played an important role to change 
the paradigm of philosophy from non-realistic analysis of language to realistic analysis of 
knowledge. Before Goldman, criticism towards foundationalism was popular in the field 
of philosophy because foundationalism was thought to keep only a narrow foundation. 
After Goldman, philosophy could recover its contact with reality and it became possible 
by systematic analysis of diverse kinds of knowledge.  
However, from the viewpoint of Sosa’s version of reliabilism, Goldman’s method still 
misses an important point of reliabilism. By his understanding of the unique field of 
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205 Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 5.  
83 
 
‘reliabilism’ as a normative discipline, Goldman made his version of ‘reliabilism’ close to 
a type of ‘foundationalism’. This is because if a multiplication of foundations plays a 
normative role, the ‘reliabilism’ loses its intention of making a balance between ‘multiple 
foundations of knowledge’ and ‘a coherent perspective among them’. ‘Reliabilism’ is seen 
as a third way beyond ‘foundationalism’ and ’coherentism’, because ‘reliabilism’ holds its 
tension between plural foundations and a coherent perspective. If it remains as a 
‘reliabilism’, the tension should never be solved, and the balanced position of ambiguity 
must be sustained. If ‘a multiplication of foundations’ is seen as a norm as a whole, it’s just 
to make another kind of indubitable and credible foundation with no fear of error. If 
cognitive science and social science play a role of normative value, it’s just to make another 
field of the ultimately given. Such a notion of ‘norm’ steals the characteristic of a balanced 
position from Goldman’s version of ‘reliabilism’.  
 
 
II. ALVIN PLANTINGA 
This section will examine an alternative version of ‘reliabilism’: that of Alvin Plantinga. 
Plantinga was a latecomer to the debated field of ‘reliabilism’, and he introduced an 
important notion of ‘proper function’ to the field.206 Plantinga deems ‘reliabilism’ to be a 
                                                 
206 See James Beilby, Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga’s Religious 
Epistemology, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 72-89.  
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step in the right direction, but he concurs that what provides warrant to a belief is not 
evidence marshaled in favour of truth-conduciveness. ‘Reliabilism’ overlooks an element 
absolutely crucial to a proper conception of warrant: some specification as to the necessity 
that one’s belief producing faculties are ‘functioning properly’.207  
As it has been seen in the previous section, one of the dominant versions of ‘reliabilism’ 
was that of Alvin I. Goldman. Goldman’s version of ‘reliabilism’ can be seen as a position 
which emphasizes the integrity of the multiplication of sources of knowledge. Integrity of 
multiple sources was used as a normative foundation to ground other fields of research. 
Integrity was used as evidence marshalled in favour of truth-conduciveness. On the 
contrary, Plantinga’s notion of ‘proper function’ can be seen as an emphasis on the 
partiality of the multiplication of sources of knowledge. Each source of knowledge can be 
separated, and what has to be inquired is a proper characteristic of each source of 
knowledge.  
The notion of ‘proper function’ as Plantinga employs the terms is closely correlated 
with the notion of ‘appropriate environment’.208  An automobile might be in perfect 
working order, despite the fact that it will not run well at the top of Pike’s Peak, or under 
water, or on the moon: ‘faculties must be in good working order, and the environment must 
be appropriate for your particular repertoire of epistemic powers’.209 The appropriate 
                                                 
207 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 6. 
208 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 7.  
209 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 7.  
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environment is closely connected with yet another notion: ‘design plan’.210 The design or 
purpose of an organism or artifact is relevant to the specification of what constitutes proper 
function for that organism or artifact: ‘a thing’s design plan is the way the thing in question 
is ‘supposed’ to work, the way in which it works when it is functioning as it ought to, when 
there is nothing wrong with it, when it is not damaged or broken or nonfunctional.’211 A 
cognitive faculty is something the proper function of which is defined or governed by a 
teleological order.  
What has to be mentioned here is that, for Plantinga, to capture a whole picture of the 
diverse environments of the world is supposed to be impossible. And, in spite of the 
impossibility, a partial understanding of the world is supposed to be possible. There are 
quite diverse environments in this world, and to capture the whole picture of these 
environments is impossible for human beings, but to develop a partial understanding of 
the world is possible. The role of ‘philosophical theorizing about knowledge’ is to promote 
the partial understanding of the world. Through a clarification of the proper function of a 
human faculty and its corresponding environment, the partial understanding of the world 
becomes possible.  
This is the reason why Plantinga develops an investigation of a properly Christian 
worldview. One of the most distinctive aspects of Plantinga’s philosophy is his claim that 
‘theistic belief produced by the sensus divinitatis can … be properly basic with respect to 
                                                 
210 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 13.  
211 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 21.  
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warrant’.212  The sensus divinitatis is a belief-producing faculty that under the right 
conditions produces belief that isn’t evidentially based on other beliefs. A belief is basic 
for a given person if it is not based on any other beliefs in that person’s noetic structure. 
Theistic belief is not arrived at by inference or argument, but in a much more immediate 
way. One may hold a warranted belief about the Christian God not on the evidential basis 
of other propositions, but grounded on or occasioned by an appropriate experience. The 
purpose of the sensus divinitatis is to enable us to have true beliefs about God; when it 
functions properly, it ordinarily does produce true beliefs about God. These beliefs 
therefore meet the conditions for warrant; if the beliefs produced are strong enough, then 
they constitute knowledge.  
This clarification of a properly Christian worldview can be seen as an example of 
promoting a partial understanding of the world. One possible problem of Plantinga’s 
version of ‘reliabilism’ is that he is not intending to make a whole picture of the world. 
From the very first, Plantinga gives up the aim of synthesizing different positions into one 
whole perspective and he concentrates only on clarifying a proper function of a human 
faculty and its corresponding environment. A Christian worldview is based only on its 
proper belief-producing faculty and isn’t evidentially based on other beliefs. Here is a 
danger of relativism and the truth of one worldview becoming self-contained. Everything 
makes sense only within the worldview and nothing makes sense outside of it.  
                                                 
212 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp.178-79. The italics is in the original.  
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All of these make Plantinga’s version of ‘reliabilism’ close to a type of ‘coherentism’. 
This is because Plantinga neglects a characteristic of ‘reliabilism’ as a tension between 
plural foundations and a coherent perspective. If there is no possibility of constructing ‘a 
whole coherent perspective’, ‘the plural closed worlds with each proper foundation’ 
becomes separated and can have meaning only within the closed worlds. A possibility of 
integration among the diverse and closed worlds is lost and the way to a substantive reality 
is missed. This is the same danger forced by ‘coherentism’ and the ‘diversity model’ of the 
problem of religious diversity.  
 
 
III. ERNEST SOSA AND THE RELIGIOUS IMPLICATION 
In section 2.3., the method of reliabilism was understood as the combination of two 
radically different kinds of inquiry: (1) an inquiry based on the difference of plural 
foundations, and (2) an inquiry based on the historical process to form a coherent 
perspective among different foundations. Sosa’s method of reliabilism is an attempt to 
combine elements from two contrary methods of foundationalism and coherentism. The 
two methods of foundationalism and coherentism look contradictory, but Sosa tries to 
keep both of the two methods. His attempt at reconciliation can be grasped as granting the 
narrow scope of a perfectly solid standpoint but instead turning to an imperfect but reliable 
standpoint of a wider perspective. The synthesis of the two radically contradictory methods 
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is reasonable because of its considerable subtlety.  
   This is also why Sosa’s version of reliabilism is different from that of Alvin I. Goldman 
or Alvin Plantinga. For Goldman, reliabilism means a promulgation of a norm. Goldman 
understands the method of reliabilism as an establishment of a standard of criteria for 
knowledge. Therefore, the standard is used for guiding other fields of knowledge. For 
Plantinga, reliabilism means a defence of proper function. Plantinga thinks that 
establishing such a standard is impossible and instead proposes a notion of ‘proper 
function’. When Plantinga mentions reliabilism, it means plurality of sources of 
knowledge without integration. Plantinga does not intend to integrate them to establish a 
standard. He emphasizes that each different kind of source of knowledge has a special 
status of proper function and each must be defended as a narrow but solid foundation of 
knowledge. His intention is to isolate a particular type of proper function as a defensible 
source of knowledge.  
   The strategy of Goldman and Plantinga is different and almost contradictory, but both 
of them try to make a perfectly solid standpoint. This is the difference from the reliabilism 
of Sosa. Sosa’s version of reliabilism does not intend to make a perfectly solid standpoint. 
Instead of accepting the limited scope of a perfectly solid standpoint, Sosa takes an 
imperfect but reliable standpoint of a wider perspective. Sosa emphasizes a whole balance 
among different kinds of criteria and history solves the difficult problem of a conflicting 
truth seeking process.  
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   If one takes the reliabilist view on religion, John Hick’s hermeneutics of a revisionist 
view of religion is better understood as an imperfect but reliable standpoint rather than a 
perfectly solid standpoint. Gavin D’Costa criticized Hick for making up an artificial 
construct of an ultimate ground which imposes it’s particular viewpoint on all the others 
in the name of universality. Although D’Costa grasps one side of Hick’s project, he misses 
the other side of Hick’s project.  
When Hick had a claim about substantive identity or overlap among diverse religious 
traditions, the emphasis was not only on the underlying transcendental unity, but also on 
diverse cultural and historical settings of religions. One subtlety of Hick’s method is to take 
these two contradictory standpoints at the same time. When Hick emphasizes the 
transcendental unity of all religions, he always emphasizes the diverse forms of self-
understanding of religion too.  
This reconciliation of two contradictory standpoints is what Hick means when he 
speaks of religions as an essentially related ‘family’ rather than as rival strangers. The 
family is working towards the same goal of human transformation, but the goal is not 
something one can take as fixed. This is because the goal lies beyond the boundaries of 
one’s cultural and historical settings. The goal is to be taken as a necessary hypothesis as it 
is on this basis that one is able to systematize the differences of cultural and historical 
settings. One can never finally succeed in completing a synthesis from the diversity of 
religions, but one should nevertheless be impelled to seek to extend one’s boundaries of 
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those settings as far as possible.  
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Chapter 2.  
 
CRITICS OF HICK 
A Proposal of Reliabilist Ethics 
 
 
   John Hick’s work on the philosophy of religion has generated considerable critical 
response and there are even alternative – some might say divergent or incompatible – 
critical readings of the nature and significance of Hick’s project. Reformed epistemologists 
such as William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga, for example, take a foundationalist position 
and criticise Hick as coherentist,213 while theologians of religions such as Gavin D’Costa 
and S. Mark Heim take a coherentist position and criticise Hick as foundationalist.214 Each 
of these readings argues – on different grounds – that Hick’s theory is based on an 
inadequate position.215 
   Such divergent readings of one theory raise the critical problem of its precise nature 
                                                 
213 See, for example, Alston’s Perceiving God, and Plantinga’s ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious 
Exclusivism’. 
214 See, for example, D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp. 24-29, and 45-52, and 
Heim, Salvations, pp. 13-43.  
215 About incompatible interpretations of Hick’s position, see Twiss, ‘The Philosophy of Religious 
Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His Critics,’ pp. 533-68. 
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and import, as well as posing the question of whether the weaknesses identified, in fact, 
undercut the theory’s validity. In order to answer these questions, this chapter aims to 
clarify the hidden philosophical presuppositions of such divergent critiques and to find an 
adequate philosophical method for understanding the subtlety of Hick’s theory.  
The first section of this chapter will examine the characteristic of William P. Alston’s 
and Alvin Plantinga’s interpretations of John Hick. Philosophical systems of Alston and 
Plantinga depend on different theoretical concepts (religious experience and proper 
function), but they share the same philosophical orientation to emphasize a person. Due to 
the same philosophical orientation, both of them have a somewhat negative understanding 
of current society which allows diversity of religions. Their understanding of Hick is a 
result of their position and their understanding of society. Through an examination of their 
position, Alston’s and Plantinga’s approaches, both of which claim to criticise 
foundationalism, will be grasped as hiding the same philosophical presupposition of weak 
foundationalism.  
   The second section will turn to the examination of Gavin D’Costa’s and S. Mark 
Heim’s interpretation of John Hick. D’Costa and Heim have almost opposite political 
orientations (D’Costa is more conservative, Heim is more liberal), but both of their 
philosophical positions depend on the transformational flexibility of society. D’Costa finds 
the transformational flexibility in Christian society, and Heim finds it in actual practices of 
religious life. As a result of these concerns, they find a static foundation in Hick’s theory. 
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Through an examination of their positions, these two contrasting reactions will be grasped 
as hiding the same philosophical presuppositions of coherentism.  
   The last section will propose a method of reliabilism as reconciliation between 
foundationalism and coherentism. First, the different readings of Hick will be compared 
and contrasted, and the points of controversy will be clarified. Second, an ethical aspect of 
reliabilism will be examined as a conceptual preparation for the appropriate reading of 
Hick. Lastly, reliabilism will be proposed as an appropriate reading of Hick.  
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1.  
Reformed Epistemology 
 
 
I. WILLIAM P. ALSTON 
   In Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, William P. Alston, on 
the one hand, admits that his project of religious epistemology was originally inspired by 
Hick’s Faith and Knowledge216, and, on the other hand, understands and criticizes Hick’s 
project as coherentism which emphasizes the indirect and mediated character of perception 
rather than its direct and unmediated one. 217  This orientation towards direct and 
unmediated perception characterizes Alston’s project, and the direct and unmediated 
perception in his argument is meant to defend a personal belief in a particular religion 
rather than a universal basis for any religious belief. In this sense, the philosophical 
presupposition of Alston can be understood as a weak foundationalism. This section first 
examines Alston’s understanding of Hick’s philosophy of religion, and then Alston’s own 
position will be examined.  
                                                 
216 ‘The earliest sustained attempts to work through my ideas on our experience of God were 
strongly influenced by John Hick’s treatment in Faith and Knowledge (2d ed., 1966)’. See Alston, 
Perceiving God, p. xi.  
217 Alston, Perceiving God, pp. 27-28.  
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   In the beginning of Perceiving God, Alston summarizes his position that ‘the central 
thesis of this book is that experiential awareness of God, or as I shall be saying, the 
perception of God, makes an important contribution to the grounds of religious belief. 
More specifically, a person can become justified in holding certain kinds of beliefs about 
God by virtue of perceiving God as being or doing so-and-so.’218 Here one can see 
Alston’s indebtedness to Hick and also his difference from Hick. For example, in Faith 
and Knowledge, Hick also gives a central importance to the concept of perception:  
 
All conscious experience of the physical world contains an element of interpretation … 
The perceiving mind is thus always in some degree a selecting, relating and synthesizing 
agent.219  
 
A basic characteristic of Hick’s concept of perception is that experience and interpretation 
are always mixed in the perception, and Hick does not admit that there is pure experience 
without interpretation. What is intended in the rejection of pure experience is a sense of 
contradiction in the interpretative perception and a gradual resolution of the contradiction 
that develops little by little through personal as well as world history.  
Alston does not accept Hick’s position as it is. What Alston does not accept is the 
                                                 
218 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 1. The italics is in the original. Alston acknowledges an influence of 
John Hick on his own thinking: ‘the earliest sustained attempts to work through my ideas on our 
experience of God were strongly influenced by John Hick’s treatment in Faith and Knowledge (2nd 
ed., 1966).’ See Alston, Perceiving God, p. xi.  
219 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 108.  
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primacy of interpretation in Hick’s argument. According to Alston, Hick defends a view 
that the chief relationship with God consists in ‘an interpretation of the world as a whole 
as mediating a divine presence and purpose.’220 Alston distinguishes direct and indirect 
perception and categorizes Hick’s concept of perception as indirect perception, or even 
calls it as ‘indirect perceptual recognition’ which is closer to linguistic recognition rather 
than personal perception: ‘this [Hick’s] account of the interpretation of the world and the 
events of one’s life as manifesting a divine presence and purpose sounds like what I termed 
‘indirect perceptual recognition.’221  
   The reason why Alston does not accept Hick’s position is that Hick’s position remains 
uncertain and does not explain genuine certainty of religious belief: ‘I do not agree with 
Hick that all experience of objects involves interpretation … What makes this a matter of 
perceiving the house, rather than just thinking about it or remembering it, is the fact of 
presentation, givenness, the fact that something is presented to consciousness, is 
something of which I am directly aware.’222 As an analogy to understand Hick’s position, 
Alston mentions taking a vapor trail as a sign of the recent presence of a jet plane, but 
without actually seeing the plane. For Alston, Hick’s position is a rejection of personal 
reality. Instead of personal reality, Hick prioritises ambiguous linguistic recognition which 
                                                 
220 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, pp. 114-15, quoted in Alston, Perceiving God, p. 
27.  
221 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 27. The italics is in the original. 
222 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 27. The italics is in the original.  
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never reaches the reality itself. In this sense, Alston understands Hick as coherentist223 and 
criticizes a coherentist aspect of Hick’s argument. What should be noted here is that Alston 
neglects the holistic aspect of Hick’s argument. Hick’s argument has a dual aspect of 
linguistic and holistic. When Hick mentions perception, it includes not only linguistic 
recognition, but also includes evolution and synthesis towards a whole understanding of 
the world. According to Hick, divine presence and purpose is also shown in the evolving 
and synthesizing order of the whole world.  
Instead of Hick’s position of indirect perception, Alston defends the position of direct 
perception: ‘what distinguishes perception from abstract thought is that the object is 
directly presented or immediately present to the subject so that ‘indirect presentation’ 
would be a contradiction in terms.’224  When Alston defends the position of direct 
perception, what is presupposed in the argument is that the direct perception is given to a 
person and the emphasis is on the particularities of a person.  
This point becomes clear by examining Alston’s argument about religious diversity. 
According to Alston, an important point about the problem of religious diversity is a 
personal choice of a particular religion which has meaning only for the specific person, 
                                                 
223  According to Ernest Sosa, coherentism is characterized by the rejection of the notion of 
foundation in favour of the one that one’s body of knowledge is a raft that floats free of any anchor 
or tie. Instead of keeping the position of foundationalism, which supports the confrontation between 
what one believes and reality, coherentism suggests that ‘nothing can be counted as a reason for 
holding a belief except another belief.’ See Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 108. See also the 1st 
chapter of this dissertation.  
224 Alston, Perceiving God, pp. 20-21. The italics is in the original.  
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and abstract thought about religious diversity does not deprive someone of having a 
particular religious belief. Alston says that abstract thought always falls short of giving a 
participant of a particular religious practice confidence that his practice reliably describes 
the one religious reality in the face of rival practices: ‘there is still a need for faith, for 
trusting whatever we do have to go on as providing us with a picture of the situation that 
is close enough to the truth to be a reliable guide to our ultimate destiny. Since it is an 
essential part of the religious package that we hold beliefs that go beyond what is 
conclusively established by such objective indicators as are available to us … it should be 
the reverse of surprising that religious diversity should render us less than fully 
epistemically justified in the beliefs of a particular religion.’225 Alston argues that it is 
rational for practitioners of a particular religion to continue forming beliefs within the 
particular traditions although they do not have available to them an infallible argument for 
the conclusion that a particular religion is, among the plurality of mutually incompatible 
religious traditions, the one that is superior to others: ‘the only rational course for me is to 
sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding 
my activity in the world.’226 For Alston, one (abstract) realm of religious diversity and the 
other (realistic) realm of personal choice are distinctively different fields and, for example, 
Hick’s position is made on the basis of religious diversity227 and Alston’s position is made 
                                                 
225 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 277.  
226 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 274.  
227 ‘Hick’s position … will have to be viewed as a proposal for a reconstruction of religious doxastic 
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on the basis of personal choice. Therefore, Hick’s proposal of religious pluralism is thought 
to destroy the personal choice of a particular religion. This understanding of Hick must be 
questioned, but before examining an appropriate understanding of Hick, this chapter will 
examine Alvin Plantinga’s position.   
 
 
II. ALVIN PLANTINGA 
   Plantinga further developed Alston’s position, and the difference between Alston and 
Plantinga is that Alston takes Christian belief as basically an experiential position, whereas 
Plantinga takes Christian belief as basically a cognitive position. In order to grasp 
Plantinga’s position and his understanding of Hick accurately, this section first presents 
what Plantinga is saying about the epistemic adequacy of Hick’s philosophy of religious 
pluralism and then Plantinga’s own position will be analyzed in some detail. 
   In his paper, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’228 Alvin Plantinga 
divides the argument into two parts: ‘there are initially two different kinds of indictments 
of exclusivism: broadly moral or ethical indictments, and other broadly intellectual or 
                                                 
practices, rather than as a description and evaluation of those practices as they are.’ Alston, 
Perceiving God, p. 265.  
228 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ in Kevin Meeker & Philip 
Quinn (eds.), The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, pp. 172-192. 
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epistemic indictments.’229 The first part is titled as ‘I. Moral Objections to Exclusivism’230 
and the second part is named as ‘II. Epistemic Objections to Exclusivism’.231 John Hick 
is mentioned in each part. Before directly examining Plantinga’s argument on Hick, it is 
necessary to examine how Plantinga sets up the background of the arguments. After the 
examination of the background, the moral part and the epistemic part will be discussed in 
detail.  
   Plantinga begins his argument from the fact of religious diversity: ‘in recent years 
probably more of us western Christians have become aware of the world’s religious 
diversity; we have probably learned more about people of other religious persuasions, and 
we have come to see more clearly that they display what looks like real piety, devoutness, 
and spirituality.’232 Then Plantinga goes on to define what is exclusivism: ‘the exclusivist 
holds that the tenets or some of the tenets of one religion – Christianity, let’s say – are in 
fact true; he adds, naturally enough, that any propositions, including other religious beliefs, 
that are incompatible with those tenets are false.’233 To illustrate the tenets of one religion, 
Plantinga gives an example of his own faith: ‘for example, I believe both (1) The world 
was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing and perfectly good personal being (one that 
holds beliefs, has aims, plans and intentions, and can act to accomplish these aims) and (2) 
                                                 
229 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ pp. 174-75.  
230 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 175.  
231 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 179.  
232 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 174.  
233 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 174.  
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Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way of salvation through 
the incarnation, life, sacrificial death and resurrection of his divine son.’234 In this way, 
Plantinga sets out the basic direction of his argument as reconciliation between ‘the fact of 
religious plurality’ and ‘the exclusivist faith’.  
After that, Plantinga introduces a criticism on exclusivism: ‘there is a fairly widespread 
belief that there is something seriously wrong with exclusivism. It is irrational, or 
egotistical and unjustified or intellectually arrogant, or elitist, or a manifestation of harmful 
pride, or even oppressive and imperialistic.’235 Plantinga characterizes these objections 
not directed to the truth of any propositions someone might accept in the exclusivist way, 
but ‘they are directed to the propriety or rightness of exclusivism.’236 
What is important to realize here is that the Plantinga’s version of exclusivism does not 
aim to refute the other kinds of propositional truth. His aim is not to offer a logical 
foundation to a proposition. That is to say, Plantinga’s exclusivism is not based on the 
content of the proposition, but the exclusivist character of the proposition itself. This 
presupposition is shared with the critics of exclusivism. What the critics question are not 
any contents of exclusivist belief, but the propriety of excluding one proposition from other 
propositions. If one misses the characteristic of this initial presupposition, one misses the 
central argument of Plantinga.   
                                                 
234 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 173. 
235 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 174.  
236 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 174. The italics is in the original.  
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On the basis of this setting up of the background, Plantinga moves on to the first part 
on moral objections. Before examining the moral objection, Plantinga examines the 
conditions within which his version of exclusivism makes sense: ‘(1) being rather fully 
aware of other religions, (2) knowing that there is much that at the least looks like genuine 
piety and devoutness in them, and (3) believing that you know of no arguments that would 
necessarily convince all or most honest and intelligent dissenters of your own religious 
allegiances.’237  
The first condition is the initial plurality of religion. Plantinga’s exclusivism means to 
choose one position among others. The second is the personal religious conviction. To 
choose one position among others, there must be a reason. In this case, the reason is not a 
rational foundation, but personal piety or devoutness. The third is a negative reason of no 
other defeating reasons. Because of the convictional character of the reason, the reason for 
a religious conviction cannot be a positive reason by itself. The reason must accompany 
another reason of no other defeating reasons.  
After this clarification of the condition, Plantinga defines a moral objection to 
exclusivism: ‘the exclusivist is intellectually arrogant, or egotistical, or self-servingly 
arbitrary, or dishonest, or imperialistic, or oppressive.’238 The moral objection blames 
exclusivism for being guilty of some or all of these things. Plantinga mentions Hick as a 
typical example of these objections. Plantinga quotes several sentences from Hick’s An 
                                                 
237 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 176. 
238 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 175.  
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Interpretation of Religion: ‘nor can we reasonably claim that our own forms of religious 
experience, together with that of the tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst 
others are not. We can of course claim this; and indeed virtually every religious tradition 
has done so, regarding alternative forms of religion either as false or as confused and 
inferior versions of itself.’239  
What is important to realize here is that John Hick doesn’t discuss the content of 
religious tradition either. Like Plantinga, what is important to Hick is also the propriety or 
rightness of one religion. There is a difference of proposition and cultural tradition. Hick 
thinks that a religion is based on its cultural tradition, while Plantinga thinks that a religion 
is based on its propositional truth. But both of them make the argument on the basis of 
propriety or rightness.  
That is the reason why both of them start the argument from the initial plurality of 
religion. The initial plurality cannot be questioned, because the choice of one religion is 
not based on an infallible rationality. For both Plantinga and Hick, the authority of one 
religion comes from the personal religious conviction like personal piety or devoutness. In 
either case, there must be some arbitrariness. Because of this arbitrariness, the authority of 
one religion – whether proposition or cultural tradition – cannot undermine the other 
religions. 
From these similar concerns, Hick and Plantinga draw out slightly different 
                                                 
239 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235, quoted in Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of 
Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 191.  
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conclusions. The conclusion of Hick is a more holistic direction of pluralism: ‘persons 
living within other traditions, then, are equally justified in trusting their own distinctive 
religious experience and in forming their beliefs on the basis of it … let us avoid the 
implausibly arbitrary dogma that religious experience is all delusory with the single 
exception of the particular form enjoyed by the one who is speaking.’240 
On the contrary, Plantinga argues that if the exclusivist believes a proposition, then 
‘she must also believe that those who believe something incompatible with them are 
mistaken and believe what is false.’241 Plantinga says that what is important is exclusivity 
itself and that exclusivity helps to keep the authority of one religion: ‘she must therefore 
see herself as privileged with respect to those others … There is something of great value, 
she must think, that she has and they lack’.242 The exclusivity is not based on content, so 
it cannot refute other propositions. But the other religion’s propositions cannot refute the 
exclusivity of one’s own either: ‘as an exclusivist, I realize that I can’t convince others that 
they should believe as I do, but I nonetheless continue to believe as I do.’243 
In the end, Plantinga says that the position of John Hick is the same as his own. The 
pluralists like Hick also divide two different realms and choose one as true and the other 
as false: ‘those pluralists, like Hick, hold that such propositions as (1) and (2) and their 
                                                 
240 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235, quoted in Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of 
Religious Exclusivism,’ p.191. 
241 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 176. 
242 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 176. The italics is in the original.  
243 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 177. 
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colleagues from other faiths are literally false, although in some way still valid responses 
to the Real.’244 Plantinga says that Hick takes the literal realm as false and the mythical or 
allegorical realm to be true, so the pluralists’ position is also exclusivist and the charge of 
arrogance is also valid for them. 
This understanding of Hick is foundational, because the mythical realm is serving as a 
foundation on which the literal realm is built.245 But is this characterization of John Hick 
as exclusivist really appropriate? Or, does his position include more contradictions within 
it? Is it impossible to think the relation of the literal realm and the mythical realm as a 
mixed whole rather than a choice of either/or? These questions will be discussed in the 
later section. 246  As for now, this section will examine the epistemic objections to 
exclusivism. Plantinga divides the epistemic objections into three parts: A. Justification, B. 
Irrationality, and C. Warrant. Plantinga discusses John Hick in Part C, so this section 
briefly reviews Part A and B, and examines Part C.  
In Part A, Plantinga starts the argument by examining the claim that to hold exclusivist 
views is unjustified. Plantinga gives two possibilities of what this means. The first 
possibility goes back to Descartes and Locke: ‘having violated no intellectual or cognitive 
                                                 
244 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 177. 
245 In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga argues that the philosophy of John Hick has two 
contradictory elements and therefore it fails to be valid. See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 
pp. 43-63.  
246 The problem of the literal and mythical understanding of religion will be discussed in the 6th 
chapter of this dissertation.  
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duties or obligations in the formation and sustenance of the belief in question.’247 That is 
to say, the exclusivist belief is not derived from self-evident or incorrigible evidence. 
Plantinga does not give a clear answer to this classical foundational criticism: ‘at present 
there is widespread (and as I see it, correct) agreement that there is no duty of the Lockean 
kind.’248 
The second possibility is that ‘exclusivism is intellectually arbitrary.’249 To answer 
this objection, Plantinga says that exclusivism is not arbitrary. This is because, Plantinga 
explains, the objection is assuming the beliefs in question are on a par in the face of the 
plurality of conflicting religious beliefs: ‘there is an intellectual duty to treat similar cases 
similarly.’250 But the belief in question is not on a par, and each belief is exclusively 
different. If an exclusivist thinks a proposition is true, it means those incompatible with it 
are false: ‘as an exclusivist, I do think (nonculpably, I hope) that they are not on a par.’251 
                                                 
247 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 180.  
248 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 180. In his other books, Plantinga 
gives a detailed argument to refute classical foundationalism. For example, in God and Other Mind, 
Plantinga argues that the lengthy and august tradition of natural theology and evidentialism 
regarding belief in God was mistaken. Just as the absence of a compelling argument does not 
disqualify belief in the existence of other minds as a rational belief, the absence of a compelling 
argument should not disqualify belief in the existence of God. In ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ 
Plantinga develops this assertion to a greater degree of complexity and suggests that belief in God 
need not be based on arguments or evidence at all. See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell, 1967. Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’ in Faith and Rationality: 
Reason and Belief in God, pp. 16-93.  
249 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 180. The italics is in the original.  
250 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 180.  
251 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 181.  
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What should be mentioned here is that Plantinga denies self-evident or incorrigible 
evidence, but defends the exclusivity of a proposition. If a proposition is not based on self-
evident or incorrigible evidence, there must be something arbitrary in the proposition. But 
Plantinga tries to avoid the arbitrariness by articulating the exclusivity of a proposition. 
This is the reason why Plantinga says that a religious proposition is not for everyone, but 
the proposition is only personally valid: ‘[proposition] (1) and (2), after all, seem to me to 
be true; they have for me the phenomenology that accompanies that seeming.’252 The 
phenomenology here means that the proposition is only personally meaningful. The 
proposition is personally limited, but has a solid basis.  
Plantinga relates this limited solidity of a proposition to John Calvin: ‘if … John Calvin 
is right in thinking that there is such a thing as the Sensus Divinitatis and the Internal 
Testimony of the Holy Spirit, then perhaps (1) and (2) are produced in me by those belief-
producing processes.’253 The Sensus Divinitatis or the Internal Testimony of the Holy 
Spirit does not have self-evident or incorrigible evidence, so the validity is limited to a 
personal matter. But the validity is internally articulated and has enough validity to 
believe.254 
                                                 
252 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 181.  
253 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 181.  
254 Plantinga explains Calvin’s idea of the Sensus Divinitatis in Warranted Christian Belief. 
According to Calvin, there is a sort of instinct, a natural human tendency, a disposition, a nisus to 
form beliefs about God under a variety of conditions. Calvin calls this tendency a Sensus 
Divinitatis or sense of divinity. The functioning of the Sensus Divinitatis requires a little maturity, 
but the deliverances of the Sensus Divinitatis are not inferential. It works in an immediate way. 
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Finally, Plantinga criticises pluralism. Plantinga identifies pluralism with the view to 
treat all religions on a par: ‘I can go wrong that way as well as any other, treating all 
religions, or all philosophical thoughts, or all moral views, as on a par.’255 Plantinga says 
that pluralism tries to avoid the risk of defending a particular religious position. In this sense, 
pluralism tries to escape exclusivity, but there is no way to avoid exclusivity: ‘there is no 
safe haven here, no way to avoid risk.’256 
Plantinga’s criticism of pluralism here is close to Alston’s criticism of Hick. According 
to Alston, Hick’s position accepts the primacy of interpretation, and therefore his position 
necessarily remains uncertain and cannot theorize a certainty of direct awareness that is 
given as a personal reality. For Alston, there is social diversity of religion on the one hand, 
and personal choice on the other. Likewise, Plantinga also points out a weakness of 
pluralism which treats all religions as equally valid and therefore fails to defend a particular 
religious position. This is an understanding of Hick as a coherentist, and both Alston and 
Plantinga start their arguments from a primacy of personal perspective.  
In Part B, Plantinga articulates the idea of rationality as sanity and proper function. This 
idea of rationality is Aristotelian rationality: ‘a person is rational in this sense when no 
                                                 
The beliefs of the Sensus Divinitatis are properly basic. See Plantinga, Warranted Christian 
Belief, pp. 168-186. See also, John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. 
McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, London: SCM Press, 1961, I, iii, 3, p. 46, quoted in 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 172.  
255 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 182.  
256 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 182.  
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malfunction obstructs her use of the faculties by virtue of the possession of which she is 
rational in the Aristotelian sense.’257 Rationality as sanity does not require possession of 
particularly exalted rational faculties: ‘it requires only normality (in the nonstatistical 
sense) or health, or proper function.’258 Plantinga does not examine this idea of rationality 
in detail, and instead goes next to Part C. This is because this idea of rationality is closely 
related with the idea of warrant.  
The third objection to exclusivism is that ‘the exclusivist doesn’t have warrant.’259 
According to Plantinga, the pluralist declares that ‘at any rate the exclusivist certainly can’t 
know that his exclusivistic views are true.’260 Plantinga quotes John Hick to exemplify the 
objection:  
 
For it is evident that in some ninety-nine percent of cases the religion which an 
individual professes and to which he or she adheres depends upon the accidents of birth. 
Someone born to Buddhist parents in Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone 
born to Muslim parents in Saudi Arabia to be Muslim, someone born to Christian 
parents in Mexico to be a Christian, and so on.261  
 
This objection says that a religious belief is not justified by its foundational content, but is 
                                                 
257 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ pp. 185-86.  
258 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 186.  
259 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 186.  
260 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 186.  
261 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2, quoted in Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious 
Exclusivism,’ p. 187.  
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justified by a cultural-linguistic framework within which the religious belief is embedded. 
A religion like Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity is understood to be a closed grammatical 
framework, and a belief becomes coherent only within the framework. So it seems to be a 
coherentist objection to a foundational exclusivism.  
Against Hick’s coherentist objection, Plantinga tries to defend foundational 
exclusivism. Firstly, Plantinga interprets the coherentist objection as a total negation of any 
religious beliefs: ‘does it follow … that I ought not to accept the religious views that I have 
been brought up to accept, or the ones that I find myself inclined to accept, or the ones that 
seem to me to be true?’262 Plantinga denies the objection. It is because if one accepts the 
objection, the idea of truth itself becomes impossible. If one has to give up the idea of truth 
because of its relativity or locality, the idea of truth becomes nonsense.  
Then Plantinga argues for his idea of ‘proper functionalism’. 263  The proper 
functionalism approximately means that ‘S knows p iff … the belief that p is produced in 
S by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly (working as they ought to work, 
suffering from no dysfunction).’264 The central point of the idea is that the properly 
functioning faculty is in the middle between true and false. The properly functioning 
                                                 
262 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 187. 
263 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 188. Plantinga explains this idea 
of proper function in detain in Warrant and Proper Function: ‘a belief has warrant for you only if 
your cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, working the way it ought to work, in producing 
and sustaining it.’ See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 4.  
264 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ pp. 188-89.  
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faculty does not directly conclude the truth or falsity of a proposition, but it implies a certain 
kind of rationality which comes from a certain kind of cognitive faculty. There are diverse 
kinds of cognitive faculties and just one kind of cognitive faculty does not serve as self-
evident or incorrigible evidence. But it gives a certain kind of aptness to a proposition. It is 
not a strong kind of foundationalism, but a weak kind of foundationalism.  
Finally, Plantinga shows an alternative interpretation of pluralism. Plantinga says that 
pluralism is not a rebutting defeater, but an undercutting defeater: ‘it calls into question, to 
some degree or other, the sources of one’s belief.’265 From the alternative interpretation, 
pluralism does not mean a total negation of any religious beliefs. Instead, it means to 
‘reduce the level of confidence or degree of belief in the proposition in question.’266 
According to Plantinga, many or most exclusivists are aware of this alternative type of 
pluralism.  
One possible consequence of this situation is a miserable condition from a Christian 
perspective. It is because it may deprive believers of some of the comfort and peace the 
Lord has promised his followers: ‘if he hadn’t known the facts of pluralism, then he would 
have known [propositions] (1) and (2), but now that he does know those facts, he doesn’t 
know (1) and (2).’267 Pluralism might deprive the exclusivist of the knowledge that 
                                                 
265 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 189. 
266 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 189. 
267 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ pp. 189-90. The italics is in the 
original. 
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Christianity is true, even if they are true and one believes that they are.  
However, this is not a necessary route: ‘a fresh or heightened awareness of the facts of 
religious pluralism could bring about a reappraisal of one’s religious life, a reawakening, 
a new or renewed and deepened grasp and apprehension of (1) and (2).’268 Plantinga says 
that the fact of plurality does not necessarily weaken one’s exclusive religious life, but it 
could serve as an occasion for a renewed and more powerful working of one’s religious 
belief: ‘in that way knowledge of the facts of pluralism could initially serve as a defeater, 
but in the long run have precisely the opposite effect.’269 
What should be noted here is that Plantinga does not necessarily deny every kind of 
pluralism. The pluralism that Plantinga denies is just one type of strong pluralism, and 
Plantinga accepts his alternative version of weak pluralism. Plantinga’s alternative version 
of weak pluralism is compatible with his version of weak exclusivism. Plantinga 
presupposes the initial fact of religious plurality, which is the reason why he creates the 
idea of proper function to weaken the validity of religious exclusivism. Christian belief is 
not an infallible truth for everyone, and so it has only a weak foundation. But the weakness 
does not mean that the belief is false, but that the Christian belief is a matter of choice rather 
than a logical inference. According to Plantinga, this weak kind of exclusivism and 
pluralism is more appropriate for Christian belief.  
 
                                                 
268 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 190.  
269 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 190.  
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III. A PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF WEAK FOUNDATIONALISM  
   Before directly examining Hick’s position and an adequate philosophical framework 
to understand it, it is necessary to understand correctly the philosophical presupposition 
hidden behind these critiques of Hick. Therefore, this section will examine the 
philosophical presuppositions of William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga. Some concepts 
of Ernest Sosa and George Lindbeck will be used in the examination.270  
   Alston’s contribution to the philosophy of religion lies in his theorization of a reliability 
of a particular religion. What is shown in Alston’s argument is a reduction of certainty and 
an emphasis on the uniqueness of personal choice (‘the only rational course for me is to sit 
tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my 
activity in the world’271). According to Alston, a characteristic of faith is a choice of 
something uncertain which does not have a demonstrative evidence. It is uncertain but 
there is a strong motivation for the personal choice of it, so it has its own kind of 
reasonability. Alston’s position is not simply based on pure experience, but he is fully 
aware of this idea of an own kind of reasonability. This position of Alston can be 
understood as a weak foundationalism.  
However, by connecting the reliability of a particular religion with the concept of direct 
                                                 
270 On the adequacy to use their concepts, see the 1st chapter of this dissertation. 
271 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 274.  
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perception, Alston fails to theorize how serious the requirement of coherence is in 
contemporary society. For example, when Alston divides the two distinctive realms of 
religious diversity and personal choice and defends the realm of personal choice (‘it is an 
essential part of the religious package that we hold beliefs that go beyond what is 
conclusively established by such objective indicators as are available to us’272), Alston fails 
to take seriously the requirement of coherence in contemporary society. This point will 
become clear with an examination of Plantinga’s argument.  
   Alston and Plantinga make a similar argument, but there is a subtle difference, and the 
subtle difference is shown in their attitude about religious diversity. Alston believes that a 
distinction between two different realms (‘a social situation of religious diversity’ and 
‘personal choice of a particular religion’) is possible, but Plantinga’s attitude is more 
nuanced. Plantinga accepts religious diversity as a miserable, but necessary starting point. 
For example, Plantinga starts the argument from the initial plurality of religion: ‘in recent 
years probably more of us Christians have become aware of the world’s religious 
diversity.’273 Plantinga keeps this awareness of the world’s religious diversity throughout 
his argument, and this is important because this awareness is taken as a necessary 
requirement of coherence in the current religious situation.  
   If a religion becomes true only because it has a cultural-linguistic framework274, is it 
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273 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 174.  
274 The cultural-linguistic view of religion by George Lindbeck can be seen as an application of 
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possible for a believer to have a solid confidence in the religion? If a religious belief is 
something like a raft that floats free of any anchor or tie, can one call it a religion? This is 
the fundamental problem for Plantinga, and his entire argument can be seen as a project 
which tries to recover personality after the threat of the requirement of coherence in 
contemporary society. Plantinga sees plurality of religions as a necessarily miserable 
condition. If a believer hadn’t known the facts of plurality, he would have lived in a 
comfort and peace. But now that he does know the facts of plurality, he cannot live in a 
comfort and peace.275 This is Plantinga’s reluctant acceptance of the requirement of 
coherence in contemporary society.  
Then, in that miserable situation, what can a religion provide for a believer without 
contradicting the requirement of coherence? Plantinga provides three conditions as an 
environment of exclusivism: (1) being fully aware of other religions, (2) knowing that 
there is much that at the least looks like genuine piety and devoutness in them, (3) believing 
that you know of no arguments that would necessarily convince all or most honest and 
intelligent dissenters of your own religious allegiances.276  
                                                 
coherentism into the field of religion. Lindbeck explains the cultural-linguistic view as the rejection 
of a common ground that makes religions all valid: ‘a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural 
and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought.’ Each cultural 
and linguistic framework is coherent only within each framework and does not have another 
foundation outside the framework. Therefore, one’s religious identity is not a matter of choice, but 
is given to one by the cultural and linguistic family we are part of. See Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine, p. 33. See also the 1st chapter of this dissertation.  
275 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ pp. 188-89. 
276 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 176.  
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Here one can see what Plantinga thinks to be a foundation of religion and there is his 
own version of foundationalism277 in it. None of the three conditions of Plantinga works 
as a strong foundation which secures all the other knowledge on the basis of it. But they 
are working together as a limited foundation which gives security to the limited field of 
knowledge. The first condition can be seen as an awareness of coherence in society (1. 
being fully aware of other religions). The second condition can be seen as a weak kind of 
experiential-expressive standpoint, because it is valid only with the third condition (2. 
genuine piety and devoutness). The third condition can be seen as a weak kind of 
propositional-realist standpoint. It is because the proposition is not working to found other 
propositions, but is working only to secure its own proposition (3. one knows of no 
arguments that would necessarily convince all or most honest and intelligent dissenters of 
one’s own religious allegiances). 
What Plantinga explains as Christian truth (the Sensus Divinitatis and the Internal 
                                                 
277 Ernest Sosa defined the central idea of foundationalism that all knowledge is founded on what 
is ultimately given and there are two kinds of foundationalist: ‘rational’ and ‘empirical’. See. Sosa, 
Knowledge in Perspective, p. 1. See also the 1st chapter of this dissertation.  
The propositional-realist standpoint and the experiential-expressive standpoint by George 
Lindbeck can be seen as religious counterpart of foundationalism. The propositional-realist 
standpoint emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in which doctrines 
function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities: ‘for a propositionalist, 
if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false.’ The experiential-
expressive standpoint interprets doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner 
feelings, attitudes, or existential orientation: ‘for experiential-expressive symbolist … religiously 
significant meanings can vary while doctrines remain the same, and conversely, doctrines can alter 
without change of meaning.’ See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 16-17.  
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Testimony of Holy Spirit)278 corresponds to these conditions. The Christian truth can be 
categorized neither as a propositional-realist standpoint nor as an experiential-expressive 
standpoint, but it works as a mixture of both. It also works as a weak foundation and is 
compatible with the requirement of religious coherentism.  
Plantinga coined the term, ‘proper function’279 , to conceptualize this situation. Its 
central idea is that the properly functioning faculty does not directly conclude the truth or 
falsity of a proposition, but it implies a certain kind of rationality which comes from a 
certain kind of cognitive faculty. Instead of a strong idea of truth, it introduces a weak idea 
of truth. A negative point of the idea is that ‘a certain kind of cognitive faculty’ is too 
obscure and any cognitive faculty can be a properly functioning faculty. That is, if a 
proposition is neither truth or false, any proposition can be a candidate for truth. A positive 
point is that the idea of proper function can be expected to find a new category of 
knowledge. Without the idea of proper function, the idea of truth has been based on only 
‘rationality’ and ‘experience’. The idea of proper function provides a possibility of finding 
a new meaning for what has been traditionally neglected. What Plantinga did to Christian 
truth is that kind of procedure.  
From these examinations, what could be known is that Alston began to theorize a weak 
foundationalism, but it had a limitation in the rejection of coherentism. Plantinga further 
developed Alston’s position, and Plantinga gave a more nuanced version of weak 
                                                 
278 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 181.  
279 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p. 188.  
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foundationalism, which presupposes the idea of coherentism. If one carefully follows 
Plantinga’s argument, it can be seen that coherentism does not necessarily violate 
foundationalism. This is a big contribution of Plantinga to the philosophy of religious 
pluralism. Furthermore, the examination of his idea of ‘proper function’ reveals that the 
idea of proper function can give a more positive meaning to the plurality of religion. It is 
still under development, but the idea of proper function is expected to work as a more 
appropriate criterion in the field of religion.  
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2. 
 Theologians of Religions 
 
 
I. GAVIN D’COSTA 
   Before examining the appropriate reading of John Hick, this section will turn to a 
different kind of a more coherentist critique of Hick. In his book, The Meeting of Religions 
and the Trinity, D’Costa provides his mature reading of Hick.280 The basic argument of 
D’Costa is theological, and the philosophical reading of D’Costa might give an impression 
of distorting the original intention of D’Costa. However, on the basis of this recognition, 
this section will offer a philosophical reading of D’Costa as a possible argument which can 
be newly developed from D’Costa’s original argument.  
   Before examining the position of John Hick, Gavin D’Costa characterizes his 
understanding of pluralism: ‘all religions (with qualifications) lead to the same divine 
reality; there is no privileged self-manifestations of the divine; and finally, religious 
harmony will follow if tradition-specific (exclusivist) approaches which allegedly claim 
monopoly over the truth are abandoned in favor of pluralist approaches which recognize 
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that all religions display the truth in differing ways.’281   
   What can be seen from this understanding of pluralism is that D’Costa makes a clear 
distinction between pluralism and exclusivism. If one accepts pluralism, it inevitably 
entails the denial of exclusivism. This starting point is different from that of Plantinga. 
Plantinga starts his arguments from the necessary background of religious plurality, and 
then seeks a way to reconcile exclusivism with the fact of religious plurality. It is necessary 
to examine D’Costa’s reason for separating pluralism and exclusivism.  
   D’Costa illustrates two consequences of his argument. First, pluralism does not work: 
‘pluralists simply present themselves as honest brothers to disputing parties, while 
concealing the fact that they represent yet another party which invites the disputants 
actually to leave their parties and join the pluralist one.’282 D’Costa thinks that there is an 
option not to choose pluralism.  
   The second consequence of D’Costa’s argument is that: ‘our Christian pluralists … in 
fact espouse one of the ‘gods’ of modernity: unitarian, deistic or agnostic. The Trinitarian 
God can find no place within such ‘Christian’ approaches.’283 What can be seen from this 
statement is that, in D’Costa’s understanding, ‘the modern pluralist’ belongs to one 
cultural-linguistic group and ‘the Trinitarian Christianity’ belongs to another cultural-
linguistic group. These two cultural-linguistic groups are in conflict and one is forced to 
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choose between them.  
   D’Costa relates Hick’s project with liberal modernity: ‘Hick’s ‘pluralism’ masks the 
advocation of liberal modernity’s ‘god,’ in this case a form of ethical agnosticism.’284 
Here the un-capitalized ‘god’ is used in a bad sense. Hick’s ethical agnosticism tries to be 
God, but it fails. The ethics tries to invalidate the content of a religion and instead places 
ethics at the centre of our lives. We are forced to choose either ethics or religion. But the 
project necessarily fails, because it does not have a solid ground of content. Ethics is 
nothing more than an artificial construct and it cannot be substituted for the real religion.  
   According to D’Costa, a hidden presupposition of the liberal modernity is ‘the attempt 
to turn history into ‘Essences,’ a restless drive which will not cease until modernity has 
‘fixated this world into an object which can be forever possessed, catalogued its riches, 
embalmed it, and injected into reality some purifying essence which will stop its 
transformation’.’ 285  What is important here is that D’Costa contrasts essence and 
transformation and defends the side of transformation. In D’Costa’s understanding, 
modernity is artificial and static and stops the ongoing history of the human being, whereas 
the Christian tradition is rich and lively and enables the engagement into the transformative 
wholeness of human reality. This understanding of modernity is arbitrary and questionable, 
but what is more important is what D’Costa defends against the threat of modernity.  
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285 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp. 26-27. The quotation is from Roland 
Barthes, Mythologies, London: Paladin, 1983, p.155.  
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   D’Costa’s understanding of the tradition of Christianity can be grasped from his 
understanding of ethics. D’Costa does not deny ethics in general. What D’Costa criticises 
is the modern version of liberal ethics, and instead D’Costa defends Thomist virtue ethics: 
‘those religions where ethics is viewed as intrinsically related to the life of the community, 
in response to a particular revelation, and which, therefore, place a significant emphasis on 
the precise narrative context of ethics rather than its instrumental outcome, such as 
Thomistic virtue ethics, are marginalized and occluded within Hick’s system.’286 From 
this statement, it can be seen that what D’Costa defends is a tradition of community. In the 
tradition of community, a narrative of Christianity has been cultivated after a long period 
of time and it is not something which can easily be replaced. Virtue ethics has long been 
inherited over the generations. If the tradition of Christianity is removed according to the 
abstract ideal of John Hick, that removal leads to a vital destruction of community.  
   If one carefully reads the text of D’Costa, one can know that D’Costa does not 
necessarily deny pluralism. D’Costa says that Christianity can embrace pluralism: ‘my 
trinitarian orientation may better attain the real goals of pluralists, ‘openness,’ ‘tolerance,’ 
and ‘equality’.’287 According to D’Costa, the tradition of Christianity is more appropriate 
for embracing pluralism than modern liberalism. The reason for this can be inferred from 
D’Costa’s basic position. D’Costa claims that the tradition of Christianity is richer and 
allows more diversity, whereas modern liberalism is more flat and accepts only a narrow 
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standard. The tradition of Christianity is flexible and has plenty of plasticity which accepts 
the unknown stranger. This flexibility becomes possible because the tradition of 
Christianity is based on a deeper understanding of reality, which centres on the abundance 
of the world. 
   From this examination of D’Costa, it can be seen that D’Costa provids an alternative 
understanding of pluralism. For D’Costa, the pluralism of modern liberalists means 
distributing equal rights to all the religions. Every religion has equal value and each person 
must be free to choose any religion. D’Costa questions this very basic presupposition. If 
one thinks that every religion has the same value, that understanding itself will impoverish 
one’s religious life. Religion is not a problem of choice, but an organic worldview. If there 
is diversity contained in religion, that diversity is a consequence of a long history of 
cultivation. If one changes religion in a short period of time, it must reduce the richness of 
religion.  
 
 II. S. MARK HEIM 
   This section will turn to another coherentist critique of Hick. In his book, Salvations, 
S. Mark Heim provides his reading of Hick.288 Like D’Costa, the basic argument of Heim 
is also theological, and the philosophical reading of Heim might give an impression of 
distorting the original intention of Heim again. However, on the basis of this recognition, 
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this section will further offer a philosophical reading of Heim as a possible argument which 
can be newly developed from Heim’s original argument. 
   S. Mark Heim understands that the most important aspect of Hick’s theory lies in its 
totalities: ‘Hick asks if there are criteria by which to judge different religious traditions as 
totalities.’289 The criteria, which enable the totality of religion, are soteriology and ethics: 
‘there is then an ethical test for how well each religion is realizing the common religious 
end they all seek.’290  
   S. Mark Heim says that Hick does not aim to destroy cognitive and experiential 
particularities of religion. Instead, what Hick intends to do is more likely to include these 
cognitive and experiential particularities within a common total reality: ‘it grounds the 
cognitive and experiential cores of the great religious traditions in one common object and 
one common salvific process, whose character Hick describes.’ 291  In Hick’s 
understanding, all particularities of religion eventually lose their meaning without the 
totality of the whole reality and this is the reason why he provides a meta-religious 
perspective: ‘he provides a meta-religious perspective which accounts for the religions’ 
specific beliefs, practices, and objects as culturally variant versions of the reality and 
process he posits.’292 
                                                 
289 Heim, Salvations, p. 15.  
290 Heim, Salvations, p. 15. 
291 Heim, Salvations, p. 16. 
292 Heim, Salvations, p. 16. 
125 
 
   It means that, in Heim’s interpretation, Hick is not a liberalist. But he is more likely a 
mystic. For example, Hick has an idea of ‘religious ambiguity of the universe.’293 Hick 
uses the concept of ambiguity in a good sense. This is because ambiguity has the 
connotation of creative and transformative power of the universe. This ambiguity is the 
same as what is theologically regarded as ‘epistemic distance’294. The limitation on the 
ability of the human being does not limit the creative power of the divine nature. On the 
contrary, the limitation of the human being can truly be creative by being a part of the 
whole reality. The limitation of the human being is more likely a condition to manifest the 
creativity of divine reality.  
   What can be seen from here is that Heim finds totality in the project of Hick and Heim 
has a negative view of the idea of totality. This is an important point because this 
interpretation of Hick is different from the one of D’Costa. D’Costa defends totality, a 
totality that is given from the tradition of the Christian worldview. That is the reason why 
D’Costa criticises Hick. Hick brings fragmentation to the Christian world. If every religion 
becomes equal, it destroys the basic background of the Christian worldview.  
   Heim is against this idea of totality. However, this does not make Heim close to Alston 
and Plantinga. This is because what Heim defends is not a perceptual faith or a 
propositional faith, but a cultural-linguistic description: ‘both religious practice and 
                                                 
293 Heim, Salvations, p. 16. 
294 Heim, Salvations, p. 17. 
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religious fulfillments are culturally-linguistically ‘thick’.’ 295  The cultural-linguistic 
description is not what a person can choose, but is culturally-linguistically given. A person 
is always already enclosed within the thickness: ‘people who follow different traditions 
live discernibly different lives.’296 Faith as we actually find them on the historical plane is 
patterned around concrete images, beliefs, practices, and ends. Those kinds of tangible 
reality constitute the essence of religious life and faith.  
   According to Heim, this cultural-linguistic thickness is dynamic and always more than 
our static understanding of religion: ‘an adequate theory of religious diversity must include 
a positive account of religious change.’297  The actual practices and instruments of 
religious life are always more diverse than what is prescribed as this or that religion: ‘even 
where people have clear formal agreement about ultimate religious aims and authorities, 
wide gulfs can open up when the actual practices and instruments of religious life diverge 
significantly.’298 Heim says that if we look at what is actually going on in the name of 
religion, that concrete practice is always more than our understanding of religion.  
About the opposition between pluralism and exclusivism, Heim says that both 
pluralism and exclusivism are not appropriate for the factual plurality of religious life. For 
example, Heim refers to the idea of Abrahamic faith.299 Heim says that pluralists often 
                                                 
295 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
296 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
297 Heim, Salvations, p. 189.  
298 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
299 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
127 
 
have an understanding of religious diversity that cause conflict and ‘this conflict can 
escalate to denials that people actually are on the same way or share an ultimate end in 
common.’300 According to pluralists, religious diversity is the cause of conflict. This idea 
of pluralism is close to the idea of the Abrahamic faith. According to Heim, this pluralist 
idea of religious diversity is just an abstraction from concrete religious life and the concrete 
religious life cannot be limited under the name of Abrahamic faith or an ultimate end: 
‘though these traditions share in some measure a vision of the end of the religious life, their 
differences over what constitutes the way towards it arguably amount to distinct 
alternatives for any individual or community life.’301 In this way, Heim focuses more on 
concrete life than identity.  
Likewise, exclusivism is also a limitation to concrete religious life. Heim says that 
exclusivism aims to convert everyone into one single religion, but that aim is none other 
than a limitation to concrete religious life: ‘suppose we were all Muslims or all Christians 
or all Buddhists. Would that lead to an end to religious conflict and violence? The evidence 
points in the opposite direction.’302 According to Heim, exclusivism hides the same 
philosophical presupposition as pluralism. Both exclusivism and pluralism presuppose the 
idea that ‘they seek the same general religious end,’ but the idea of the same general 
religious end is a projection to the actual fact of religious life.  
                                                 
300 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
301 Heim, Salvations, p. 187. 
302 Heim, Salvations, p. 186. 
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On the basis of this understanding, Heim says that the original religious life has always 
been changing from the very beginning: ‘from a broad perspective, change is at least as 
prominent as stasis in regard to religion.’303 Heim says that ‘at least two-thirds of the 
world’s people belong to faiths that did not exist two thousand years ago (Christianity, 
Islam, and ‘nonreligious’). At least a third follows paths that did not exist fourteen hundred 
years ago and at least a sixth paths that hardly existed two hundred years ago.’304 In 
Heim’s understanding, religion has always been changing throughout history and the 
projection of a category on the actual currents of history is nothing more than an artificial 
construction from a bird's-eye view. There has always been ‘the constant currents of 
exchange among the traditions and which may leave no net change, as well as the even 
greater numbers who migrate from one path to another within a tradition.’305 
   From the reading so far, it has been known that the reality of concrete religious life has 
primary importance for Heim: ‘an appreciation of the diversity of effective religious ends 
provides the best ground on which to achieve the difficult and delicate task of affirming 
the validity of differences while still maintaining that the alternatives are importantly 
different.’306 What is important to understand about Heim’s argument is that when Heim 
talks about ‘diversity’, the idea of diversity is not graspable as such.  
                                                 
303 Heim, Salvations, p. 189. 
304 Heim, Salvations, p. 189. 
305 Heim, Salvations, p. 189. 
306 Heim, Salvations, p. 222. 
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III. A PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF COHERENTISM 
   From the summary of the arguments of D’Costa and Heim so far, it can be seen that 
their philosophical positions share a lot of similarities. This section will use the concepts 
of ‘coherentism’ and ‘cultural-linguistic standpoint’ as methodological tools and examine 
their philosophical presupposition in detail.307 
    Before the examination, what is important to realize is the fact that their philosophical 
positions are not the same. They share a lot of similarities, but they also have subtle 
differences. The subtle difference eventually leads to their fundamentally different views 
of current society. This point becomes clear when D’Costa and Heim are contrasted from 
Alston and Plantinga. Alston and Plantinga start their arguments from a rather pessimistic 
                                                 
307 The concept of ‘coherentism’ and the one of ‘cultural-linguistic standpoint’ have a slightly 
different connotation. Both of them have a similar motivation to overcome the so-called 
‘foundational’ position of philosophy and so the ‘cultural-linguistic standpoint’ has enough reason 
to regard it as an application of coherentism to the religious field. In spite of this fundamental 
similarity, their nuance is slightly different. To put it straightforwardly, ‘coherentism’ has a more 
theoretical nuance and has an implication of abstraction from reality; the ‘cultural-linguistic 
standpoint’ has a more concrete nuance and has an implication of description from within reality. 
Therefore, when Ernest Sosa understands coherentism as a ‘raft that floats free of any anchor or tie,’ 
the explanation has a negative connotation to be overcome because of its abstraction from reality. 
On the contrary, George Lindbeck understands the cultural-linguistic standpoint as ‘a medium that 
shapes the entirety of life and thought’ and Lindbeck defends the cultural-linguistic standpoint as a 
concrete reality itself. See Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p.169, and Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine, p.33.  
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idea of religiously diverse society. If one can remove the religious plurality from the 
current society, it’s the best thing to do. However, it’s impossible. The religious plurality 
is an obvious fact of current society and what can be done more realistically is only to 
defend a small secure place within the broadly chaotic situation of current society.  
For example, Alston says that ‘the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the 
practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the 
world’308. Alston limits the field of religion within the personal realm, and tries to secure a 
safe place within which one can be a master. Likewise, Plantinga says that ‘a fresh or 
heightened awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a reappraisal of 
one’s religious life.’309 According to Plantinga, the current situation of religious plurality 
looks miserable, but one can turn the miserable situation into personal strength. Plantinga’s 
argument shows a more serious and nuanced acceptance of religious plurality, but both of 
their arguments and their idea of personal choice presuppose the pessimistic view of 
religiously diverse society.  
The pessimistic view on the inevitable fact of society is a crucially important starting 
point for Alston and Plantinga. Therefore, there is a necessary tension between current 
society and what they want to realize. Their philosophical contribution lies in their 
awareness of the tension. On the contrary, D’Costa and Heim share a philosophical 
principle and they both have an optimistic attitude about the realization of their 
                                                 
308 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 274.  
309 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p.190.  
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philosophical principle.  
On the basis of this examination, this section will first examine the philosophical 
principle of D’Costa and Heim and clarify their basic similarity. The starting point for 
argument can be the ‘cultural-linguistic standpoint’310.  
Both D’Costa’s and Heim’s view of religion have a cultural-linguistic standpoint. Both 
of them make their argument from the context of culture. When they argue in terms of 
society and especially dynamic society, it presupposes a cultural-linguistic standpoint. 
When D’Costa explains his view of religion, there is the cultural-linguistic group of 
Catholic Christianity on the one hand and the cultural-linguistic group of modern 
liberalism on the other. When Heim explains his view of religion, it was based on the idea 
of cultural-linguistic thickness. Neither of them take the idea of personal choice as the 
starting point for their arguments.  
   What is important to realize is that both of their arguments centre on something 
indeterminate. To be precise, it does not mean that they are against the rationality of 
knowledge or reason. It is more likely that they are against the limitation of rationality. For 
example, the sense of ‘more’ plays an important part in what D’Costa thinks as reality. 
When D’Costa defends the tradition of Christianity, what he defends is ‘richness,’ 
                                                 
310 When George Lindbeck explains the ‘cultural-linguistic standpoint’, the importance lies in the 
priority of communal language over personal experience. Religion is not a personal choice, but what 
is given from a community: ‘like a culture or language, it [religion] is a communal phenomenon 
that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those 
subjectivities.’ See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p.33.   
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‘transformation,’ ‘the life of the community,’ ‘narrative,’ ‘virtue,’311 and these concepts 
imply what is more than a personal knowledge. Occasionally, D’Costa looks like imposing 
a broad framework of Catholic Christianity, but the aim of D’Costa is more like a defence 
of local plasticity.  
Likewise, when Heim defends ‘the diversity of effective religious ends,’312 his idea of 
diversity is meant to be fundamentally diverse and always more than what can be 
categorized. If Heim’s idea of diversity is understood to be a lot of religious groups from 
which one can freely choose one position, there is a crucial misunderstanding. In Heim’s 
intention, religious traditions cannot be categorized as such. Religious traditions are in 
‘constant currents of exchange’313 and ‘the actual practices and instruments of religious 
life’314 are supposed to be indeterminate.  
What can be seen from these examinations of D’Costa and Heim is that both of their 
positions are based upon some understanding of fundamental reality. On this basic 
similarity, their difference must be examined. D’Costa has a positive view of totality, and 
Heim defends a more fragmentary position.315  For example, when D’Costa defends 
                                                 
311 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp. 26-27.  
312 Heim, Salvations, p. 222. 
313 Heim, Salvations, p. 189. 
314 Heim, Salvations, p. 187.  
315 This difference can be understood as their different views of coherence. For example, when 
Rorty discusses coherentism, there are slightly different types of coherentism. On the one hand, 
there are more holistic kind of coherentism like Sellars and Quine. They emphasize the wholeness 
of conceptual scheme that gives framework to propositions. On the other hand, there are more 
behaviorist kind of coherentism like Dewey and Wittgenstein. They emphasize the partiality of 
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‘richness,’ ‘transformation,’ ‘the life of the community,’ ‘narrative,’ and ‘virtue,’ these ideas 
are supposed to make sense within the order of the Christian worldview. The reason for 
this is that each partial practice of religious life gets a special meaning only when they are 
placed within a framework of the bigger worldview. For D’Costa, there is a unique kind 
of reality that can be acquired only within the bigger worldview. This becomes apparent 
when one looks at his defence of ‘narrative’. When personal religious practices are placed 
within a whole narrative, each religious practice gets a special meaning that is more than 
each religious practice. The whole narrative gives a special status to each religious practice. 
That kind of narrative is not something that can be immediately realized by a personal 
intention. It can only be realized from an elaboration for generations and generations.  
   When Heim defends ‘diversity,’ ‘constant current of exchange,’ ‘actual practice,’ and 
‘dynamic change,’ there is also a unique kind of reality. This kind of reality is lost if it’s 
placed within a whole framework of narrative. It is because Heim’s understanding of 
reality is centred on what escapes from categorization. Heim finds more reality in excess, 
margin, and process, and this kind of reality cannot fit in a closed tradition.  
   It has been revealed in this section that both D’Costa and Heim defend a kind of reality, 
and that can be distinguished from the defence of personal choice by Alston and Plantinga.  
 
 
                                                 
contingent relations between propositions. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 170-74; See also Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 91-92.  
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3. 
 Reliabilist Ethics of Normality 
 
 
I. A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF CRITICISMS OF HICK 
   Before beginning the examination of the criticisms of John Hick, it should be noted 
that the aim of this chapter is not a direct analysis or evaluation of the theory of Hick. The 
aim of this chapter is rather to compare and contrast different readings of Hick, clarify the 
points of controversy around the readings of Hick, and sort out some guidelines towards 
an appropriate reading of Hick. On the basis of this basic policy, it must be pointed out that 
there are two philosophically different understandings of Hick. First, Alston and Plantinga 
shares a coherentist understanding of Hick’s position, the essential point of which is an 
acceptance of the requirement to recognize cultural-linguistic diversity of religions in 
contemporary society. As compared to Alston, Plantinga has a more nuanced assessment 
of religious plurality in contemporary society. But both of them have a similarly 
coherentist understanding of Hick.  
In contrast, when D’Costa and Heim criticize Hick, they understand Hick as a 
foundationalist who starts from a fixed view of pluralism. Even though D’Costa 
understands the foundation as modern liberalism and Heim understands it as totality, both 
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of them have an image of superstructure which is imposed upon other diverse aspects.  
   Alston and Plantinga share a coherentist understanding of Hick. When Alston 
criticizes Hick, the criticism presupposes an understanding that Hick’s position cannot 
theorize a directness of religious faith: ‘this [Hick’s] account of the interpretation of the 
world and the events of one’s life as manifesting a divine presence and purpose sounds 
like what I termed ‘indirect perceptual recognition’316 For Alston, Hick’s position is closer 
to linguistic recognition and it fails to theorize a directness of religious faith which is shown 
in personal reality.  
   The same structure can be found in Plantinga’s understanding of Hick. When 
Plantinga quotes Hick, it is related to the cultural-linguistic group: ‘for it is evident that in 
some ninety-nine percent of cases the religion which an individual professes and to which 
he or she adheres depends upon the accidents of birth. Someone born to Buddhist parents 
in Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone born to Muslim parents in Saudi 
Arabia to be Muslim, someone born to Christian parents in Mexico to be a Christian, and 
so on.’317 For Plantinga, Hick’s recognition of society comes from the requirement of 
coherence in contemporary society, and the whole project of Plantinga can be seen as a 
defence of personal choice from the threat of contemporary society. Even though the 
attitudes to the plurality of religions are different, both of them have a similarly coherentist 
                                                 
316 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 27. The italics is in the original.  
317 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2, quoted in Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious 
Exclusivism,’ p. 187. 
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understanding of Hick.  
   In contrast, D’Costa and Heim shares a foundationalist understanding of Hick. When 
D’Costa criticizes Hick as liberalist, the liberalism is understood as an imposition of 
content-less ethics which represses diversity of religions: ‘Hick’s ‘pluralism’ masks the 
advocation of liberal modernity’s ‘god,’ in this case a form of ethical agnosticism.’318 For 
D’Costa, Hick’s position is understood to be based on liberal ethics, which can be found 
in every religion and therefore it neglects the concrete grammar of religious community 
including Catholic Trinitarianism. Modern ethics does not have content, and this is the 
reason why it can be found in every religion. In this sense, D’Costa’s understanding of 
Hick is closer to what George Lindbeck calls the ‘experiential-expressive’ standpoint319.  
   A similarly foundational character can also be found in Heim’s understanding of Hick: 
‘Hick asks if there are criteria by which to judge different religious traditions as 
totalities.’320 However, Heim’s understanding of Hick is slightly different from D’Costa’s. 
D’Costa understands Hick as a modern liberalist, but Heim understands Hick as more of 
a mystic: ‘Hick argues for what he calls the ‘religious ambiguity of the universe’.’321 The 
                                                 
318 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 26. 
319 According to George Lindbeck, the experiential-expressive standpoint is characterized as a 
position which interprets doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientation: ‘for experiential-expressive symbolist … religiously significant 
meanings can vary while doctrines remain the same, and conversely, doctrines can alter without 
change of meaning’. See Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p.17. 
320 Heim, Salvations, p. 15.  
321 Heim, Salvations, p. 15. 
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religious ambiguity of the universe is meant to include everything as a creative power of 
the whole reality: ‘he [Hick] is actually an inclusivist through and through …he [Hick] 
exempts himself from the charge of being an inclusivist because he relativizes the ultimates 
of particular faiths not in favor of one among them, but in terms of something above and 
beyond them all.’322 
The uniqueness of this understanding of Hick becomes apparent if it’s contrasted with 
George Lindbeck’s ‘experiential-expressive’ standpoint. The idea of the experiential-
expressive standpoint presupposes the distinction of subjective feeling and objective 
doctrine and it exclusively chooses the side of subjective feeling as the primarily important 
component of religion. This standpoint is theorized fundamentally as a personal standpoint. 
On the contrary, in Heim’s understanding, the position of John Hick is a cosmic one. It 
doesn’t choose the subjective side on the basis of the division between the subjective side 
and the objective side. The aim of Hick’s project is to include every level of religion within 
a whole cosmic reality. Both of their positions depend on the idea of unknowable reality, 
but their fundamental actor is different. In the case of the experiential-expressive 
standpoint, the actor is a person. In the case of Hick, the actor is the cosmos.  
An advantage of Heim’s understanding is that it can explain Hick’s emphasis on ‘the 
cognitive meaningfulness of religious beliefs.’323 Heim refers to Hick’s argument on 
                                                 
322 Heim, Salvations, p. 30. The concept of the religious ambiguity of the universe and Hick’s 
cosmic optimism will be examined in the 4th chapter of this dissertation.  
323 Heim, Salvations, p. 17.  
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eschatological verification: ‘in response to objections that faith predicted no specific state 
of affairs in distinction from another and so was empty, Hick maintained there were future 
conditions in which certain religious expectations would be confirmed or refuted.’324 
According to Heim, if one misses Hick’s emphasis on the cognitive content of religion, 
one cannot understand the argument of eschatological verification. Heim’s understanding 
also explains Hick’s criticism of non-realist interpretations of religion.325  
   Heim’s understanding of Hick is helpful and it illuminates an important aspect of 
Hick’s project. For example, Hick’s emphasis on ethics can be understood in this direction. 
Hick states that  
 
Self-sacrificing concern for the good of others is the basic ethical principle of all the 
religions.326  
 
This kind of ethical concern is ranked high with special importance within the entirety of 
Hick’s project. This kind of ethical concern is not necessarily understood as a universal 
imperative which imposes a fixed principle on every person, but it can be understood as a 
vision in which all the different parts of the cosmos are connected with each other. The 
welcoming of the other is necessary because the hidden possibility of the other can help to 
                                                 
324 Heim, Salvations, p. 17. 
325 Heim, Salvations, p. 17. Hick’s argument about eschatological verification will be examined in 
the 6th chapter of this dissertation, and Hick’s criticism of non-realist interpretations of religion will 
be examined in the 3rd chapter of this dissertation.  
326 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 325.  
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revitalize the stabilized order. From Hick’s viewpoint, if a religious group is separated 
from another religious group, the religious group loses its creative nature. The self-
sacrificing concern for the good of others is required to radically change a religious group 
towards the fundamental goodness of the cosmos.  
   However, Heim and D’Costa similarly interpret the ethics of Hick as an extension of 
a mythological understanding of religion and this interpretation eventually leads them to 
interpret Hick as a foundationalist. Heim says that ‘any language within a religious 
tradition which intends to be about the Real itself – as opposed to the effects or marks of 
the Real in human life – can only be mythological.’327 In the intention of Heim, this 
mythological orientation of Hick has a hidden coercive impact on the diverse practices and 
instruments of religious life. Likewise, D’Costa says that ‘if ethical agnostics were to 
suggest that the conflict between religions would be best dealt with by everyone becoming 
an ethical agnostic, not only would this fail to deal with plurality, in so much as it fails to 
take plurality seriously, it would also fail to take religious cultures seriously by dissolving 
them into instrumental mythical configurations best understood within modernity’s 
mastercode.’328 Here, the intention of D’Costa is not to defend a plurality of religions, but 
to defend a tradition of Christianity. But Hick’s mythological orientation is understood to 
threaten the requirement of religious plurality and to eventually destroy the tradition of 
Christianity.  
                                                 
327 Heim, Salvations, p. 20. 
328 D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, p. 26. 
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This kind of mythological and foundational reading of Hick has the effect of 
invalidating the original intention of Hick’s ethics. It misses the fundamental importance 
of the creative and transformational aspect of mythology and ethics in the whole system 
of Hick’s philosophy. For Hick, the mythological understanding of religion is understood 
as a creative and transformational aspect which makes a creative reconciliation between 
cognitive/literal understanding of religion and non-cognitive/analogical understanding of 
religion. Both the analogical understanding and the literal understanding have a limited 
content which have their own irreplaceable importance and both of them can exercise their 
creativity when they are appropriately placed within the creative process of the whole 
cosmos.329 Mythology is the principle of the whole creative process and ethics also should 
be seen as the more concrete principle of the whole creative process.330 According to Hick, 
mythology and ethics must be prioritized because they are the only way of thinking in 
which all the different religious beliefs are connected with each other.  
What could be revealed from these examinations is that both weak foundationalists 
such as Alston and Plantinga and coherentists such as D’Costa and Heim catch a limited 
aspect of Hick’s philosophy, but their criticism of Hick also looks to be directed at their 
                                                 
329  ‘According to the pluralistic hypothesis we can make true and false literal and analogical 
statements about our own image of the Ultimate, truth or falsity here being determined internally by 
the norms of our tradition. But statements about the Real in itself have mythological, not literal, 
value.’ Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, Second Edition, p. xxxiii.  
330 About a more detailed explanation of mythology and ethics in the whole system of Hick’s 
philosophy, see the 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
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constructed image of Hick rather than what Hick really intends. What is truly required 
must be to correctly understand a central intention of Hick’s whole argument. 
Interpretations given by weak foundationalists and coherentists can be used as a useful 
stepping stone to find a more nuanced philosophical position which is more appropriate 
for the reading of Hick. Only after this kind of procedure, will the evaluation of Hick, either 
positive or negative, become possible. 
 
 
II. AN ETHICS OF RELIABILISM 
Before summing up a preliminary guideline for an appropriate reading of John Hick, 
this section will examine an ethical aspect of reliabilism. Reliabilism is a useful idea for 
the interpretation of Hick because the idea was originally invented to recover 
foundationalism after the threat of coherentism. The whole project of Alston, Plantinga, 
D’Costa and Heim can be understood within this context. The projects of Alston and 
Plantinga can be understood as a more foundational direction within this context. Those of 
D’Costa and Heim can be understood as a more coherentist direction. All of their positions 
are different from classical positions of foundationalism and coherentism, but the context 
of foundationalism and coherentism is useful to interpret their positions. To add one more 
methodological option of reliabilism, especially the ethical aspect of reliabilism, promises 
to be useful in interpreting John Hick.  
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Reliabilism is primarily an epistemological theory, but it also has some ethical 
implications. For example, the idea of normality, equilibrium, and virtue can be understood 
as ethical implications of reliabilism. Therefore, this section will first examine reliabilism 
as an attempt to recover foundationalism after coherentism. Then, the idea of normality, 
equilibrium, and virtue will be examined. Lastly, coherence included in the idea of the 
requirement of social plurality and foundationalism included in the idea of cosmic 
optimism will be analyzed from a reliabilist point of view.  
   First, the characteristic of reliabilism as an attempt to recover foundationalism after 
coherentism will be examined. Reliabilism can be understood as the combination of two 
radically different kinds of inquiry: (1) an inquiry based on the difference of plural 
foundations, and (2) an inquiry based on the historical process to form a coherent 
perspective among different foundations. 331  What is the intention of reliabilism to 
overcome coherentism?  
   According to Ernest Sosa, coherentism means ‘any view according to which the 
ultimate sources of justification for any belief lie in relations among that belief and other 
beliefs of the subject.’332 The problem of coherentism is that it ‘is open to an objection 
from alternative coherent systems or detachment from reality.’333 On the one hand, if a 
coherentist system is supposed to be fragmentary and is determined just by a belief’s 
                                                 
331 See the 1st chapter of this dissertation.  
332 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 184.  
333 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 184. 
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relation with other beliefs, it becomes difficult to have a fixed view of truth. In this case a 
coherentist system is always floating like a raft and every possible system of beliefs 
becomes an arbitrary fragment that can always be mixed with other systems of beliefs. On 
the other hand, if a coherent system is supposed to be holistic and requires no contact with 
the world outside that system of beliefs, it becomes difficult to justify a system of beliefs 
against other systems of beliefs. In this case, all systems of beliefs are not based on the 
world and every system of belief cannot avoid an arbitrary characteristic.334  
   Essentially speaking, this understanding of coherentism is close to what Alston, 
Plantinga, D’Costa and Heim characterize as the threat of religious pluralism. Its 
fundamental problem is the loss of a fundamental foundation and the lack of substantial 
absoluteness. Alston and Plantinga have a more foundationalist orientation and find an 
answer in the idea of ‘personal choice’. D’Costa and Heim have a more coherentist 
orientation and find an answer in the idea of ‘indeterminate reality’. 
   Then, what is the fundamental foundation for reliabilism? A clue to this problem is the 
ideas of normality, equilibrium, and virtue. When Ernest Sosa defines reliabilism, he 
includes an idea of normality: ‘reliabilism requires for the epistemic justification of belief 
that it be formed by a process reliable in an environment normal for the formation of such 
belief.’335 Here the word ‘normal’ is used like a synonym of ‘reliable’. This idea of 
normality must be examined in detail.  
                                                 
334 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 184. 
335 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 89.  
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   What has to be stated is that this idea of normality is what looks like normality in a 
particular situation for a particular person. This normality does not mean to include what 
everyone else is thinking as normality. It means to create one’s unique kind of probabilistic 
normality within each given situation. According to Sosa, reliabilism is thought of as 
‘one’s way of arriving directly and noninferentially at beliefs respectively about: certain of 
one’s own states at the time; certain features of one’s surroundings; and certain aspects of 
one’s past.’336 Here Sosa says that reliabilism is ‘one’s way of arriving … at beliefs 
respectively about.’ That is to say, that way of arriving at beliefs cannot be applied for 
everyone. It is valid only in that particular time, in that particular situation and for that 
particular person. Likewise, it is arrived at ‘directly and noninferentially’. That is to say, 
the beliefs are immediately arrived at in a natural and obvious way for that person. That 
process is not a consequence after a process of reasoning. However, it does not mean that 
the process is simple. On the contrary, the naturalness has been acquired on a very subtle 
balance that has been accumulated through history in an unconscious way.  
   In another passage, Sosa says that ‘beliefs are states of a subject, which need not be 
occurrent or conscious, but may be retained even by someone asleep or unconscious, and 
may also be acquired unconsciously and undeliberately, as are acquired our initial beliefs, 
presumably, whether innate or not.’337 Sosa says that this is what he supposes as ‘a normal 
                                                 
336 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 212. 
337 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 135. 
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human with an ordinary set of beliefs normally acquired through sensory experience.’338 
This passage implies that Sosa’s idea of normality is something that has been acquired in 
conscious or unconscious process.  
A distinctive characteristic of Sosa’s idea of normality is that his idea of normality must 
be created by the person as one’s unique normality, and therefore one cannot acquire 
normality before one’s actual engagement with the world. Sosa’s idea of normality must 
be created at each time at each occasion. That is to say, that normality can only be acquired 
after one’s embodied engagement with the world’s complexity. Here one can see what 
Sosa implies when he says to give up ‘the narrow scope of perfect knowledge, and turning 
to imperfect but reliable knowledge.’339 This is an aspect of the fundamental foundation 
of reliabilism.  
   Sosa’s idea of equilibrium and virtue must be seen on the basis of this idea of normality. 
Sosa’s idea of equilibrium can be seen as a holistic and comprehensive process to acquire 
the normality. For example, Sosa says that ‘the method of reflective equilibrium aims to 
maximize two factors in one’s beliefs: harmonious coherence, and plausibility of 
content.’340 The two factors can be understood as the first order of plausible content 
(difference of plural foundations) and the second order of harmonious coherence (a 
coherent perspective among different foundations). What is important to realize is that the 
                                                 
338 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 135. 
339 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 212. 
340 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 257. 
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first order of plausible content must be understood as one’s unique engagement with the 
world’s complexity. If the plausible content is understood as what can be fixed and 
stabilized, one misses the intention of Sosa. If the plausible content becomes fixed and 
stabilized, the second order of harmonious coherence is also fixed, stabilized, and reduced 
just to follow what everyone else is thinking under the name of normality. On the contrary, 
the reflective equilibrium must be an endeavour to cope with the lively reality of the 
changing world. That is the reason why Sosa says that the reflective equilibrium must be 
‘wide’ rather than ‘narrow’.341 
   Sosa says that the idea of reflective equilibrium is threatened to become conservative 
orthodoxy: ‘the use of reflective equilibrium has been attacked as serving only to organize 
and protect conservative orthodoxy.’342 An idea of reflective equilibrium has a social 
aspect and if the way to integrate the different fields of sensations is stabilized and shared 
among people, there is a threat of conservative orthodoxy. It does not mean that the 
stabilization is useless. On the contrary, the stabilization of normality is necessary as a 
conventional standard for a social life. That kind of ‘common sense’343 is the very basis 
for the possibility of conducting a healthy judgment against the complexity of reality. 
However, if the normality becomes stabilized, it loses the flexibility to cope with the 
                                                 
341 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, pp. 257-66. 
342 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 261.  
343 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 264. 
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multifaceted reality of the world. What is required is ‘the method of wide equilibrium’344 
and it must be created from one’s engagement with reality.  
   Likewise, the idea of virtue must also be seen on the basis of Sosa’s idea of normality. 
On the one hand, Sosa’s idea of virtue is valid only for a unique situation: ‘a virtue is 
virtuous only relative to appropriate surroundings, which are not the product of any 
reflection.’345  On the other hand, it is a comprehensive ability of a person to find 
something common in the complexity of the world: ‘broader intellectual virtue makes it 
possible to accept wide reflective equilibrium.’346 
   What is important to realize is that the reliabilist idea of virtue is deeply related to one’s 
surroundings and it leads to its social aspect towards humanity in general and more: ‘we 
conceive of pursuit of knowledge as an endeavor whose most basic seat is the individual; 
his tribe; his historical epoch; humanity at large: past, present, and future; or rational beings 
generally (being capable of knowledge).’ 347  The reliabilist idea of virtue implies 
associating individual sensations with each other and it leads to an integration of them as 
a basic seat of an individual such as one’s environment, one’s community, or even one’s 
unconsciousness.  
According to Sosa, the reliabilist idea of virtue is deeply related to the social 
                                                 
344 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 264. 
345 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266. 
346 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266. 
347 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 212. 
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construction of a norm: ‘a concept of epistemic justification that measures the pertinent 
virtues or faculties of the subject relative to the normal for the community will be useful to 
the community.’348 This passage implies that the reliabilist idea of virtue has a dialectic 
relation between person and society. A reliabilist justification functions to unite different 
abilities of a person and that process of justification is heavily influenced by what has 
implicitly been inherited through society and maybe humanity in general from generation 
to generation. What is required is, on the one hand, that the process of justification is made 
by one’s embodied engagement with living reality. On the other hand, the process of 
justification helps to construct hidden norms of society as ‘the implied social component 
of knowledge’349 . Both of the two aspects of the process, the creating process and the 
stabilizing process, are necessary components of reliabilism.  
   What has been revealed from these examinations is that the method of reliabilism has 
its own idea of normality as the proper field of study. The characteristic of the idea of 
normality can be summarised as follows. (1) The idea of normality is valid only for a 
unique situation and it determines one’s immediate reaction with the world. (2) The idea 
of normality is a comprehensive ability of a person and is based on the balance of the whole 
aspects of reality. (3) The idea of normality has a social aspect and it has both creating and 
stabilizing functions.  
   Is it possible to apply this idea of normality to the interpretation of John Hick? Before 
                                                 
348 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 276. 
349 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 276. 
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directly answering this question, this section will examine the possibility of relating the 
ideas of requirement of social plurality and cosmic optimism to the reliabilist idea of 
normality. It looks possible to find both coherent and foundational elements in the 
reliabilist idea of normality.  
According to Plantinga, a characteristic of contemporary society is a coherentist 
requirement that gives equal weight to every religion. Plantinga says that ‘in recent years 
probably more of us western Christians have become aware of the world’s religious 
diversity.’350 This recognition makes a pluralist position like John Hick, and the process 
of giving equality inevitably has an effect of abstraction and it contains the threat of 
depriving a personal choice of a solid foundation. This is the reason why he thinks 
coherence in contemporary society does not give any solid content. 
This process of giving equality is close to the reliabilist process of forming normality. 
Reliabilism involves a kind of abstractive process of making a norm which is based on 
qualitatively different kinds of diverse sources of knowledge. In contrast with Plantinga’s 
focus on the specificity of personal choice, the reliabilist idea of making normality is 
crucially important for one’s engagement with the world. From the reliabilist point of view, 
one cannot form an appropriate understanding of the world without the creation of a unique 
norm as a balance among difference. Sosa says that ‘reliabilism requires for the epistemic 
justification of belief that it be formed by a process reliable in an environment normal for 
                                                 
350 Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,’ p.174. 
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the formation of such belief,’351 and this idea of normality must be based on the use of 
‘wide reflective equilibrium.’352 According to Sosa, the reliabilist idea of normality is not 
something that deprives the strength of concrete reality. On the contrary, one cannot engage 
with the multi-dimensional reality without forming a perspective. This point needs further 
examination, but, at least, it is possible to say that reliabilism has some elements of what 
Plantinga thinks as a coherentist requirement of contemporary society.  
   Likewise, when Heim criticises Hick’s cosmic optimism as foundationalism, the 
criticism was directed towards its totality: ‘Hick asks if there are criteria by which to judge 
different religious traditions as totalities.’353 According to Sosa, the method of reliabilism 
necessarily does have a danger of stabilizing the implicit norm. The reliabilist idea of norm 
is difficult to control, because it involves an implicit part of one’s ability. Sosa even says 
that reliabilism is related with not only ‘humanity at large’ but also ‘rational beings 
generally.’354 A possible reaction to the danger is to challenge the generally accepted 
notion of common sense by questioning the false stabilization of multi-dimensional reality. 
This is what Sosa means when he introduced the idea of ‘wide reflective equilibrium’355. 
This point also needs further examination, but, at least, it is possible to say that reliabilism 
has some element of what Heim characterizes as Hick’s cosmic optimism.  
                                                 
351 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 89. 
352 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266. 
353 Heim, Salvations, p. 15.  
354 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 212. 
355 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266.  
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   From these examinations it can be said that the reliabilist idea of normality can be a 
possible choice of methodological tool for an interpretation of John Hick. This section 
couldn’t fully apply the reliabilist idea of normality to the reading of John Hick, but this 
will be the task of following chapters.356 
 
 
III. A RELIABILIST READING OF HICK 
   The aim of this section is not to show a reliabilist reading of John Hick, but it is to 
propose a guideline as a preparation before the textual reading of Hick. Some important 
points of possible controversy have been revealed in this chapter and these points should 
be reflected in the following chapters.  
On the one hand, weak foundationalists such as Alston and Plantinga prioritize the 
personal choice of an individual, and coherentists such as D’Costa and Heim prioritize the 
indeterminate reality. Instead of those positions, the position of Hick can be understood as 
reliabilist and its central intention lies in the creation of normality on a social and cosmic 
scale rather than just a personal scale.357 Various aspects of Hick’s position become easy 
                                                 
356 A reliabilist aspect of Hick’s cosmic optimism will be examined in the 4th chapter of this 
dissertation, and a reliabilist aspect of Hick’s common sense philosophy will be examined in the 6th 
chapter.  
357 A good example of Hick’s defence of normality and common sense can be found in his reading 
of Hume. See 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
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to understand by understanding him as a reliabilist. For example, Hick denies a simple idea 
of independent individuality and treats a person as always embedded in a cultural-
linguistic framework (this is broadly close to Alston and Plantinga’s understanding of Hick 
and the reason why Alston and Plantinga criticizes Hick). In spite of this denial, Hick 
defends an independent reality which cannot be restricted within a cultural-linguistic 
framework (this is broadly close to D’Costa and Heim’s understanding of Hick and the 
reason why they criticize Hick). These two aspects of Hick’s position was accused of being 
contradictory, but reliabilism and a reliabilist concept of normality is useful to understand 
the central intention of Hick’s position, which can be distinguished from weak 
foundationalist’s and coherentist’s positions.  
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Chapter 3.  
 
PHILLIPS AND SELLARS 
Contradiction between Language and Reality 
 
 
   From the second edition of Faith and Knowledge, John Hick defends Wittgensteinian 
philosophy as an important part of his system of philosophy. 358  The defence of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy continues in An Interpretation of Religion, and the defence can 
be seen in his argument about ‘religion as a family-resemblance concept’ 359  and 
                                                 
358 ‘The philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge the influence … (in the 2nd edition) 
of Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘seeing-as’ received through John Wisdom.’ See Hick, An 
Autobiography, p. 115. ‘The discovery of God as lying behind the world, and of his presence as 
mediated in and through it, arises from interpreting in a new way what was already before us. It is 
epistemologically comparable … to what Wittgenstein called ‘seeing-as’.’ See Hick, Faith and 
Knowledge, Second Edition, pp. 141-48. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, part II, section xi.  
359 ‘Much time and energy has been devoted over the years to the debate between rival definitions 
of ‘religion’. But Wittgenstein’s discussion of family-remembrance (or, as they have also been 
called, cluster) concepts has opened up the possibility that ‘religion’ is of this rather different kind. 
He took the example of games … Instead of a set of defining characteristics there is a network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing like the resemblances and differences in build, features, 
eye colour, gait, temperament and so on among the members of a natural family.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 4. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 66.  
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‘experiencing-as’360. However, Hick’s defence of Wittgensteinian philosophy requires a 
careful analysis. When Hick defends Wittgensteinian philosophy, Hick always adds 
another complementary viewpoint. In this sense, Hick’s system of philosophy always has 
a dual character.  
On the one hand, Hick defends epistemology and Wittgensteinian philosophy of 
language which indicate diversity of religions. On the other hand, Hick adds an ontological 
and cosmic viewpoint which indicate the totality of religions. What should be realized here 
is that the latter viewpoint (ontological or cosmic) is not independent and always 
presupposes the former viewpoint (epistemological or linguistic). For example, in Faith 
and Knowledge, Wittgensteinian philosophy is discussed within a larger framework of 
‘two types of faith’. According to Hick, these are faith as cognition (epistemological faith) 
and faith as trust (ontological faith). Wittgensteinian philosophy is related to 
epistemological faith, and ontological faith is discussed with epistemological faith as a 
complementary viewpoint with each other.361  
The dualistic character can also be found in An Interpretation of Religion. On the one 
hand, Hick defends Wittgensteinian philosophy by making such arguments as ‘religion as 
                                                 
360 ‘In relation to our physical environment the mind/brain is actively interpreting, though at this 
level its operation is largely controlled by the environment itself. The outcome in consciousness can 
be called ‘experiencing-as’ – developed from Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’. See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 140. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part II, 
section xi.  
361 ‘Our primary concern … is with faith as cognition, and we shall treat of faith as trust only so far 
as may be required by our main purpose.’ See Hick, Faith and Knolwedge, Second Edition, p. 4.  
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a family-resemblance concept’ and ‘experiencing-as’. On the other hand, Hick criticizes 
Wittgensteinian philosophers (D. Z. Phillips362 and Peter Winch363) by categorizing them 
as non-realist364 and instead defends the critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars365. What 
should be noted here is that Hick does not simply set Wittgensteinian philosophy and 
critical realism in opposition. But, what Hick is actually doing is to use Wittgensteinian 
philosophy to recover the basic insight of critical realism from within a very different 
context of contemporary philosophy.  
On the basis of these considerations, this chapter will first discuss Wittgensteinian 
philosophy and the dualistic character of Hick’s philosophy in Faith and Knowledge. Then 
Hick’s argument about D. Z. Phillips and Roy Wood Sellars in An Interpretation of 
Religion will be discussed. Lastly, Hick’s defence of critical realism will be examined.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
362 ‘Phillips has provided a clear and eloquent version of a non-realist interpretation of religious 
discourse.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 198. About neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy 
of religion, see also Brian R. Clack, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 78-105. 
363 ‘Another contemporary neo-Wittgensteinian philosopher who has expressed similar views, and 
to whom Phillips often refers, is Peter Winch.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 209.  
364 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 198-201.  
365 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 172-75.  
156 
 
 
1. 
 Faith and Knowledge 
 
 
John Hick begins to incorporate Wittgenstein’s philosophy into his own system of 
philosophy from the second edition of Faith and Knowledge.366 An important feature of 
Hick’s system of philosophy is that Hick always embraces views that could be perceived 
                                                 
366 ‘The philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge the influence … (in the second 
edition) of Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘seeing-as’, received through John Wisdom.’ See Hick, An 
Autobiography, p. 115.  
In Faith and Knowledge, Hick states the position of Wisdom that ‘language is used not only to 
convey information and to express emotions but also to alter our apprehensions, to set an object or 
a situation in a new light which reveals it as, in a sense, a different object or situation; and that the 
statement that there is a God functions in this way.’ In An Autobiography, Hick again states the 
position of Wisdom that ‘doing metaphysics is like finding a pattern in a puzzle picture’ and says 
that it was for him ‘a clue to the nature of religious experience and religious faith’. See Hick, Faith 
and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 144. Hick, An Autobiography, p. 81.  
In Paradox and Discovery, Wisdom says that metaphysical questions such as ‘Does matter 
exists?’, ‘Is knowledge of the mind of another possible?’, ‘Does God exists?’, and ‘Have men free 
will?’ have no answers, and yet they do evince some inadequacy in our apprehension of things, and 
that when this inadequacy is removed by thought, which while it is helped by precedent is not bound 
by it, we gain a new view of what is actual. As David Pole and Ilham Dilman point out, the position 
of Wisdom is Wittgensteinian but at the same time original. Wisdom’s argument has a more 
heuristic orientation than Wittgenstein. See John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1965, p. ix. David Pole, The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein: A Short Introduction with 
an Epilogue on John Wisdom, London: Athlone Press, 1958, p. 103. Ilham Dilman, ‘Cambridge 
Philosophers VII: Wisdom,’ in Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 278, 1996, pp. 577-90.  
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as significantly opposed or even contradictory. For example, this feature can be seen in 
Hick’s argument about Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing-as’:  
 
The discovery of God as lying behind the world, and of his presence as mediated in and 
through it, arises from interpreting in a new way what was already before us. It is 
epistemologically comparable … to what Wittgenstein called ‘seeing as’.367 
 
A contradictory tension can already be found in this quotation as a tension between the 
world and God. In this quotation, Hick first says that God is discovered as lying behind the 
world. Here what Hick means by it looks as if he distinguishes the realm of the world and 
another realm of God. However, Hick then says that the divine presence is mediated in and 
through the world. This looks contradictory, because it means that the world and God are 
not distinguished and it is a denial of divine independence. Lastly, this contradiction is 
solved by indicating that the discovery of God arises from interpreting in a new way what 
was already before us. Here it can be seen that what Hick means by the tension between 
the world and God is a discovery of a new view of what is actual.  
Hick relates this understanding of God with Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’368. 
                                                 
367 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, pp.141-142.  
368 Wittgenstein drew philosophical attention to the concept of ‘seeing-as’, or aspect seeing, and 
used it in the exploration of philosophical issues and puzzles in Philosophical Investigations, notably 
issues about perception. Wittgenstein was particularly concerned with puzzle pictures: one may see 
an ambiguous figure as, for example, the picture of a duck facing left or of a rabbit facing right. 
Wittgenstein distinguished among different types of aspect seeing or ‘seeing-as’, and he did not 
think that each type had the same requirements. For some types a familiarity with the applicable 
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However, Hick does not simply accept the concept of ‘seeing-as’. Hick develops the 
concept of ‘seeing-as’ into his original concept of ‘faith as experiencing-as’: ‘faith is an 
uncompelled mode of ‘experiencing-as’ – experiencing the world as a place in which we 
have at all times to do with the transcendent God.’369 The difference between ‘seeing-as’ 
and ‘experiencing-as’ is that when Hick refers to the ‘experiencing-as’, the emphasis is 
more on the side of perceiving the transcendent God rather than just looking through the 
interpretation of a religious community.370  
                                                 
concepts was required, for other types it was not. In the case of the ‘double cross’ no familiarity with 
the concept of cross was necessary to see it as a black cross on a white background and a white cross 
on a black background. But in the case of the duck-rabbit, Wittgenstein says, ‘you only ‘see the duck 
and rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant with the shapes of these two animals’. See 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part II, section xi.  
According to Kellenberger, religious ‘seeing-as’ is more like seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a 
duck or as a rabbit: it requires a familiarity with religious concepts. ‘Seeing-as’ or aspect seeing 
presupposes a community of discourse in a way that seeing does not. With regard to religious 
‘seeing-as’ experiences, it is important that they not be thought of as independent of culture, 
upbringing and training and of a religious community in which certain religious concepts are used. 
One’s religious community and upbringing help to determine the way one thinks of or would 
describe the object of worship, as well as religious practice, the language of prayer, and so on. See 
J. Kellenberger, ‘‘Seeing-as’ in Religion: Discovery and Community’ in Religious Studies, Vol. 38, 
2002, pp. 101-08. 
369 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 151.  
370 On Hick’s concept of ‘experiencing-as,’ see Hick, Philosophy of Religion, First Edition, pp. 71-
73. Hick, God and the Universe of Faith, pp. 39-45. Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 17-
20. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, p. 49.  
In God and the Universe of Faith, Hick relates the concept of ‘experiencing-as’ with the 
epistemology of John Oman: ‘in a classic statement of John Oman’s, ‘knowing is not knowledge 
as an effect of an unknown external cause, but is knowledge as we so interpret that our meaning is 
the actual meaning of our environment.’’ See Hick, God and the Universe of Faith, p. 43.  
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What should be noted here is that Hick, however, does not underestimate the 
importance of the interpretative element within faith. Hick, on the one hand, sees faith as 
an ‘interpretative element within the religious person’s claimed awareness of God.’371 In 
this sense, Hick defends Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. Despite the presentation 
of religious faith as culturally and linguistically oriented interpretation through religious 
community and upbringing, Hick, on the other hand, wishes to defend the factual nature 
of religious language, which leads to the encounter with the ultimate reality. An interesting 
feature of Hick’s notion of ‘faith as experiencing-as’ is this contradictory tension between 
‘the interpretation in and through language’ and ‘the encounter with reality’. What is 
implied in this tension is Hick’s understanding of God as composed of harmonious 
difference whose parts are mutually enhancing within the whole. Each of these differences 
is understood as just as real as any particular part of the whole. Then, Hick explains that 
this tension within the notion of ‘faith’ comes from two different usages of the word ‘faith’:  
 
‘Faith’ is employed both as an epistemological and as a nonepistemological term. The 
word fides and fiducia provide conveniently self-explanatory labels for the two uses.372 
                                                 
371 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 151.  
372 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 3. Hick’s concept of two types of faith comes 
from Martin Buber: ‘Buber … uses the Greek Pistis and the Hebrew Emunah (trust) to indicate the 
historical sources of these two uses of ‘faith’.’ In Two Types of Faith, Buber expounds his philosophy 
of history. According to Buber, the history of Judeo-Christian religion can be understood as a 
transition from the organic (Emunah/Fiducia) to the artificial (Pistis/Fides). But the transition 
cannot be limited in a specific moment of history and the two types of faith can always be seen in 
the history. For example, the transition can be found, in a large scale, in a comparison between 
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One speaks, on the one hand, of epistemological faith (fides) that there is a God and that 
such and such linguistic descriptions about him are true. Here ‘faith’ is used linguistically, 
referring to a state, act, or procedure which may be compared with natural instances of 
knowing or believing. On the other hand, one speaks of ontological faith (fiducia) as a trust, 
maintained sometimes despite contradictory indications, that the supernatural purpose 
towards us is wholly good and loving. The reality of the ontological Being is simply taken 
for granted and assumed as a manifest fact to be acted upon like the existence of other 
persons. An idea of faith, Hick says, necessarily includes these two different aspects and 
they are intertwined as a single whole: ‘fides and fiducia are two elements in a single whole, 
which is man’s awareness of the divine.’373  
   This distinction of the two aspects of faith becomes apparent only when a believer 
reflects on one’s faith from a philosophical point of view: ‘it is only when the religious 
believer comes to reflect upon his religion, in the capacity of philosopher … that he is 
                                                 
Jewish Bible and Christian New Testament, and, in a small scale, in Paul’s understanding of church, 
in the Jews in Diaspora, and in Mediaeval Christendom. On the basis of this recognition of the 
history, Buber says that both types of faith come from the universal nature of human beings: ‘there 
are two, and in the end only two, types of faith. To be sure there are very many contents of faith, but 
we only know faith itself in two basic forms.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 
3. Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith, trans. by N. P. Goldhawk, New York: Macmillan, 1951, p. 7. 
See also Malcolm L. Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1960, pp. 173-206.  
373 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 144.  
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obliged to concern himself with the noetic status of his faith.’374 When a believer reflects 
on himself, it emerges that faith as trust (fiducia) presupposes faith as description (fides), 
as recognition of the object of that trust. In order to worship God and commit ourselves to 
his providence one must first have faith that he exists.  
After this characterization of the two aspects of faith, Hick distinguishes two uses of 
‘interpretation’: ‘the word “interpretation” suggests the possibility of differing 
judgments’.375 In one of its senses, an interpretation is an explanation, answering the 
question, why? One speaks, for example, of a metaphysician’s interpretation of the 
universe. Therefore, it is related with the ultimate cause beyond the world. In its other 
senses, an interpretation is a recognition, answering the question, what? It is, for example, 
like the question ‘what is that, a dog or a fox?’ Therefore, it is related with a thing within 
the world. Along the line of the relation between trust (fiducia) and description (fides), Hick 
argues that ‘all explanation operates ultimately in terms of recognition.’376 This is the case 
because one renders the unfamiliar intellectually acceptable by relating it to the already 
recognizable, indicating a connection or continuity between the old and the new. One 
explains a puzzling phenomenon by disclosing its context, revealing it as part of a wider 
whole.  
   Through these aspects of Hick’s arguments on the two aspects of faith and 
                                                 
374 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 4.  
375 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 101.  
376 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 102.  
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interpretation, it becomes apparent that Hick always tries to show the identity of two 
contradictory principles. These principles are often illustrated as the epistemological side 
and the ontological side, and the epistemological side is depicted as a description of reality 
which becomes possible only through linguistic grammar within the community and the 
ontological side is depicted as an immediate trust which is exposed as an encounter with 
the reality. The epistemological side has more of a this-worldly nature, and the ontological 
side has more of an other-worldly nature. The nature of reality always has these two aspects 
at once and the tension between the two implies a dynamic order of reality on the whole 
as interaction between the two sides.  
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2.  
An Interpretation of Religion 
 
 
I. NON-REALISM OF D. Z. PHILLIPS  
   In Faith and Knowledge, John Hick explained the dual nature of knowledge as both 
experience and interpretation by relating it with perception: ‘all conscious experience of 
the physical world contains an element of interpretation … The perceiving mind is thus 
always in some degree a selecting, relating and synthesizing agent.’ 377  In An 
Interpretation of Religion, Hick still continues this basic position and it can be found in his 
defence of realism. After defending the Wittgensteinian concept of ‘seeing-as’ and its 
development into ‘experiencing as’378 , Hick refers to Roy Wood Sellars as a typical 
defender of critical realism379 and, in contrast, Hick mentions D. Z. Phillips380 as a typical 
                                                 
377 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 108.  
378 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 140-42.  
379 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 172-75.  
380 See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 198-201. In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick also 
mentions Peter Winch and Steven Katz. Hick argues Winch as a predecessor of Phillips. Winch’s 
The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy is one of the first attempt to apply 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of language to social science: ‘the criteria of logic are not a direct gift of 
God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social 
life.’ According to Winch, even a physicist is following her own grammar which has been cultivated 
within her own community and sociologist, political scientists, and economist also have their own 
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defender of non-realism.  
   Even though Hick categorizes Phillips as non-realist (‘Phillips has provided a clear and 
eloquent version of a non-realist interpretation of religion’381), Hick does not simply rejects 
the position of Phillips. Hick’s emphasis on language, culture, and forms of life is shared 
with Phillips:  
 
All awareness, whether of our more immediate or of our more ultimate environment, is 
… formed in terms of conceptual systems embodied in the language of particular 
societies and traditions.382  
 
Therefore, this section will first describe the position of Phillips and then examine Hick’s 
criticism of Phillips.  
   D. Z. Phillips has made many important contributions to philosophy of religion, and 
                                                 
kind of grammar. See Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 100. See also Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 
209.  
Hick mentions Katz when he denies the possibility of non-propositional or non-interpretative 
experience: ‘I am … in disagreement with those who distinguish, both for experience in general and 
for religious experience in particular, between ‘propositional’ or ‘interpretative’ and ‘non-
propositional’ or ‘non-interpretive’ experience … I am thus in agreement at this point with Steven 
Katz.’ In his paper ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ Katz suggests that experience is 
always mediated with interpretation: ‘there are No pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences … All 
experience is processed though, organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex 
epistemological ways.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 169. Steven Katz, ‘Language, 
Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ p. 26.  
381 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 198.  
382 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 173.  
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central to the contributions is his theory of language games and the grammar of religious 
belief.383 At the root of many problems in philosophy of religion, Phillips finds one’s 
inveterate tendency, in Wittgenstein’s expression, to ‘sublime the logic of our language,’384 
that is to take language out of their normal contexts of application and treat it as an 
abstraction in a contextual vacuum: ‘there is no question of a general justification of 
religious belief, of giving religion a ‘sound foundation’. If the philosopher wishes to give 
an account of religious belief he must begin with the contexts in which these concepts have 
their life’.385 For Phillips and Wittgenstein, the meaning of words and concepts is not 
autonomous but always mediated by their contexts. They make sense only in the context 
in which they originate and which does justice to their proper nature or character. There is 
nothing that is free of all contexts and makes sense for all contexts. The first role of 
philosophical business, therefore, is to specify and locate the proper context of application 
in which alone it makes sense to speak of a particular concept or problem at all: 
‘philosophy does not provide a foundation for prayer, it leaves everything as it is, and tries 
to give an account of it.’386 For Phillips, the confusion of subliming or de-contextualizing 
can occur in a number of ways, by ignoring the proper context of a concept, regarding 
                                                 
383 See, for example, Clark, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion, pp. 83-89, 
92-103. Anselm K. Min, ‘D. Z. Phillips on the Grammar of ‘God’,’ in International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 63, No. 1/3, 2008, pp. 131-46.  
384 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation, Aphorism 89 and 94.  
385 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 27. The italics is in the original.  
386 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 3.  
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proof as an independent, external, and prior condition for the context of believing, or 
abstracting from all contexts.  
For Phillips, God is a radically different kind of reality to which the logic of ordinary 
empirical things does not apply: ‘the criteria of the meaningfulness of religious concepts 
are to be found within religion itself, and … failure to observe this leads to 
misunderstanding.387 According to Phillips, one ignores the proper context whenever one 
speaks of God as though God were simply one object among others and try to apply the 
same logic to God that one applies to ordinary empirical things. The proper context of the 
speech about God is the religious context of worship, and God is experienced in this 
context as an absolute reality with necessary and eternal existence, as the graceful and 
loving creator of all things. In the eyes of faith, God’s existence is eternal, necessary 
existence; it is not necessity added on to an otherwise contingent existence simply 
externally and factually, as though God, without ceasing to be God, could just possibly be 
contingent although, as a matter of fact, he is not. Phillips divides the context for ordinary 
things and the one of divine things and says that the divine context requires a special kind 
of logic which is appropriate for God.  
According to Phillips, one also commits the confusion of subliming when one regards 
proof as a prior, independent, and external condition for the practice and context of 
believing: ‘it is not the task of philosopher to decide whether there is a God or not, but to 
                                                 
387 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 12.  
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ask what it means to affirm or deny the existence of God.’388 Phillips argues that it is the 
confusion committed by epistemological foundationalism that regards the belief in the 
existence of God as something to be proven in order to serve as the foundation of religious 
life. For Phillips, this is like trying to first prove the existence of the physical world before 
one actually use it for one’s many practical purposes. For him, one does not presuppose 
the existence of physical object before one sits on chairs, sets tables, and climbs stairs, but 
rather show the reality of physical objects in such activities, which is the very context in 
which alone it makes sense to speak of the reality of the chairs and tables and outside of 
which it does not. In the same way, one does not first presuppose God’s existence, as 
though it were in need of demonstration – in order to talk of his love and judgment. One 
shows the meaning or sense of the talk about God’s necessary existence precisely in the 
talk about God’s love and judgment: ‘the ultimate appeal is to actual usage itself, that is, to 
the activity of praying. Wittgenstein’s point implies that the meaning of ‘prayer’ is in the 
activity of praying.’389 According to Phillips, one’s actual engagement in the action is 
prior to the context within which the action makes sense. The meaning is made only after 
the action. This priority of action leads to a diversification of context rather than an 
enclosure within a certain framework.  
Therefore, for Phillips, considering the context of application is essential for 
determining the sense or meaning of a belief, but the meaning of ‘context’ needs further 
                                                 
388 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 10.  
389 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 3.  
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elucidation. Phillips provides this by discussing the grammatical issues involved in the 
relation between belief and its objects. The relation between belief and its object is not as 
straightforward as foundational realists tend to make it when they say that ‘one cannot 
believe in God unless one believes there is a God to believe in’. The relation depends on 
the character of the object, which requires considering the context in which belief has its 
sense but which foundational realism refuses to take into account. For foundational realism, 
action is not internal to belief but only an external consequence of belief. To believe in a 
true God is to worship God, whereas to believe in a theory does not entail such 
commitment. By divorcing belief and its object, foundational realism makes any kind of 
believing unintelligible.390  
For Phillips, the context of application for belief is the context of actions and practices 
entailed in the belief. According to Phillips, whether one believes in something is 
                                                 
390 In An Interpretation of Religion, John Hick categorizes Phillips and Don Cupitt under the 
category of non-realism. Cupitt first articulates his vision of the non-realist conception of God in 
Taking Leave of God. Christianity, Cupitt argues, must be internally appropriated by the believer as 
a disinterested practice and enactment of its religious demands. For the realization of this religious 
demand, the perpetuation of a commitment to a realist God is a hindrance rather than a help: ‘if 
indeed belief in God has to take that very objectified form then the religious consciousness must be 
obsolete; but I hope to show that things are not as bad as that … The main requirements … are a 
break with our habitual theological realism, a full internalization of all religious doctrines and themes, 
and a recognition that it is possible autonomously to adopt religious principles and practices as 
intrinsically valuable.’ From this non-realist viewpoint, Cupitt discusses that ‘it seems doubtful 
whether there is any immense cosmic or supracosmic Creator-Mind.’ Hick criticizes this non-realist 
rejection of cosmic viewpoint because it leads to a negation of ‘any notion of the ultimate goodness 
of the universe.’ See Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, pp. xii and 8, quoted in Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, pp. 200-201. See also Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 207.  
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concretely shown in one’s practices and actions. The relation between belief and its 
practical consequences or fruits is internal, not external as foundational realism would have 
it. It is precisely in and through these fruits that God is operative in one. What a belief 
amounts to is shown in how it regulates and illuminates one’s life: ‘the conceptual accounts 
of the believers must be judged on the grounds of whether they accommodate the various 
features which ‘the life of prayer’ exhibits.’391 
It is this context of practice that forms religious concepts and provides the appropriate 
condition for the sense and meaning of religious beliefs. Constituted by a set of practices 
or forms of life, every context also generates, for Phillips, a distinctive language game with 
its own worldview, grammar, and logic: ‘‘practice’, ‘activity’, ‘what we do’, in 
Wittgenstein is not something apart from language-games, since the latter are themselves 
forms of activity, practice.’392 Even language game contains a worldview or picture of the 
world, an informal system of basic propositions each of which depends on the other in 
ways that are more practical than logical, whose function is not so much to provide 
evidence and proof as to provide elucidation by underlying and shedding light on others 
that surround them. This means that the world picture with its basic propositions is not in 
itself in need of demonstration but simply taken for granted in what one thinks and does 
while shedding light on other propositions that surround them. The meaning of belief in 
God, a basic proposition, for example, is shown in the light it casts on all that surrounds it: 
                                                 
391 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 3,  
392 Phillips, Belief, Change and Forms of Life, p. 25.  
170 
 
‘no serious account can be given of religious belief which does not take note of the way in 
which it is interwoven with the surrounding features of human life.’393 Therefore, for 
Phillips, the meaning of belief in God is not a simple, readily defined idea, but rather a 
range of family or interrelated forms of life. 
Just as one shows one’s belief in the existence of other human beings by actually 
talking to them and dealing with them in many practical ways, so basic propositions and 
their totality called the ‘world picture’ shows their reality in the many particular ways of 
one’s thinking and acting. They provide the very context that makes one’s statements and 
actions meaningful, where one can make meaningful arguments and predicate truth and 
falsity, correctness and incorrectness of statements and claims. One’s worldviews 
themselves, therefore, are neither right nor wrong. The grammar of a language, the concept 
of reality in terms of which denials and affirmations may be made, is not itself a belief or 
a theory about the nature of reality. The criteria for judgment of particular statements are 
internal to this world picture, which in turn requires no external justification other than 
those practices that generate it. Whether something agrees with reality is itself a question 
that arises and makes sense only within a certain world picture. As for the practices 
themselves, they are simply there as part of one’s life: ‘we must do away with explanation 
and description alone must take its place.’394 The point of description is the solution of 
                                                 
393 Phillips, Belief, Change and Forms of Life, p. 79.  
394 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, aphorism 109, quoted in Phillips, Belief, Change 
and Forms of Life, p. 42.  
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philosophical problems: ‘the problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by 
arranging what one has always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of 
one’s intelligence by means of language.’395 
   On the basis of the above description about the philosophy of Phillips, it could be found 
that Hick shares the Wittgensteinian viewpoint with Phillips. When Hick defends ‘religion 
as a family-remembrance concept,’ Hick defends a Wittgensteinian idea that one cannot 
resolve which of their practices belong together, or what count as doing the same, without 
taking account of the cultural context in which those activities occur and the diversity of 
culture in different contexts should be affirmed as it is and there is no priority due to the 
difference of cultures:  
 
It is … illuminating to see the different traditions, movements and ideologies whose 
religious character is either generally agreed or responsibly debated, not as exemplifying 
a common essence, but as forming a complex continuum of remembrances and 
differences analogous to those found within a family.396  
 
This is the same when Hick defends the idea of ‘experiencing-as’: ‘it is at this level, at 
which experience is pervaded, moulded and coloured by human meanings, that I wish to 
maintain that all experience embodies concept-laden forms of interpretation.’397 
                                                 
395 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, aphorism 109, quoted in Phillips, Belief, Change 
and Forms of Life, p. 42.  
396 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 4.  
397 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 142.  
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   However, from Hick’s viewpoint, Phillips’ position gives an impression that forms of 
life and practice are relatively fragmented and isolated 398 , and it has a pessimistic 
orientation about the assumption of a whole perspective. What is lacking from Phillips’ 
position is a holistic integrity which must be required to introduce historical change, 
heterogeneity and mutual interaction within the whole. This is the reason why the position 
of non-realists such as Phillips is claimed by Hick to ‘negate any notion of the ultimate 
goodness of the universe.’399 According to Hick, if one follows the non-realist position, it 
leads to a conclusion that ‘the hope that the world is about to be dramatically transformed 
for the better, although entertained periodically throughout history, has so far always 
                                                 
398 As an example of Phillips’ non-realist and linguistic orientation, Hick mentions the problem of 
death: ‘I shall use as a representative sample his analysis of language about death.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 198.  
According to Phillips, ‘[it] would be foolishness … to speak of eternal life as some kind of 
appendage to human existence, something that happens after human life on earth is over.’ For 
‘eternal life is not more life, but this life seen under certain moral and religious modes of thought.’ 
See Phillips, Death and Immortality, London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977, 
pp. 48-49, quoted in Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 198. The italics is in the original. 
According to Hick, Phillips understands religious language ‘as referring, not to realities alleged 
to exist independently of ourselves, but to our own moral and spiritual states.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 199. For Hick, the question of the meaning of death does not belong 
to this life, but can be solved only after human life on earth is over. Therefore, the problem of death 
is not a matter of individual morality or spirituality, but it is a matter of independent reality. See also 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 178-80.  
This point about the problem of death will be further examined as Hick’s argument of 
eschatological verification in the 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
399 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 207.  
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proved delusory.’400 The point of Hick’s reflection on forms of life and practices is that 
the linguistic grammar that Phillips insists on is itself a product of a long history of human 
changes and subject to all the complicated interaction with competing forms of life and 
their worldviews in their contemporary world. Not only are forms of life variant in scope 
or products of history, these variations in scope and historical genesis are themselves results 
of complex interactions with other forms of life and practices, interactions which 
increasingly become internal to the affected forms, promoting, eroding, and in any case 
significantly changing their identity, which is no longer identical but internally 
heterogeneous.  
   When Hick defends Wittgensteinian philosophy or the importance of linguistic 
interpretation, Hick always adds a holistic viewpoint such as ‘higher unseen power’401 or 
‘something that is … transcendent’402. In Hick’s intention, the holistic viewpoint is not an 
imposition of an external definite perspective, but it is a uniquely created integration which 
becomes possible by participation from each different context at each specific moment. 
When Hick refers to ‘something … that stands transcendently above or undergirding 
beneath and giving meaning or value to our existence,’403 it means a living creation of 
making a new synthesis in relation to the whole.  
                                                 
400 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 207.  
401 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 5.  
402 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 172-73.  
403 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 172.  
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   According to Hick, Phillips argues that God is a different kind of reality to an object 
among other objects, but then refuses to engage in a further, systematic analysis of the 
being created and uncreated entities precisely to show the ontological basis for the 
difference in reality. Phillips does not give an analysis of what it means to create, how this 
creating is not comparable to the making of things at the level of created things of one’s 
experience. What Phillips does is to take them for granted as given grammar within a 
community, even though there is an emphasis on one’s action. There is a large core of truth 
and plausibility about Phillips’ grammatical understanding of community. However, if 
Phillips limits the belief in God only within a context of faith and worship given by a 
particular community and does not think of any possibility to have an integrated 
understanding that synthesize all the different contexts in their particularities, Hick says ‘it 
has to face the charge of an unintended elitism.’404 
 
 
II. CRITICAL REALISM OF ROY WOOD SELLARS 
   In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick makes a contrast between the non-realism of 
                                                 
404 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 207.  
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Phillips and the ‘critical realism’405 of Sellars406:  
 
Critical realism holds that the realm of religious experience and belief is not in toto 
human projection and illusion but constitutes a range of cognitive responses, varying 
from culture to culture, to the presence of a transcendent reality or realities … I want to 
contrast with this a range of non-realist and anti-realist theories which deny that religious 
language should be interpreted realistically and which offer their own alternative ways 
                                                 
405  Critical Realism is a movement which emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Following Sellars in The Philosophy of Physical Realism, Hick distinguishes the version of critical 
realism developed by Roy Wood Sellars, Arthur Lovejoy, A. K. Rogers and J. B. Pratt and the one 
developed by George Santayana, Durant Drake, and C. A. Strong. See Hick, An Interpretation of 
Religion, p. 174.  
According to Sellars, both of them agree with the independence of the external thing: 
‘perception must be regarded as directed at external objects.’ However, difference can be seen in 
their theory of knowledge. Sellars and his followers defend a creatively synthetic and evolutionally 
organic character of perception, whereas Santayana and his followers limit the basic perception 
within an instinctive belief in the world. Sellars calls Santayana’s theory of knowledge one of 
identity, in contrast with his own version which is one of disclosure: ‘I would … point out that my 
theory of knowledge is one of disclosure rather than one of identity, which is but another way of 
saying that I stress similarity as against the identity of logical entities.’ For Sellars, perception is the 
process of ‘the manifestation of order’, through which one becomes closer to the approximation of 
it. For Santayana, perception is a primitive rationality that is like ‘animal faith’ in the world. See 
Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, pp. 59-60, and 195. The italics is in the original. See 
also George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy, New 
York: Scribner, 1923. 
406 Not only Roy Wood Sellars, but also Arthur Lovejoy developed his own version of critical 
realism. In The Revolt Against Dualism, Lovejoy characterizes the positions of Alfred North 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell as the revolt against dualism, and instead defends a dualism 
contained in plain man’s common sense: ‘the starting point of the argument for physical realism, I 
suggest, is the plain man’s normal and reasonable belief that the processes of nature do not stop 
when he stops noticing them.’ See Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism, pp. 267-68.  
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of construing it.407  
 
What can be seen from this quotation is that Hick makes a contradicting argument like 
arguments in other parts of An Interpretation of Religion. On the one hand, Hick defends 
a relativistic viewpoint that the realm of religious experience and belief is constituted by a 
range of cultural cognition. On the other hand, Hick defends a holistic viewpoint that the 
realm of religious experience and belief is a response to the presence of a transcendent 
reality.408  
But what is more important here is that Hick’s version of critical realism is different 
from that of Sellars. What Hick is trying to do is to restore the central importance of the 
old, almost forgotten position of critical realism by introducing the new position of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy. This is the reason why Hick is using the expression that 
                                                 
407 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 175.  
408 On Hick’s explanation of critical realism, see also Hick, The Fifth Dimension, pp. 42-43. Hick, 
Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 104-11. Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, pp. 137-38.  
In The Fifth Dimension, Hick relates his concept of critical realism with the epistemology of 
Thomas Aquinas: ‘it was a brilliant insight of Thomas Aquinas that ‘Cognita sunt in congnoscente 
secundum modum cognoscentis’ – ‘Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the 
knower.’’ See Hick, The Fifth Dimension, p. 43.  
In The New Frontier of Religion and Science, Hick distinguishes three main positions of 
epistemology (naïve realism, idealism, and critical realism) and understands critical realism as the 
middle of the other two. Then Hick relates it with Immanuel Kant: ‘he [Kant] affirmed a reality 
beyond us and existing independently of us, but argued that we are not aware of it as it is in itself, 
unobserved, but only as the innate structure of the human mind is able to bring the impacts of that 
reality to consciousness as the phenomenal world.’ See Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, p. 138.  
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religious experience and belief varies from culture to culture. Sellars might use terms like 
interpretation or subjectivity, but does not use terms like culture or language game. By 
developing the terms from Sellars’ interpretation/subjectivity to Wittgensteinian 
culture/language game, Hick’s philosophy could incorporate an aspect of social dimension 
which Sellars’ basically epistemological philosophy of perception did not provide. It is 
Hick who discovered the social implication of critical realism to be developed into a 
nuanced position which is based on Wittgensteinian philosophy but also has a holistic 
viewpoint which emphasizes mutual interaction and historical change.409 On the basis of 
the above consideration, this section will provide a very basic description of Sellars’ 
contribution to philosophy and then the next section will examine Hick’s acceptance and 
development of Sellars’ position.  
   In his ‘Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism,’ in Contemporary American Philosophy, 
Roy Wood Sellars summarizes the essential orientation of his version of critical realism: ‘I 
was led to think of perception as a selective interpretation of external things and to break 
away completely from the subjectivistic tradition that ideas are the objects of 
knowledge.’410 What Sellars means is that the objects one perceives are not identical with 
the ideas, or appearances, by means of which one perceives them. The appearances of 
                                                 
409 This social dimension of Hick’s philosophy will further be examined in the 4th chapter of this 
dissertation.  
410  Roy Wood Sellars, ‘Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism,’ in Contemporary American 
Philosophy: Personal Statements, ed. George P. Adams and Wm. Pepperell Montague, London: G. 
Allen & Unwin; New York : Macmillan company, 1930, p. 265.  
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objects, unlike the objects themselves, are subjective effects of the perceptual process and 
depend upon the perceiving subject for their existence. It had been assumed by many 
philosophers that this subjective conception of appearances implies that the perceiving 
subject perceives only its own ideas and never perceives external objects. The principal 
task of Sellars’ philosophy is to show that this assumption is false.  
   Sellars suggests that one commits a fallacy if one believes that, merely from statements 
describing how things appear and statements describing the causal conditions of appearing, 
can one infer that appearances are perceived or that no external physical things are 
perceived. Sellars explains this fallacy ‘a reduction of perception to a mere awareness of 
sensory impressions.’411 Philosophers who describe perceiving as a representative process 
commit the fallacy when, having identified appearances with ideas, they reason that one 
can perceive only one’s own ideas; and when, having concluded that appearances or ideas 
are pictures of external things, they infer that what people perceive are pictures of things 
rather than the things themselves. Philosophers commit the fallacy when they assume that 
these two statements are mutually exclusive: (1) that appearances are ideas or subjective 
effects of physiological and psychological processes and (2) that people perceive external 
things which exist independently of one’s perception of them.  
   For Sellars, directness and mediation must be realized at the same time in the theory 
                                                 
411 Roy Wood Sellars, ‘A Statement of Critical Realism,’ in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 
Première année, No. 3, p.484. See also Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Sellars’ Critical Realism,’ in 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1954, p. 35.  
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of knowledge. On the one hand, ‘human knowing is a direct knowing of object’412 – this 
is against representative epistemology – and, on the other hand, ‘this knowing is mediated 
by logical ideas.’413 What critical realism speaks of as the content of knowing is that which 
can be exhibited in a series of propositions, and this content is the knowledge of the object 
in the complex act of knowing. Thus critical realism maintains that various people can 
know identically the same external object: ‘in perceiving one regards oneself as in some 
fashion meaning and characterizing independent public things.’414 Therefore, according 
to Sellars, the tree or John that I know is not only my idea of the tree or of John, but the 
tree or John themselves.  
   Sellars does not just deny the role of appearances. In describing the role of appearances, 
Sellars makes use of the distinction between ‘content’ of perception and the ‘object’ of 
perception. Appearances are not the object of perception, but they are the content of 
perception. Critical realism says that appearances reveal the various kinds of essences of 
the object of perception: ‘the content is relevant to the object, that it contains its structure, 
position and changes… The content of knowledge offers us the fundamental categories, 
such as time, space, structure, relations, and behavior, in term of which we think of the 
                                                 
412 Roy Wood Sellars, ‘A Re-Examination of Critical Realism,’ in Principles of Emergent Realism, 
p. 113. The italics is in the original.  
413 Sellars, ‘A Re-Examination of Critical Realism,’ in Principles of Emergent Realism, p. 113. The 
italics is in the original. 
414 Sellars, ‘A Statement of Critical Realism’, p. 474. See also Chisholm, ‘Sellars’ Critical Realism,’ 
p. 36.  
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world.’415  
   In characterizing appearances, Sellars stresses their dependence upon conditions of 
observation. By altering these conditions, a man may alter the appearance he senses; when 
he does this, ‘the appearance of a thing changes while the thing remains the same’.416 By 
viewing the thing from different places, for instance, he can vary its visual appearances in 
a way which could be correlated with a series of photographs taken from the different 
places. The way in which a thing may thus be made to appear is conditioned in part by 
certain properties of the thing.  
   There is a second respect in which appearances may be adequate to the objects of 
perception. Complex appearances or a series of appearances may, on occasion, resemble 
such objects in significant ways. Sellars says that an appearance may have a sort of 
revelatory identity with the object: ‘the basic postulate is the claim to know or … the 
revelatory nature of our predicates. This postulate, if challenged, is confirmed by the 
success of our critical thinking.’417 Sellars says that thought cures its own difficulties by 
showing how new distinctions satisfy old conflicts. Through the process of critical thinking, 
what has been thought as complex appearances or even perceptual illusion continues to 
reveal its new aspects: ‘I am convinced that the very advance of thought rests on the belief 
                                                 
415 Roy Wilfred Sellars, ‘Knowledge and its Categories,’ in Essays in Critical Realism, London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1920, p. 200.  
416 Roy Wood Sellars, The Principles and Problems of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, 1926, 
p. 50.  
417 Sellars, ‘Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism,’ p. 272. 
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that sense-perception is revelatory of nature and that the proper use of it enables us to 
penetrate into the characteristics of the world’.418  
   Here, the content of Sellars’ basic postulate about perception can be re-expressed in 
this way: every perceptual belief is prima facie credible because of the fact that it is a 
perceptual belief. If one takes a certain state of affairs to obtain, then this fact is, of itself, 
some justification for the belief that that state of affairs does obtain. Only when a particular 
belief has come into conflict with some one of other beliefs, some of our perceptual beliefs 
become false. The beliefs one does have, including those about perception and the history 
of human errors, indicate that human beings have a tendency to make correct guesses and 
that the human mind is, in this respect, adapted to the comprehension of the world.  
   On the basis of the above description, one can understand some important features of 
Sellars’ version of critical realism. First, Sellars says that human knowing is a direct 
knowing of the object.419 This directness is deeply related with the reason why Sellars’ 
philosophy is important for contemporary philosophy. As the philosophy of Phillips shows, 
one trend in contemporary philosophy is a rejection of direct relationship with reality. The 
direct relationship was called foundationalism and hidden linguistic grammar or cultural 
context were emphasized which is hidden behind the direct relationship. However, some 
weaknesses of this new position were also discovered, and a recovery of foundationalism 
                                                 
418 Sellars, ‘Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism,’ p. 273.  
419 ‘Knowing is direct in that its primary object is objective disclosure; but it is mediated by data 
and concepts.’ See Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 61.  
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has become a task of contemporary philosophy. According to Sellars, human knowing 
reveals only a partial truth of the object, but the partial knowledge is not a representation 
of the object but is part of reality. This notion of partial but direct knowledge of the object 
can be seen as an important feature of Sellars’ philosophy.  
   Second, Sellars says that appearances of the object reveal various kinds of essences of 
the object of perception.420 This diversity of appearances of object can also be understood 
as an important feature of Sellars’ philosophy. It supposes a lot of different sources of 
knowledge and each contributes to construct the whole understanding of reality. According 
to Sellars, the basis of reality can be understood as a total balance of different kinds of 
elements rather than a tangible, but partial element which is chosen as one of possibilities. 
When one seeks to recover the basis of reality, one can choose a narrow but certain 
foundation, but Sellars took an alternative, more holistic direction. The holistic direction 
might be less certain, but could be more reliable. Sellars says that complex appearances or 
a series of appearances of object construct a whole understanding of the object. This idea 
can also be seen as an important feature of Sellars’ philosophy.  
   Third, Sellars says that thought cures its own difficulties by showing how new 
                                                 
420 Sellars calls this point levels of causality: ‘it will be my argument that science and philosophy 
are only now becoming sufficiently aware of the principles involved in the facts of levels, of natural 
kinds, of organization, to all of which the old materialism was blind. I shall even carry the notion of 
levels into causality and speak of levels of causality.’ Sellars also names the same point from the 
side of the knower as levels of knowing: ‘knowing must be studied at its various levels as a 
characteristic claim of the human knower.’ See Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 4 
and 73. The italics is in the original.  
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distinctions satisfy old conflicts. 421  This emphasis on the historical process of 
reconciliation and maturation also shows another important feature of Sellars’ philosophy. 
Not only Wittgensteinian philosophy of Phillips, but also analytical philosophy in general 
has a possible weakness of a lack of historical awareness. Sellars says that human beings 
have an evolutional tendency to make correct guesses and they can develop the 
comprehension of the world through the history of errors. By introducing the insight of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy which emphasizes cultural difference and language game, 
Hick tries to inherit the historical awareness of Sellars in a very different setting of 
contemporary philosophy.422  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
421 Sellars calls this aspect of his position as evolutionary naturalism: ‘the evolutionary naturalist 
holds that, just as matter is unevenly distributed throughout the universe, so are conditions making 
for complicated organic synthesises such as life and mind … The generic category is change; at the 
very least, evolution is a kind of cumulative change … Evolutionary naturalism rests upon physical 
realism and the fact of creative synthesis.’ See Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 3.  
422 Various aspects of Hick’s philosophy can be understood as a recovery of an old pre-analytical 
worldview from within a new analytical worldview. This point will further be examined in the 5th 
chapter of this dissertation.  
184 
 
 
3.  
Hick’s Defence of Critical Realism 
 
 
   When Hick makes a contrast between the non-realism of Phillips and the critical 
realism of Sellars, the comparison has an implication of an historical awareness that by 
introducing the currently neglected position of critical realism, which had been popular in 
the early twentieth century, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, which had been 
popular in the late twentieth century, can make a further contribution to a progress of 
philosophy. For example, one of the central claims of Sellars’ philosophy is that there is an 
irreducible difference between human subjectivity in all its forms and the objectivity of 
reality. In contrast, Wittgensteinian appeal to language games and forms of life as the 
context of meaning and evaluation can be understood as one of the attempts in the 
anthropocentric direction to measure and evaluate reality by the criteria of human 
subjectivity in its many forms, individual and collective, theoretical and practical.  
   If Hick’s argument can be understood as a contribution to philosophy, its central 
significance lies in the way of considering the relation between language and reality. Hick 
is careful to deal with the necessity of language and not to simply deny the appeal of 
subjectivity: ‘the kind of religious realism that I shall advocate takes full account of the 
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subjective contribution to all awareness.’423 According to Hick, reality is indeed mediated, 
theoretically interpreted and practically transformed, by human beings in light of their 
worldviews and horizons. This fact, however, should not lead one to the anthropocentric 
illusion that there is nothing outside the horizons or language games. Despite all the 
inevitable mediation by one’s own subjectivity, reality remains both other and more than 
what it means to the human subject: ‘the sensory data of which we are directly aware (or 
which we ‘intuit’) are private to the perceiving consciousness, but … it is by means of 
these private contents of consciousness that we are able to live in relation to a physical 
world transcending our own mind.’424  
   Without denying that some ideas might be more adequate than others, one’s collective 
ideas are not identical with the objective reality of the things and situations of which one 
has ideas. According to Hick, human beings have a tendency to assume a simple identity 
between one’s ideas and the objective reality of the world and claim that the world is what 
one thinks it is. One entertains the illusion that one’s ideas are themselves the realities of 
the world, reducing the world to one’s subjectivity. Through various experiences, 
empirical researches, but most dramatically disasters natural or social, one learns that one’s 
ideas are wrong, often shocked and disillusioned into the recognition of the persisting 
difference and contradiction between one’s thoughts and the world one thinks about. 
Changes in the real world have a way of replacing and displacing philosophical systems.  
                                                 
423 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174.  
424 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174.  
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   Phillips had tried to place God in the religious context where God can be recognized 
as an absolute reality. He does this by saying that to know God is to worship God, that to 
worship God is to change one’s ways in light of God. The claim is that there is an internal 
relation between belief and practice: belief by its nature is meant to lead to the 
transformation of one’s existence. Hick adds a careful reservation to this position of 
Phillips. Hick says that one should not equate the necessary exhortation to subjective 
transformation with a statement of the objective reality of the object of belief. To say that 
there is an internal relation between belief and practice is still to maintain a distinction 
between the two. By the nature of the content, the belief demands to be actualized by each 
subject who believes. There is also the objective side of the reality, which should not be 
equated with and reduced to its role in the transformation of subjective existence. It is the 
intention for Hick, then, to realize that in one’s haste to emphasize the imperative of 
transforming one’s subjectivity, one should not forget the transcendent reality over us. 
   What Hick intends when he accepts the two contradictory standpoints of linguistic and 
realistic is the tension between subjectivity and objectivity. On the one hand, it is important 
to emphasize a linguistic standpoint within Hick’s argument: ‘we have already recognized 
the unavoidable element of interpretation within all conscious experience’.425 This is one 
of the points Hick learned from the critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars: ‘critical differed 
from naïve realism mainly in taking account of the conceptual and interpretative element 
                                                 
425 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 173.  
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within sense perception.’426 The linguistic side of Hick’s argument, which is inherited 
from Wittgenstein, corresponds to the necessity of conceptual interpretation, or subjective 
appearance, of Sellars. They, accordingly, acknowledge that the sense perception of which 
one is directly aware is subjective to the conceptual interpretation of an individual or a 
culture. On the other hand, the kind of religious realism that Hick advocates takes full 
account of the realistic standpoint to an awareness of a human being. One is living in a 
physical world transcending one’s own minds by means of the conceptual, or subjective, 
contents. Thus, sense perception is a complexly mediated awareness of the physical world: 
‘attitudes, expectations, memories, accepted facts, all operate interpretatively to make us 
regard ourselves as somehow aware of public, independent things.’427 In the form of 
religious realism that Hick advocates, the realm of religious experience and belief is not in 
toto human projection but constitutes a range of cognitive responses, varying from culture 
to culture, to the presence of a transcendent reality. Therefore, specific human language, 
which is working from within individuals and society, is seen to be real that is situated 
within the whole: ‘what I am calling the realist option understands such language in a 
basically realist way as referring to an object of discourse that is ‘there’ to be referred to.’428 
This chapter has examined a theoretically typical aspect of Hick’s philosophy as the 
                                                 
426 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 174.  
427 Roy Wood Sellars, ‘A Statement of Critical Realism’, p. 477, quoted in Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, p. 175.  
428 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 173.  
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contradictory relation between language and reality. More concrete aspects of Hick’s 
philosophy (the epistemic, the social, and the historical) could not be fully explored in this 
chapter. These aspects will be further examined in later chapters.  
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Chapter 4.  
 
COSMIC OPTIMISM 
Contradiction between the Particular and the Universal 
 
 
   When Hick explains cosmic optimism in An Interpretation of religion, there is a sense 
of historical progress which is realized through gradual reconciliation of fundamental 
contradictions in the world:  
 
The proclamation of a limitlessly better possibility arising from another reality, 
transcendent to our present selves … we can express this abstractly by saying that post-
axial religion embodies a cosmic optimism.429 
 
What I called earlier the cosmic optimism of each of the great traditions is intensified 
when we see them all as pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly better existence and 
as affirming that the universe is such that this limitlessly better possibility is actually 
available to us and can begin to be realized in each present moment.430  
 
This sense of historical progress is what Hick intends when he divides the two 
                                                 
429 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 56.  
430 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 380. 
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contradictory standpoints between the epistemological/linguistic, which indicates diversity 
of religions, and the ontological/cosmic, which indicates totality of religions.  
   This basic structure of Hick’s philosophy is not only shown in a tension between 
language and reality (this aspect was discussed in the last chapter), but also takes various 
forms from the early stage of Faith and Knowledge towards the late stage of An 
Interpretation of Religion and beyond. For example, the substantive argument of Faith 
and Knowledge can be found in Part II and Part III.431 Part II discusses William James, 
Immanuel Kant, and John Henry Newman respectively, and this part is recognized as a 
preparation which mainly discusses an epistemological side of faith and will be integrated 
into a wider perspective in Part III.432 Under a fundamental influence from John Oman, 
Part III discusses the ontological side of faith and integrates the epistemological side of 
faith from the viewpoint of totality, which is discussed as a relation between the natural 
and the supernatural.433  
                                                 
431 ‘Any contribution that the book may make to current discussions in the philosophy of religion 
is contained, so far as criticism is concerned, in Part II and, so far as construction is concerned, in 
Part III.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. v.  
432 ‘Part II will review three types or groups of theory concerning the nature of theistic faith … they 
are, I think, the most important theories, both in themselves and in relation to the standpoint to be 
developed in Part III. In each case I shall offer criticisms of the theory under discussion, and yet 
from each of them a significant truth will be carried forward into the next part.’ See Hick, Faith and 
Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
433 ‘In Part III, the central section of the book, I shall offer for the reader’s consideration an account 
of the nature of religious faith and its relation to human cognition … I shall not refer to Oman’s 
discussion in detail, either by way of exposition or of criticism, those who are acquainted with The 
Natural and the Supernatural (1931) will find in the present essay an attempt to work out Oman’s 
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   In An Interpretation of Religion, the basic structure of cosmic optimism is further 
developed and it is shown in various arguments such as ‘the religious ambiguity of the 
universe,’ ‘the distinction of the physical, the ethical, and the religious,’ etc. More 
specifically, the religious ambiguity of the universe is discussed in Part Two of An 
Interpretation of Religion:  
 
The universe is religiously ambiguous in that it is possible to interpret it, intellectually 
and experientially, both religiously and naturalistically.434  
 
In the argument about the religious ambiguity of the universe, Hick intends to use the 
concepts of the religious and the naturalistic in a basically epistemological and linguistic 
manner, because they are based on a particular interpretation. Both natural science and 
religion have equally appropriate evidence, and therefore both have a similarly limited 
reliability.435  
   However, when the distinction of the physical, the ethical, and the religious is 
discussed in Part Three, Hick discusses them in a different manner. On the one hand, Hick 
intends to use the concepts of the physical and the ethical in a basically epistemological 
                                                 
basic standpoint in relation to the very different world of contemporary philosophy.’ See Hick, Faith 
and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
434 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 12.  
435 ‘We are continuously experiencing aspects of our environment as having kinds of meaning in 
virtue of which it is appropriate for us to behave within it in this or that way or range of ways.’ See 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 12.  
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and linguistic manner like the case of the natural and the religious (‘both the religious and 
the naturalistic ways of construing the world arise from a fundamental cognitive choice, 
which I call faith, which is continuous with the interpretive element within our experience 
of the physical and ethical character of our environment’436), and, on the other hand, Hick 
further intends to use the concept of the religious in a basically ontological and holistic 
manner (‘as religious beings we continue to live in the world in terms of its physical and 
ethical meanings, but do so in new ways required by its religious meaning’437). Here, the 
religious intends to have no content, but works in a relating and synthesizing way.438 What 
should be understood here is that Hick uses the concept of the religious in two different 
manners: the epistemological and the ontological.  
On the basis of this recognition, the first section of this chapter will examine the basic 
structure of Hick’s philosophy in Faith and Knowledge (Hick’s argument about Kant will 
be discussed in the 5th chapter). The second section will examine An Interpretation of 
Religion (Hick’s argument about Kant and soteriology will be discussed in the 5th and 6th 
                                                 
436 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 13. 
437 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 13.  
438  ‘It is interpretive element within religious experience that enables us to enter into an 
uncompelled, though always necessarily limited and mediated, awareness of the Real … Religious 
traditions, considered as ‘filters’ or ‘resistances’, function as totalities which include not only 
concepts and images of God or of the Absolute, with the modes of experience which they inform, 
but also systems of doctrine, ritual and myth, art form, moral codes, lifestyles and patterns of social 
organization. For religions have been basically communal responses to the real, rooted in the life of 
societies and forming an essential element of human culture.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of 
Religion, pp. 162-63.  
193 
 
chapter). The third section will provide an intermediate summary of the argument up to 
this point, which discusses a connection between reliabilism and cosmic optimism.  
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1. 
Faith and Knowledge 
 
 
I. WILLIAM JAMES  
   This and next sections will examine Hick’s discussion about William James and John 
Henry Newman. Their philosophical arguments can be understood as typical liberal and 
conservative argument around the late 19th century and the early 20th century. Hick’s 
criticism against them is that their arguments are structured to defend a particular kind of 
knowledge which is distinct from other kinds of knowledge, and consequently they cover 
only a limited field of human knowledge and fail to include a totality within their theory, 
even though James has a liberal orientation and Newman has a conservative orientation.  
   For example, James proposes to understand faith as hypothesis: ‘faith … is 
synonymous with working hypothesis … [The believer’s] intimate persuasion is that the 
odds in its favour are strong enough to warrant him in acting all along on the assumption 
of its truth.’ 439  Again, ‘faith means belief [strong enough to determine action] in 
something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible.’440 Here James suggests 
                                                 
439 William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, New York, 1897, p. 95, quoted in Hick, 
Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 48.  
440 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 90, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
195 
 
that there are a lot of different choices and faith makes one choose one of them. To further 
clarify the nature of faith, James suggests that the justification of faith does not come from 
outside faith, but justification comes from inside faith: ‘there are cases … where faith 
creates its own verification.’441 According to James, faith has its own way of justification 
and it is distinguished from the other ways of justification: ‘there are truths which cannot 
become true till our faith has made so.’442 Here one can find a weak foundationalist 
argument to justify the limited reliability of a particular position. James says that faith 
requires its own way of justification. Faith is not an incorrigible truth for everyone, but it 
is a specific truth which is chosen by a particular person. The idea of hypothesis is here 
used to limit the applicable validity of the nature of faith and instead give a specific 
characteristic to it.  
   Then the argument of James goes in a little different direction and he mentions an 
example of personal relationship. In the case of personal relationship, the beginning of 
personal relationship does not come from the result of logical inference, but the 
relationship immediately presupposes the existence of another person’s friendliness: ‘the 
previous faith on my part in your liking’s existence is in such cases what makes your 
likings come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective 
                                                 
Edition, p. 49.  
441 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 97, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 49.  
442 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 96, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 49. 
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evidence, until you shall have done something apt, as the absolutists say, ad extorquendum 
assensum meum, ten to one your liking never comes.’ 443  James says that the 
presupposition of the other’s liking’s existence does not mean the personal relationship is 
irrational, but it means that the personal relationship has its own way of reasonability, in 
which cognitivity and experience are intricately mixed.  
   James relates this aspect of faith with trust: ‘a social organism of any sort whatever, 
large and small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust 
that the other members will simultaneously do theirs.’444 According to James, trust is what 
makes community possible, and trust is not just one’s imaginative projection but it is a fact 
of community. To understand the reason of the basis of community, one must figure out 
this aspect of faith: ‘wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many 
independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in 
one another of those immediately concerned.’445 James says that the reasonability of faith 
as trust is different from pure logical inference, but it has its own kind of reasonability. 
Faith is not just a personal imaginative projection, but is based in community.  
   Then, John Hick interrupts the argument of William James and adds his own argument. 
                                                 
443 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, pp. 23-24, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 
First Edition, p. 49.  
444 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 24, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 50. 
445 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 24, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 50. 
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Hick says that James’ argument from precursive faith cannot be applied to the proof for 
the existence of God, because ‘such faith does not create the person of the friend but only 
makes that person friendly.’446 The precursive faith is relevant to beliefs about matters 
which depend wholly or partly upon communal processes governed by ourselves, but it 
cannot be applied to the conviction that there is a God. Hick says that the precursive faith 
‘has a like part to play in the relationship between man and God. But this would not be 
faith making theism true.’447 According to Hick, communal faith could only be effective 
if theism were already true. For otherwise there would be nothing in the cosmos to respond 
to our advances of trust and worship: ‘precursive faith, then, is a real and important 
phenomenon, but it does not bear directly upon theistic belief.’448 
   Thereafter, Hick distinguishes two kinds of faiths: ‘the argument from the nature of 
personal relationship is important for the neighboring topic of faith as trust (fiducia), but 
not for that of faith as cognition (fides).’449 According to Hick, both aspects of faith are 
necessary for the full understanding of faith: ‘fides and fiducia are two elements in a single 
whole.’450 Faith as trust is necessary to understand the relationship between man and God, 
and it is a process governed by community. However, to make this aspect of faith possible, 
there must be another kind of faith as cognition. If one follows James’ argument, according 
                                                 
446 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 51.  
447 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 51.  
448 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 51.  
449 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 55.   
450 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 186-87. 
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to Hick, it implies that the personal faith as cognition is primary and the communal faith 
as trust is secondary, because what is given from community is just a human construction. 
However, faith as cognition can go beyond the human construction and it can touch the 
ultimate cause of the universe.451 
   On the basis of the distinction of the two types of faith, Hick interprets the ‘will to 
believe’ argument of William James as essentially the argument to defend faith as 
cognition, which makes the personal conviction true. James opens his argument of the will 
to believe from the premise of epistemological agnosticism: ‘nothing can be gained … by 
waiting for proof that God does or does not exist, for such proof may never be 
forthcoming.’452 But nevertheless the issue is of tremendous concern to us. The decision 
between belief and disbelief is a living, momentous, and forced option, and one which 
nevertheless cannot be decided by rational enquiry. Whichever way one decides, one runs 
a risk: ‘in either case we act, taking our life in our hands.’453 James says that both believer 
                                                 
451 Hick’s understanding of James’s argument, which emphasizes the personal aspect of faith as 
cognition, is a typical modern position. In another part of Faith and Knowledge, Hick gives a 
different explanation of faith in the pre-modern period, which emphasizes the communal aspect of 
faith as trust: ‘it is significant that in the Bible faith appears frequently as fiducia and hardly at all as 
fides. The reality of the divine Being is assumed throughout as a manifest fact.’ At the time of the 
Bible, faith as trust was the primary aspect of faith. People were living in a closed community on 
the basis of the trust in transcendent Being, and they could have no doubt in the existence of God: 
‘the validity of faith in divine existence, like the validity of sense perception in ordinary life, is simply 
taken for granted and acted upon.’ Only after the modern period, personal faith was seen as more 
primary than communal faith. See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 3-4.  
452 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 52. 
453 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, p. 30, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
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and disbeliever are making hypotheses which warrant them in acting all along on the 
assumption of its truth: ‘[a faith-vetoer] is actively playing his stake as much as the believer 
is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the 
religious hypothesis against the field.’454 James is asserting the right to believe at one’s 
own risk whatever one feels an inner need to believe. A believer’s own stake is important 
enough to give one the right to choose one’s own form of risk.  
   According to Hick, this is the essence of the ‘will to believe’ argument, and this aspect 
of faith warrants faith as cognition. It is still a working hypothesis, but it is about the 
personal conviction that there is a God. This argument can be understood as a weak 
foundationalism, and, for example, it can be found in James’ argument that both believer 
and disbeliever are making hypotheses. Here James means that both religious and natural 
interpretations of the universe have their specific reasons to defend their positions. That is, 
James gives up the perfect reliability of both positions and understands them as imperfect 
but reliable positions.  
Then, Hick suggests that James’ argument from personal relationship, which secures 
faith as trust, must be understood on the very basis of the ‘will to believe’ argument, which 
secures the faith as cognition. All valuable personal relationship is genetically based upon 
faith as trust, upon treating others in a more trustful way than the evidence currently 
                                                 
Edition, p. 52. The italics is in the original.  
454 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, pp. 26-27, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 
First Edition, p. 53. 
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warrants. What one needs to make a good community is faith as trust. But to make the 
community possible in the first place, one needs the faith as cognition. A communal 
practice of faith as trust presupposes an experiment of personal faith as cognition: 
‘knowledge in the personal sphere consists precisely in faith which has been put into 
practice and verified in our experience. But clearly, if this is so, we cannot have the 
verification without experiment … we cannot enjoy the flower if we never plant the 
seed.’455 According to Hick, James’ argument suggests that one can enjoy the flower of 
religious community, only if we admit an individual experiment of personal conviction. 
   As a concluding comment on the argument given by William James, John Hick says 
that James’ argument from personal conviction is applicable to any faiths in the world: ‘if 
it is rational to believe in the Christian God on the ground that this may be the only way of 
gaining the final truth, then it is equally rational to believe in any alternative religious 
system which may also be the sole pathway to Truth.’456 Hick says that if the personal 
conviction authorizes us to believe any proposition that is not demonstrably false, but has 
an inner need from the inside of a believer, then any sort of accidental circumstance may 
predispose us towards a proposition: ‘for a Chinese, Confucianism (or rather, today, 
Communism) tends to be a live option; for an Arab, Mohammedanism; and for a Briton 
or an American, Christianity.’457 Hick’s argument here can be understood as a necessary 
                                                 
455 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 55. The italics is in the original.  
456 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 56-57. The italics is in the original.  
457 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 56.  
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consequence of weak foundationalism. The weak foundational argument gives specific 
meanings to different foundations. Instead of giving up a perfectly reliable position, weak 
foundationalism can give expressions to diverse positions which could not be understood 
as a specific position before.  
   Hick understands a consequence of James’ position that it requires us to respect any 
faith in the world, but keep holding one’s own truth. It is firstly because the personal 
conviction often follows just a geographical orientation: ‘to a purely rational mind, 
liberated from the accidents of geography and illuminated by James’s argument, it must 
appear as important to believe in the Mahdi or Mohammed or any other self-assertive 
person who offers a heaven and threatens a hell as to believe in the orthodox God of Europe 
and America.’458 Secondly because the self-insurance often comes from an exclusive 
belief in something: ‘the only reasonable course would be to wager our faith where the 
greatest good is to be hoped for if our faith should turn out to be justified.’459 Hick goes 
on to say that one should believe in that religion or philosophy which one most desire to 
be true. For it may be that it is true, and that only by pinning one’s faith on it can one 
realizes its benefits.  
   What can be understood from the above examination of Hick’s understanding of 
James is that James does have an understanding of the two types of faith (‘faith as cognition’ 
and ‘faith as trust’). However, in Hick’s interpretation, James’ theory has an emphasis on 
                                                 
458 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 57.  
459 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 57. 
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the aspect of ‘faith as cognition’ and it fails to give an appropriate position to ‘faith as trust’ 
by interpreting it as secondary and superficial. As a consequence of ‘faith as cognition,’ 
James’ argument has the implication of respecting any faith in the world, but it is just about 
a defence of personal preference and it fails to theorize a totality of the world. This is why 
Hick calls James’ position just ‘wishful thinking’460: ‘is he not saying that since the truth is 
unknown to us we may believe what we like and that while we are about it we had better 
believe what we like most?’461 According to Hick, if one accepts James’s advice, it just 
means that each person will follow what each person likes and accordingly there is no 
unity in the world.462 James’ argument of ‘the will to believe’ gives a defence of a limited 
field of personal choice and it is important as a part of the whole aspect of faith, but it does 
not give a defence of totality: ‘although James … [ascribes] to the human will too large 
and central a part in the act of faith, it would equally be a mistake to accord to it no place 
at all. Faith is an activity of the whole man, and as such there is a volitional side to it … 
religious faith is a ‘total interpretation,’ or mode of apperceiving the world.’463  
 
                                                 
460 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 57.   
461 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 57.  
462 James’ argument of The Will to Believe can also be seen in Hick’s An Interpretation of Religion 
and Hick gives a similar evaluation of James’ position: ‘the weakness of his [James’] position, as he 
himself presents it, is that it would authorize us to believe anything that we may have a strong 
enough propensity to believe, providing the evidence concerning it is inconclusive.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 227.  
463 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 65-66.  
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II. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 
   A similar structure, which defends only a limited field, can be seen in Hick’s 
interpretation of John Henry Newman. According to Hick, in spite of Newman’s own 
intention to theorize totality (‘he [Newman] was deeply conscious of the fact that our more 
fundamental convictions are reached, not by the intellect alone, but by the whole man 
functioning as a thinking, feeling, and willing unity’464), Newman’s project actually 
remains to defend only a limited field.  
   The reason why Hick understands Newman’s faith as limited is because Newman’s 
faith is intended to be a choice among different options. On the one hand, there is faith 
which is about totality, and on the other hand, there is logic which is about abstraction. On 
the basis of this dictum, Newman chooses faith. According to Hick, the limited character 
of Newman’s argument is shown in his distinction between ‘real’ and ‘notional’ thinking 
in his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent: ‘now there are propositions, in which one or 
both of the terms are common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-
                                                 
464 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 83. As an example of Newman’s intention to 
understand faith as totality, Hick quotes from Newman’s Apologia pro Vita Sua: ‘for myself … it 
was not logic, then, that carried me on; as well might one say that the quicksilver in the barometer 
changes the weather. It is the concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and I find my 
mind in a new place; how? the whole man moves; paper logic is but the record of it.’ See Newman, 
Apologia pro Vita Sua, Second Edition, London, 1865, p. 188, quoted in Hick, Faith and 
Knowledge, First Edition, p. 83.   
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existing, such as ‘Man is an animal, some men are learned, an Apostle is a creation of 
Christianity, a line is a length without breadth’ … These I shall call notional propositions, 
and the apprehension with which we infer or assent to them, notional. And there are other 
propositions, which are composed of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand for 
things external to us, unit and individual, as ‘Philip was the father of Alexander, the earth 
goes round the sun, the Apostles first preached to the Jews’; and these I shall call real 
propositions, and their apprehension real.’465 
   Newman tries to relate the side of the ‘real’ thinking, which is about the singularity of 
reality, with what he calls faith. Newman’s intention is to deal with convictions concerning 
matters of fact, which are as such outside the scope of demonstrative proof. Newman 
introduces a new concept to theorize a human faculty which understands the specific, 
factual, and realistic nature of faith: ‘the illative sense’466. Firstly, what Newman means by 
the illative sense is a capacity to see a large field of evidence as a whole. Newman is 
concerned to make the point that one’s reasoning is often implicit, but that it is none the 
less rational on that account: ‘the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen in 
the number and direction of accumulated premisses, which all converge to it, and as the 
result of their combination, approach it more nearly than any assignable difference, yet do 
not touch it logically (though only not touching it) on account of the nature of its subject-
                                                 
465 Newman, A Grammar of Assent, ed. C. F. Harrold, New York, 1947, p. 8, quoted in Hick, Faith 
and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 87.   
466 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 90.  
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matter, and the delicate and implicit character of at least part of reasonings on which it 
depends. It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premisses, which are only probable, 
not by invincible syllogism – by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralised, by 
difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for 
correlations found for received truth, by suspense and delay in the process issuing in 
triumphant reactions – by all these ways and many others, it is that the practiced and 
experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which 
his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession.’467  
   Then, Newman also argues that one’s reasoning concerning matters of fact involves 
an unavoidably personal element, a recognition of which is vital to the study of such 
fundamental convictions as those of religion: ‘what to one intellect is a proof is not so to 
another … We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our 
criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and 
moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his 
arguments or conclusions upon our minds.’468 
   According to Hick, Newman’s concept of illative sense does theorize an important 
                                                 
467 Newman, A Grammar of Assent, p. 244, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, 
pp. 93-94. Also, ‘many of our most obstinate and most reasonable certitudes depends on proofs 
which are informal and personal, which baffle our powers of analysis, and cannot be brought under 
logical rule, because they cannot be submitted to logical statistics.’ See Newman, A Grammar of 
Assent, p. 229, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 95.  
468 Newman, A Grammar of Assent, pp. 223 and 230, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 99.  
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aspect of faith (‘Newman’s doctrine of the illative sense is … to be accepted as 
substantially correct’469). Newman rightly theorized that one knows a great many things 
which one is not able to prove, and that religious judgement comes from a personal ability 
to respond to indefinable indications in a given field and to marshal a mass of apparently 
unrelated evidences.  
However, Hick says that Newman’s argument fails to theorize a totality of faith (‘his 
answer is not … finally satisfactory’470). This is because Newman understands divine 
existence as a kind of an ultimate proposition to be arrived at, and this is shown in 
Newman’s intention ‘to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove 
for certain that I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it.’471 According 
to Hick, Newman’s argument shows that one’s belief in divine existence is concerned with 
propositions of essentially the same logical type as ‘New York is to the north of 
Washington’ or ‘Lincoln was born in 1809’. The only important difference which 
Newman recognizes is that various kinds of implicit evidences and personal response to 
those, which are not evoked by propositions of purely logical kind, tend to intervene in 
matters of religion.  
   According to Hick, Newman is supposing that there is the realm of the natural, on the 
                                                 
469 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 100.  
470 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 101.  
471 Newman, A Grammar of Assent, p. 312, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, 
pp. 101-102.  
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one hand, and there is another realm of the supernatural, on the other: ‘he [Newman] 
assumes that truth in both the natural and the supernatural spheres may be ascertained in 
essentially the same way – the adding up of probabilities until they amount to virtual 
certainty.’472 Hick says that Newman understands the divine existence as something one 
can finally arrives at after the process of reasoning, but, for Hick, the divine existence is 
not a proposition like ‘New York is to the north of Washington’. Newman understands 
faith as a choice among other options and, in this sense, Newman’s understanding of faith 
covers only a limited field. However, as John Oman has suggested, the natural and the 
supernatural cannot be separated and the supernatural can be found only from within the 
natural: ‘the revelation of the Supernatural was by reconciliation to the Natural; and this 
was made possible by realizing in the Natural the meaning and purpose of the 
Supernatural.’473 This understanding of the natural and the supernatural will further be 
examined in the next section. 
   What can be seen from the argument above is that, in spite of Newman’s own intention 
to theorize faith as totality, Newman fails to theorize totality. This is because Newman 
divides the realm of faith as totality, on the one hand, and the realm of logic as abstraction, 
on the other hand. There is no dialectical interaction between them. By the concept of 
                                                 
472 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 104. Newman says that ‘from probabilities we may 
construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude.’ See Newman, A Grammar of Assent, p. 312, 
quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 104-05. 
473 John Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 448, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 
First Edition, p. 130.  
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illative sense, Newman tries to theorize a personal capacity to see a large field of evidence 
as a whole, and it can be understood as an important aspect of faith. But, if Newman 
defends the fixed distinction between faith and logic, Newman’s faith remains to defend 
only a limited field.474  
 
 
III. THE ORIGIN OF COSMIC OPTIMISM 
   In the previous sections, Hick’s understanding of the arguments of William James and 
John Henry Newman was examined, and both of their arguments were shown to cover 
only a limited field and they fail to theorize a totality which Hick defends as a necessary 
aspect of his understanding of faith.  
   In the beginning of Part III of Faith and Knowledge, Hick says that his understanding 
                                                 
474 In the second edition of Faith and Knowledge, Hick further adds an example of Thomas 
Aquinas and his understanding of the virtue of faith as another epistemological understanding of 
faith. According to Hick, Aquinas teaches that faith is a virtue precisely because it is not compelled. 
Faith is belief which is not coercively evoked by intrinsic evidence but which is produced by a 
voluntary adhesion to divine revelation: ‘the believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is 
moved by the authority of divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward 
instigation of the divine invitation; and so he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient 
reason for scientific knowledge [ad sciendum] and hence he does not lose the merit.’ Hick says that 
even if there is sufficient reason, it cannot force one to believe. The belief is only partially evidenced 
to be rational, and the believer is always required to be engaged with free action. See Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, pt. II, II, Q. 2, Art. 9, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 
19.  
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of faith is based on an ordinary religious believer (instead of a special person on whom 
James’ and Newman’s understanding depend): ‘it is not apart from the course of mundane 
life, but in and through it, that the ordinary religious believer claims to experience, however 
imperfectly and fragmentarily, the divine presence and activity.’475 According to Hick, 
the ordinary believer meets God not only in moments of worship, but also when through 
the urgings of conscience he feels the pressure of the divine demand upon his life. Hick 
says that this is what John Oman means by the relation between the natural and the 
supernatural: ‘the question concerns … the possibility of an awareness of the divine being 
mediated through awareness of the world, the supernatural through the natural.’476 
   Hick further explains the relation between the natural and the supernatural by 
introducing the concept of ‘significance’:  
 
By significance I mean that fundamental and all-pervasive characteristic of our 
conscious experience which de facto constitutes it for us the experience of a ‘world’ and 
not of a mere empty void or churning chaos. We find ourselves in a relatively stable and 
ordered environment in which we have come to feel, so to say, ‘at home’.477  
 
Hick says that the world becomes intelligible, only on the basic condition that the world is 
a familiar place in which one can learn to act and react in a natural and appropriate way. If 
                                                 
475 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 110.  
476 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 110.  
477 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 112.  
210 
 
one wishes to adopt purposes and adapt means to ends, the world has to reveal to one a 
familiar, settled cosmos in which one is living and acting: ‘it is in virtue of this homely, 
familiar, intelligible character of experience – its possession of significance – that we are 
able to inhabit and cope with our environment.’478  
   Then, Hick says that as a further condition for the world to have significance, the world 
must be experienced by a particular person. This is because just the objective world from 
nowhere cannot provide the homely character: ‘a universe devoid of consciousness would 
be neither significant nor nonsignificant.’479 From a perspective of a particular person, a 
puzzling phenomenon becomes intelligible by disclosing its context, revealing it as part of 
a wider whole. A person renders the unfamiliar intellectually acceptable by relating it to 
the already recognizable, indicating a connection or continuity between the old and the 
new: ‘the significance for us of the physical world, nature, is that of an objective 
environment whose character and ‘laws’ we must learn, and towards which we have 
continually to relate ourselves aright if we are to survive.’480 
   After the explanation of ‘significance,’ Hick begins to introduce another concept of 
‘interpretation’. According to Hick, interpretation plays a fundamentally important role as 
a subjective correlate of significance, because the act of interpretation and the existence of 
the world is always related: ‘the perceiving mind is thus always in some degree a selecting, 
                                                 
478 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 112.  
479 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 115.  
480 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 121.  
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relating and synthesizing agent, and experiencing our environment involves a continuous 
activity of interpretation.481  
Then, Hick begins to discuss a more basic act of interpretation:  
 
We have now to note, however, the further and more basic act of interpretation which 
reveals us the very existence of a material world, a world which we explore and inhabit 
as our given environment. In attending to this primary interpretative act we are noting 
the judgement which carries us beyond the solipsist predicament into an objective world 
of enduring, causally interacting objects, which we share with other people.482  
 
Hick says that if one starts from a personal perspective, ‘there would be only one person 
in existence, and other ‘people,’ instead of being apprehended as independent centres of 
intelligence and purpose, would be but human-like appearances.’483  The world has 
significance only in relation to a particular person, and the particular person in the particular 
world is fundamentally different from any other persons in the shared world. This is a 
necessary consequence of the singularity of a person. However, in one’s normal mode of 
experience, one is naturally acting and reacting with other persons as if they are real 
persons, who are the centres of the universe, just like oneself. This is a fundamental 
contradiction, which is innate to the structure of the world. According to Hick, one’s 
normal mode of experience and one’s presupposition of the independent reality is thus 
                                                 
481 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 122.  
482 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 122.  
483 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 123.  
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described as the very basic interpretation, or natural belief, by which the existence of the 
world itself and other persons within it become possible: ‘this is the very basic 
interpretation which one is unable to justify by argument but which one has nevertheless 
no inclination to doubt.’484 Then, Hick says that this very basic interpretation is the 
properly religious interpretation, that is to say, the essence of religious faith: ‘the basic act 
of interpretation which reveals to him the religious significance of life is a uniquely ‘total 
interpretation’.’485 
   On the basis of these arguments about ‘significance’ and ‘interpretation’, Hick says 
that the existence of God is not something which can be separated from this world, but 
God is living in the experience of a believer as a very basic reality which secures the 
normality of the world, within which different persons are living: ‘the primary religious 
perception, or basic act of religious interpretation, is not to be described as either a reasoned 
                                                 
484 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 124. As a support of this argument, Hick mentions 
David Hume: ‘We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body [i.e., 
matter]? But ‘tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for 
granted in all our reasonings.’ See Hume, Treatise, bk. I, pt. IV, sec. 2 (Selby-Bigge’s ed., pp. 187-
88), quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p, 125. Hick’s interpretation of Hume will 
be examined in detain in the 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
485 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 127. Hick says that, from a logical point of view, 
both the existence and the non-existence of the world is possible and a religious person is on the side 
to choose the existence of the world: ‘although it must be very difficult, if not possible, for the sanely 
functioning mind seriously to assent to solipsism and to apperceive in terms of it, yet this does 
represent at least a logically possible interpretation of experience, and constitutes a different 
interpretation.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 124. The italics is in the original. 
See also Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, Part Two.  
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conclusion or an unreasoned hunch that there is a God. It is, putatively, an apprehension 
of the divine presence within the believer’s human experience.’486 What is important to 
note is that Hick starts his argument from a particular person, but on the basis of the natural 
belief, one can naturally live one’s own environment, within which other persons are also 
living.  
   As a support of his argument, Hick quotes from John Oman’s explanation of the 
religious believer:  
 
What determines their faith is not a theory of the Supernatural, but an attitude towards 
the Natural, as a sphere in which a victory of deeper meaning than the visible and of 
more abiding purpose than the fleeting can be won … The revelation of the Supernatural 
was by reconciliation to the Natural: and this was made possible by realizing in the 
Natural the meaning and purpose of the Supernatural.487  
 
According to Hick, one lives in a real world, though one cannot prove by any logical 
formula that it is a real world, and this is the reason why it is ‘faith’. One discovers and 
lives in terms of a particular aspect of one’s environment through an appropriate act of 
interpretation, and having come to live in terms of it one neither requires nor can conceive 
any further validation of its reality.  
   After this primary explanation of faith as ‘significance’ and ‘interpretation,’ Hick 
                                                 
486 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 129.  
487 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 448, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, p. 130.  
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applies the argument to what he will call ‘cosmic optimism’: ‘moral personality is 
gradually being created by free response to environmental challenge and opportunities. It 
is a process within which human beings can develop those qualities of unselfishness, love, 
and courage which are evoked by difficulties and obstacles and by situations which may 
demand the sacrifice of the self and its interests for the sake of others … the universe is 
such that to remove its present finite evils would be to preclude an infinite future good.’488 
According to Hick, the growth of moral personality can be understood as a process 
because the paradox of specificity and totality applies not only as a matter of natural world, 
but also as a matter of moral obligation.489 
                                                 
488 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 141.  
489 In Faith and Knowledge, Hick explains this as a relation between the natural, the ethical, and the 
religious (‘as ethical significance interpenetrates natural significance, so religious significance 
interpenetrates both ethical and natural’), and he develops the same argument in An Interpretation 
of Religion. See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 127. See also Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, Part Three.  
Hick says that the distinction of the natural, the ethical, and the religious comes from John 
Macmurray: ‘the philosophical reader can see in Faith and Knowledge … a trace of John 
Macmurray of Edinburgh in his distinguishing of the natural, the ethical, and the divine.’ See Hick, 
An Autobiography, p. 115.  
In the second volume of his Gifford Lecture, The Form of the Personal, Macmurray explains 
his concept of person. First, Macmurray says that the world exists only through recognition by a 
specific person and, in this sense, the existence of the ‘I’ and the existence of the world is identical, 
not separated: ‘existence – both of the knower and of the world he knows – is given, and given as a 
togetherness of self and other.’  
Then, Macmurray says that, in spite of the total givenness of the world for oneself, there are 
other persons in the world, who look similarly unique just like oneself. The other persons appear for 
oneself just like a thing in the world, but, from the side of the other persons, the oneself must appear 
for them just like a thing in the world: ‘I am not alone in the world; there are other agents … This 
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Hick says that an environment can be seen as a totality, but one always needs to 
respond to it as a specific person: ‘to perceive in some situation that I am under a moral 
obligation to act in this or that way, is to be aware of my environment as constituting a 
realm of personal relationships, the present practical significance of which for myself is 
this moral requirement. Each distinguishable order and kind of significance makes its own 
immediate or potential ‘difference’ to the cognizer.’490 A response becomes personal only 
when it is incomparably different from any other responses in the world. This is the 
meaning of ‘significance’. A personal response has significance only when it is made by 
this person to this moral obligation: ‘moral significance is the ‘difference’ made for us by 
the world as mediating a system of personal relationships.’491  
                                                 
complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of 
personal existence.’  
Lastly, Macmurray says that, in spite of the fundamental distance between oneself and other 
persons, the existence of the world is presupposed among them. This is the basis of religion, 
according to Macmurray, because the existence of the world, which is incomparably unique for 
each person and incomparably absolute for everyone, is not a logical consequence, but can only be 
confirmed as a fact which manifests itself through one’s action and other person’s reactions. From 
a personal point of view, the world with other persons appears only as possibility. But, from the 
divine point of view, the world with incomparably unique persons actually exists as necessity: ‘the 
community of agents, like any individual agent, must be part of the world in which it acts ... This 
community can act only through the Other, which is both its support and its resistance; and this 
Other is the world of which the community of agents is only a part … What is verified in action is 
necessarily a conception of God, which presupposes a practical belief in His reality … The relation 
of man to the world is his relation to God.’ See Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 209, 211, and 
212-17. The italics is in the original.  
490 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 164.  
491 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 169.  
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However, if one just remains to be personal, it fails to be religious. This is because, 
according to Hick, to be religious means to have faith in the independent reality, or to create 
a very basic normality, within which incomparably different persons are living. The 
understanding of other persons is impossible right from the start, and, in spite of the 
impossibility, a religious person is required to create a very basic normality on the basis of 
the assumption that the world exists. This is what Hick means by ‘totality’, and, because 
of the impossibility, its realization necessarily includes an element of ‘process’: ‘the totality 
which it [the religious interpretation] discloses constitutes a situation within which the 
interpreter is himself inextricably involved as a constituent, a situation which makes 
continual practical demands upon him.’492  
As a support of his argument, Hick quotes from John Oman again: ‘knowing is not 
knowledge as an effect of an unknown external cause, but is knowledge as we so interpret 
that our meaning is the actual meaning of our environment.’493 Hick says as a comment 
that cognition of the world and other persons can never be formally infallible by definition. 
However, the impossibility to know the world and other persons is not a defect but a virtue: 
‘the fallibility which religious judgments share with all other interpretations does not 
constitute an epistemic defect, but rather a virtue.’494 From the argument above, this is 
                                                 
492 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 186.  
493 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 175, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, p. 166.  
494 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 166.  
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because the incomparable personality and the existence of the world are the two sides of 
the same reality. The world has significance only for a particular person, but, at the same 
time, the significance will be lost without the existence of the divine environment, within 
which incomparably particular persons are living: ‘it is in virtue of this tendency that we 
are able both to know God and yet to be genuinely free in relation to him.’495 This 
contradictory relationship is what Hick means by the necessity of the two types of faith: 
‘fides and fiducia are two elements in a single whole, which is man’s awareness of the 
divine.’496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
495 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 183-84.  
496 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 186-87.  
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2.  
An Interpretation of Religion 
 
 
   In the previous section, a fundamentally contradictory characteristic of Hick’s 
argument in Faith and Knowledge was examined. This section will examine a continuity 
of the same characteristic in An Interpretation of Religion.  
   In Part II of the book, Hick introduces a concept of ‘the religious ambiguity of the 
universe’: ‘by the religious ambiguity of the universe I do not mean that it has no definite 
character but that it is capable from our present human vantage point of being thought and 
experienced in both religious and naturalistic ways.’497  According to Hick, what is 
important in the argument is not any general inference to defend a religious or naturalistic 
worldview, but what Hick calls ‘the prima facie significance of the evidence’498.  
For example, a theistic person can suggest that theistic evidence can be found in a 
particular supposed divine revelation, or the orderliness and beauty of the world, or the 
moral nature of the human species, or some other factors. Likewise, an atheistic person 
can suggest that atheistic evidence can be found in the problem of suffering, or the 
reductionist force of a sociological or a psychological analysis of faith, or the evils caused 
                                                 
497 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 73.  
498 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 123.  
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by religion in human history, and so on. Hick says, however, that all the evidences are 
incomparably unique and therefore it can have significance only as arbitrary and subjective 
evidence: ‘I selected these particular aspects precisely because they constitute prima facie 
evidence for, or against, theism … any such relative quantifications could only be arbitrary 
and subjective.’499 These arguments from evidences can be understood as being made 
from what Hick called ‘faith as cognition’. The evidentialist defence of religion can make 
sense only from a particular viewpoint.500  
   Then, in Part Three of the book, Hick moves to the argument of ‘the natural, the ethical, 
and the religious’. According to Hick, ‘the religious ambiguity of the universe’ is taken as 
a problem because all the evidences make sense only when there is only the actual world 
rather than possible multiple worlds: ‘whilst the objective ambiguity of our environment 
consists in the fact that it is capable of being interpreted in a variety of ways, its consciously 
experienced and actively lived-in character consists in its actually being interpreted as 
                                                 
499 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 123.  
500 Hick’s interpretation of Richard Swinburne’s ‘the principle of credulity’ can be understood as 
an example of ‘the faith as cognition’. According to Swinburne, ‘what one seems to perceive is 
probably so. How things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things are.’ For example, 
having the experience of it seeming epistemically to one that there is a table there is good evidence 
for supposing that there is a table there. Likewise, in the absence of special considerations, all 
religious experiences ought to be taken by their subjects as genuine, and hence as substantial 
grounds for belief in the existence of their apparent object. After the accumulation of such evidences, 
Swinburne says that, one can increase the probability of the existence of God. Hick makes a 
comment that ‘it is rational to regard our apparently perceptual experiences as veridical except when 
we have reason to doubt their veridicality.’ See Swinburne, The Existence of God, p. 254, quoted in 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214. See also Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 215.  
220 
 
meaningful.’501 
   Hick explains that this actuality can be understood as the significance of the world: ‘we 
do not find ourselves in a homogeneous continuum within which no distinctions can be 
made, or within a mere chaos or stream of kaleidoscopic change which would offer no 
purchase for purposefully appropriate action, but rather in a structured environment within 
which we can react differently to different items and within diverse situations.’ 502 
According to Hick, the significance is the very basic condition for the world to have any 
meanings: ‘to find the world, or some aspect of it, meaningful is thus to find it intelligible 
– not in the intellectual sense of understanding it but in the practical sense that one is able 
to behave appropriately (or in a way that one takes to be appropriate) in relation to it.’503 
And, this significance provides actuality only for a particular person in this particular world 
at this particular time, because the person and the world is inseparably intricate in this very 
basic case: ‘we are not bodiless observers viewing a scene with which we have no contact, 
but integral parts of the world that we are cognizing, and we exist in continuous interaction 
with those parts of it that are adjacent to us.’504 The significance of the world is what Hick 
calls ‘the natural’. 
   Then, on the basis of the significance of the world, Hick introduces the argument from 
                                                 
501 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 129. The italics is added.  
502 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 130.  
503 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 131.  
504 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 131.  
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the existence of other persons, who look just human-like appearances for a particular 
person, but it is possible for them to be other centres of the universe: ‘to be confronted by 
another human person is to be aware of another consciousness existing independently of 
and over against myself; another centre of judgment appealing to canons of rationality to 
which we both subscribe; another system of valuation; another set of purpose; another 
will.’505 From the existence of other persons, it can possibly mean that there are a lot of 
incomparably different worlds, which are corresponding to incomparably different 
persons just like oneself: ‘in the presence of another person two evaluators meet, so that in 
judging I am at the same time judged. Not only am I conscious of the other but I am 
conscious that the other is conscious of me. Further, he or she will have aims and interests 
which may support or oppose my own.’506 This possible existence of other persons, 
instead of the actual existence of myself, is what Hick calls ‘the ethical’. 
   Furthermore, on the basis of the possible existence of other persons, a person can make 
a choice that the actual world exists in spite of the possible existence of multiple worlds. 
According to Hick, this is the essence of being religious: ‘I am going to argue, then, that it 
is rational to believe in the reality of God. More precisely, by taking account of differences 
between different people, and also between the cognitive situations of the same person at 
different times, the thesis elaborates itself as follows: it has been rational for some people 
in the past, it is rational for some people now, and it will presumably in the future be 
                                                 
505 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 145.  
506 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 145.  
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rational for yet other people to believe in the reality of God.’507 A point of argument here 
is that not only spatial difference between persons, but also temporal difference has the 
same structure. The world has ‘significance’ only at this particular time, and past and future 
looks like just human construction. In spite of the possibility, the world actually exists not 
only now but also in the past and future.  
   Hick says that, according to Norman Kemp Smith, this is what Hume called ‘natural 
belief’:  
 
Western philosophy from Descartes to Hume has shown by default that we cannot 
prove the existence of an external world … We thus come to rest in something like the 
‘natural belief’ that Hume – according to Norman Kemp Smith’s interpretation, in 
contrast to the older reading of Hume as a systematic sceptic – adumbrated … That is 
to say, we are so constituted that we cannot help believing and living in terms of the 
objective reality of the perceived world. We may be able to suspend our conviction 
during brief moments of philosophical enthusiasm; but natural belief in ‘the existence 
of body’ will soon reassert itself.508  
 
According to Hick, on the basis of this natural belief, which secures the very basis of reality, 
one’s belief in the existence of God, which secures both the absolute oneness of the world 
and the incompatible uniqueness of different persons, can be understood. What Hick adds 
                                                 
507 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 211.  
508 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213. The quotation is from Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 187. See also Norman 
Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, London: Macmillan, 1941. 
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to Hume’s argument is a personal dimension. From the structure of a person, the other 
persons necessarily appear only as human-like appearances. There is no direct 
confirmation of whether the other persons are really persons or not. Theoretically, one 
cannot distinguish a person from a machine. In spite of the theoretical ambiguity, ordinary 
people believe that the other persons are actually persons just like oneself. Then, if ordinary 
people are naturally presupposing the incompatible uniqueness of other persons, there 
must be the common recognition of God behind them.509 
   According to Hick, this natural belief is based on trust, instead of cognition: ‘we shall 
not however be asking directly whether A’s ‘experience of existing in the presence of God’ 
is genuine …, but rather whether it is rational for A to trust his or her experience as veridical 
and to behave on the basis of it.’510 The natural belief is based on trust, because the 
existence of other persons can only possibly be supposed for a particular person. In spite 
of the theoretical possibility, ordinary people naturally trust in the existence of other 
persons. But this necessity of faith as trust does not lead to disregard faith as cognition. 
This is because one’s faith as trust, which is based on one’s trust in the existence of other 
persons, originally comes from one’s faith as cognition, which is based on one’s personal 
significance of the world.  
Hick says that not only faith as cognition, but also faith as trust has its own rationality. 
This is because it is argued as a necessary consequence of an initial premise of the personal 
                                                 
509 Hick’s reading of Hume will further be discussed in the 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
510 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 212.  
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significance of the world, and it is open to decide whether it is rational or irrational: ‘a 
proposition believed can be true or false: it is the believing of it that is rational or 
irrational.’511 This natural belief, which is based on both the personal significance of the 
world and the existence of other persons, is what Hick calls ‘the religious’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
511 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 212.  
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3.  
An Intermediate Summary of the Argument 
 
 
   The last chapter had examined Hick’s argument about critical realism as a 
contradictory relation between language and reality. This chapter has further examined 
Hick’s argument about cosmic optimism as a contradictory relation between the particular 
and the universal. On the basis of these examinations, this section will examine a relation 
between reliabilism, which the 1st and the 2nd chapters examined, and critical realism / 
cosmic optimism, which the 3rd and the 4th chapters examined. Even though reliabilism 
tends to emphasize a more static aspect of balance among different factors and cosmic 
optimism / critical realism tends to emphasize a more dynamic aspect of progress through 
history, each can be understood as different aspects of the same philosophy of John Hick. 
In spite of its emphasis on ‘balance among different factors’, reliabilism necessarily 
includes ‘progress through history’. Likewise, in spite of its emphasis on ‘progress through 
history’, cosmic optimism necessarily includes ‘balance among different factors’. 
   For example, what had been examined in the 1st chapter was Ernest Sosa’s distinction 
between foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism, and an ethical implication of 
reliabilism was further examined as normality in the 2nd chapter.  
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In the 1st chapter, foundationalism was defined as a position that all knowledge is 
founded on what is ultimately given: ‘foundationalism postulates foundations for 
knowledge – even if they disagree in their respective foundations, and disagree on how to 
erect a superstructure.’512 The characteristic of foundationalism is that it has an ultimate 
foundation with which all the other kinds of knowledge are related. According to 
foundationalism, a foundation puts one directly and infallibly in touch with certain truth 
from one’s particular perspective and then enables us to reach many other truths, again 
infallibly, through deductive proof.  
   In contrast, the characteristic of coherentism is lack of foundation: ‘what distinguishes 
a coherent theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief.’513 According to coherentism, there are no basic or foundational 
beliefs and at least the primary basis for justification is the fact that such beliefs fit together 
and support each other in a variety of complicated ways, thus forming a coherent system 
of beliefs, or perhaps more than one such system. Then, two problems of coherentism were 
suggested. First is an arbitrariness, which means that whatever appears within one 
framework is the truth for the framework, and it can’t be questioned by another framework 
for the simple fact that it doesn’t belong to the framework. Whatever is declared to be truth 
for a framework is true only because it is declared as such in the framework. Second is a 
                                                 
512 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 1. See also the 1st chapter of this dissertation.  
513 Donald Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Dieter Henrich, Ed., Kant 
oder Hegel?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983, p. 426, quoted in Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 108.  
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closed nature, which means that many different frameworks are equally and internally 
coherent as others and there can be no relation or communication between them. It is 
impossible to truly understand another framework from one’s own framework.  
   Reliabilism was proposed to reconcile foundationalism and coherentism, and is 
characterized as not only static balance but also dynamic history: ‘reliabilism requires for 
the epistemic justification of belief that it be formed by a process reliable in an environment 
normal for the formation of such belief.’514 Firstly, reliabilism makes a balance among 
plural foundations. What foundationalism proposed as a perfect foundation is now 
understood by reliabilism as an imperfect but reliable foundation with a unique 
characteristic. As a result, according to reliabilism, there are a wide variety of different 
foundations, each of which has an incommensurate characteristic. What is required is more 
like making a coherent balance among incompatible foundations, instead of choosing one 
of them. Therefore, the criterion of judgement becomes whether it is reliable or not, instead 
of whether it is true or not.  
   Secondly, this side of reliabilism, which aims to make a balance, emphasizes a static 
aspect, but it also has a dynamic aspect, which aims to make historical progress. 
Reliabilism takes an historical approach to form a coherent perspective among different 
foundations. This is because what is reliable relative to a particular situation may be 
unreliable to another. There is no perfectly reliable foundation, and therefore reliabilism is 
                                                 
514 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 89.  
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required to take a broad historical approach to inquire from what have been accumulated 
in the past, through one’s present stage, towards a future ideal in which one would have 
the whole truth, or at least a close approximation.  
   The static balance and dynamic history can also be found in the ethical implication of 
reliabilism as normality. In the 2nd chapter, reliabilism was explained as ‘one’s way of 
arriving directly and noninferentially at beliefs respectively about: certain of one’s own 
states at the time; certain features of one’s surroundings; and certain aspects of one’s 
past.’515 A distinctive characteristic of the reliabilist idea of normality is that the idea of 
normality must be created by the person as one’s unique normality, and therefore one 
cannot acquire normality before one’s actual engagement with the world. One must create 
one’s own normality in that particular time, in that particular situation. One’s actual 
engagement is immediately arrived at in a natural and obvious way, but it does not mean 
that the process is simple. On the contrary, the naturalness has been acquired through a 
very subtle balance that has been accumulated through history.  
   The necessity of balance and history can also be found in the reliabilist idea of 
equilibrium: ‘the method of reflective equilibrium aims to maximize two factors in one’s 
beliefs: harmonious coherence, and plausibility of content.’516 According to reliabilism, 
the first order of plausible content can be understood as one’s unique engagement with the 
world’s complexity. If the plausible content becomes fixed and stabilized, the second order 
                                                 
515 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 212. 
516 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 257. 
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of harmonious coherence is also fixed, stabilized, and reduced just to follow what everyone 
else is thinking under the name of normality. On the contrary, the reflective equilibrium 
must be an endeavor to cope with the lively reality of the changing world. On the one hand, 
stabilizing balance is necessary for the possibility of conducting a healthy judgement 
against the complexity of reality, but, on the other hand, the stabilizing balance must 
include a moment of historical progress which is created by one’s unique engagement at 
each time on each occasion.  
   The necessity of balance and history can also be found in the reliabilist idea of virtue. 
On the one hand, virtue is valid only for a unique situation: ‘a virtue is virtuous only relative 
to appropriate surroundings, which are not the product of any reflection.’517 On the other 
hand, it is a comprehensive ability of a person to find something common in the 
complexity of the world: ‘broader intellectual virtue makes it possible to accept wide 
reflective equilibrium.’518 This reliabilist idea of virtue is related to the social construction 
of a norm: ‘a concept of epistemic justification that measures the pertinent virtues or 
faculties of the subject relative to the normal for the community will be useful to the 
community.’519 A reliabilist justification functions to unite different abilities of a person 
and that process of justification is heavily influenced by what has implicitly been inherited 
through society and humanity in general from generation to generation. The process of 
                                                 
517 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266. 
518 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 266. 
519 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 276. 
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justification helps to construct hidden norms of society as ‘the implied social component 
of knowledge’520, but, at the same time, the process of justification is made by one’s actual 
engagement with reality. Both of the two aspects of the process, the creating process and 
the stabilizing process, are necessary components of reliabilism. 
Likewise, the creating process through history and the stabilizing process through 
balance can also be found in Hick’s argument about critical realism. For example, in the 
3rd chapter, the first characteristic of Roy Wood Sellars’ critical realism was discussed that 
human knowing is a direct knowing of the object: ‘knowing is direct in that its primary 
object is objective disclosure; but it is mediated by data and concepts.’521 According to 
Sellars, human knowing is partial but direct. Human knowing reveals only a partial truth 
of the object, but the partial knowledge is not a representation of the object but is part of 
reality.  
   Then, Sellars says that appearances of the object reveal various kinds of essences of 
the object of perception: ‘knowing must be studied at its various levels as a characteristic 
claim of the human knower.’522 According to Sellars, diversity of appearances supposes 
a lot of different sources of knowledge and each contributes to construct the whole 
understanding of reality. In this sense, the basis of reality can be understood as a total 
balance of different kinds. When one seeks to recover the basis of reality, one can choose 
                                                 
520 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, p. 276. 
521 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 61. 
522 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 73. 
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a narrow but certain foundation, but Sellars took an alternative, more holistic direction. 
   Lastly, Sellars says that thought cures its own difficulties by showing how new 
distinctions satisfy old conflicts: ‘the generic category is change; at the very least, evolution 
is a kind of cumulative change … Evolutionary naturalism rests upon physical realism and 
the fact of creative synthesis.’523  This is an emphasis on the historical process of 
reconciliation and maturation. According to Sellars, human beings have an evolutional 
tendency to make correct guesses and they can develop the comprehension of the world 
through the history of errors.  
   The stabilizing process through balance and the creating process through history can 
also be found in Hick’s argument about cosmic optimism. Firstly, Hick says that the world 
has a homely character which has significance only for a particular person: ‘to find the 
world, or some aspect of it, meaningful is thus to find it intelligible – not in the intellectual 
sense of understanding it but in the practical sense that one is able to behave appropriately 
(or in a way that one takes to be appropriate) in relation to it.’524 According to Hick, this 
homely character provides actuality only for a particular person in this particular world at 
this particular time, because the person and the world is inseparably intricate in this very 
basic case.  
Then, secondly, there are other persons who are living in the world from incomparably 
different perspectives: ‘to be confronted by another human person is to be aware of another 
                                                 
523 Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 3. 
524 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 131.  
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consciousness existing independently of and over against myself; another centre of 
judgment appealing to canons of rationality to which we both subscribe; another system 
of valuation; another set of purpose; another will.’525 From the existence of other persons, 
it can possibly mean that there are a lot of incomparably different worlds, which are 
corresponding to incomparably different persons just like oneself.  
Furthermore, the natural belief to trust the actual world is required in spite of the 
possibility of multiple worlds: ‘western philosophy from Descartes to Hume has shown 
by default that we cannot prove the existence of an external world … We thus come to rest 
in something like the ‘natural belief’ that Hume … adumbrated … That is to say, we are 
so constituted that we cannot help believing and living in terms of the objective reality of 
the perceived world.526 According to Hick, on the basis of the natural belief, one can 
naturally act and react with other persons who are also the centres of the universe, just like 
oneself. This natural belief which secures the very basis of reality can be understood as a 
total balance of one’s world kept by common sense, within which incomparably different 
persons are living. 
Lastly, Hick says that the dialectical relation between the actual and the possible 
necessarily includes an historical process towards the infinite future: ‘what I called earlier 
the cosmic optimism of each of the great traditions is intensified when we see them all as 
pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly better existence and as affirming that the universe 
                                                 
525 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 145.  
526 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213.  
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is such that this limitlessly better possibility is actually available to us and can begin to be 
realized in each present moment.’527 This cosmic optimism can also be understood as 
progress through history.  
   What can be revealed from these examinations is that, even though each shows a lot 
of different emphases, both reliabilism and cosmic optimism start the argument from a 
specificity of a particular perspective, and, as a result of the necessity of synthesizing the 
incomparably different perspectives, two different kind of logic, a static logic as 
stabilization through balance and a dynamic logic as creation through history, are required.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
527 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 380.  
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Chapter 5. 
 
HICK’S INHERITANCE FROM KANT 
The System of An Interpretation of Religion 
 
 
   John Hick’s reading of Kant must be interpreted within the whole system of An 
Interpretation of Religion. First, there is a contradiction in Hick’s reading of Kant. For 
example, Hick says that ‘the mind actively interprets sensory information in terms of 
concepts, so that the environment as we consciously perceive and inhabit it is our familiar 
three-dimensional world of objects interacting in space. This is a highly generalized 
version of Kant’s complex theory of the forms and categories of perception.’528  
Here, one can find a contradiction. According to Hick, Kant, on the one hand, suggests 
that the world exists because I interpret the world through forms and categories. In this 
case, the subject (‘I’) is prior to the world, and an external object in the world is a mere 
appearance which is nothing but a representation by oneself. This is a subjective side of 
Kant’s argument. However, Kant, on the other hand, suggests that my existence in time 
and space is determined by its relation with external objects. In this case, the world is prior 
                                                 
528 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 240.  
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to the subject (‘I’), and an external object is an actual thing which exists outside oneself 
and not a mere representation of a thing. In other words, a personal world recognized 
through one’s forms and categories is, in spite of its artificial and constructed character, the 
actual world which is shared by everyone. This is an objective side of Kant’s argument.  
Hick’s use of Kant’s other concepts such as categories and concepts529 and regulative 
idea530 can be understood as an answer to this fundamental contradiction. These concepts 
indicate that the subjective side and the objective side are in a dialectical relationship which 
develops towards the ultimate reality.  
A confirmation of this interpretation can be found in Hick’s comment on Norman 
Kemp Smith. In An Autobiography, Hick says that  
 
I was deeply influenced by Kemp Smith … He was one of the last of the Idealist 
philosophers and also a major interpreter of Kant … It was through him that I realized 
the immense importance of Kant … I have retained from Kant what today I identify as 
‘critical realism’ – the view that there is a world, indeed a universe, out there existing 
independently of us, but that we can only know it in the forms provided by our human 
                                                 
529  ‘The pure categories or pure concepts of the understanding (for example, substance) are 
schematized in terms of temporality to produce the more concrete categories which are exhibited in 
our actual experience of the world (Thus, for example, the pure concept of substance is schematized 
as the more concrete idea of an object enduring through time).’ See Hick, An Interpretation of 
Religion, p. 243.  
530 ‘The idea of God … functions as a regulative idea whereby we ‘regard all order in the world as 
if it had originated in the purpose of supreme reason.’’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 
243, and the quotation is from Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B714, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 
London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1958, pp. 559-60.  
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perceptual apparatus and conceptual systems.531  
 
Here, Hick clearly states that the independent world can be known only from within 
human perceptual apparatus and conceptual systems. The world is not independent just by 
itself, but the independence of the world must be mediated by human perceptual apparatus 
and conceptual systems.  
Therefore, the ultimate reality can only be known from within the historical 
development of human understanding. However, the historical development is not enough 
for the full understanding of the ultimate reality. Even though historical development is 
relevant to matters which is about the process governed by human being, it cannot be 
applied to the confirmation of the ultimate reality itself. Then, Hick’s concept of 
environment 532  can be understood as an answer to the necessity of the ultimate 
confirmation. This concept of environment comes from John Oman:  
 
John Oman was probably the most original British theologian of the first half of the 
twentieth century, and his teaching concerning the relation between religion and 
environment, and the apprehension of the supernatural in and through the natural, 
                                                 
531 Hick, An Autobiography, pp. 66-69. 
532 ‘The impact of our environment upon our sensory equipment … comes to consciousness in 
forms prescribed by … schematized categories.’ ‘The cognitive structure of our consciousness, with 
its capacity to respond to the meaning or character of our environment … [includes] its religious 
meaning or character.’ ‘As in the case of our awareness of the physical world, the environing divine 
reality is brought to consciousness in terms of certain basic concepts or categories.’ See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, p. 243-45.  
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provides (as it seems to me) an important key to the problem of religious knowledge.533 
 
The concept of environment indicates that the ultimate reality which is reached at the end 
of history is the same as the environment here and now. 
On the basis of these arguments, it can be seen that the noumenon can only be known 
from within the historical development of the phenomenon, and the noumenon which is 
reached at the end of history is the same as the phenomenon here and now: ‘all that we are 
entitled to say about the noumenal source of … information is that it is the reality whose 
influence produces, in collaboration with the human mind, the phenomenal world of our 
experience.’534 Here Hick says that the noumenon produces the phenomenon, and not 
vice versa. Human beings can know the noumenon only from within the phenomenon, 
but the phenomenon is actually produced by the noumenon.  
Furthermore, Hick’s reading of Kant must be understood within the whole system of 
An Interpretation of Religion. For example, Hick says that ‘the divine Reality is not directly 
known an sich. But when human beings relate themselves to it in the mode of an I-Thou 
encounter they experience it as personal.’535  Here the concept of personal must be 
understood in its relation to Hick’s other argument about ‘the natural, the ethical, and the 
religious’. Accordingly, it is related with Hick’s cosmic optimism.536 
                                                 
533 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
534 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.  
535 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 245.  
536 The relation between Hick’s argument about ‘the natural, the ethical, and the religious’ and 
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Also, Hick says that ‘the particularizing factor (corresponding, in its function, to time 
in the schematisation of the Kantian categories) is the range of human cultures, actualizing 
different though overlapping aspects of our immensely complex human potentiality for 
awareness of the transcendent.’537  Here the concept of culture comes from Hick’s 
understanding of Wittgenstein. Accordingly, it is related with Hick’s critical realism.538 
On the basis of these, the first section of this chapter will discuss incompatible readings 
of Kant, exemplified in William Forgie and John Milbank, and the philosophical 
presuppositions of the conflict.539 The second section will discuss an alternative reading 
of Kant. First, Norman Kemp Smith’s A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ 
will be examined. Then, John Oman’s The Natural and the Supernatural will be examined. 
Lastly, John Hick’s reading of Kant will be discussed in relation to them. The third section 
will discuss Hick’s religious pluralism. First, incompatible readings of Hick’s religious 
pluralism, which is corresponding to incompatible readings of Kant, will be discussed.540 
Then, Hick’s critical realism and cosmic optimism will be discussed. Lastly, an alternative 
reading of Hick’s religious pluralism, which is corresponding to an alternative reading of 
Kant, will be discussed.  
                                                 
Hick’s cosmic optimism was discussed in the 4th chapter of this dissertation.  
537 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 245.  
538 The relation between Hick’s reading of Wittgenstein and Hick’s critical realism was discussed 
in the 3rd chapter of this dissertation.  
539 See the 1st chapter of this dissertation.  
540 See the 2nd chapter of this dissertation.  
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1.  
Incompatible Readings of Kant 
 
 
I. WILLIAM FORGIE 
   A typical reading of Kant, which emphasizes the objective side of Kant’s argument, 
can be found in William Forgie’s reading. For example, William Forgie suggests that the 
forms and categories for Kant are the permanent nature of the thing which is inherent in 
the objective world: ‘for Kant the a priori concepts, the categories, are twelve in number 
and are shared by all mankind. And they are inescapable.’541 According to Forgie, even if 
a person must follow forms and categories, the forms and categories are shared by all 
human beings. Therefore, the forms and categories are not subjective in nature, but they 
are objective which is inherent in the objective world. An objective person is living in the 
objective world, and there is no contradiction between them.  
   Forgie says that this objective character of one’s sense experience is the source of the 
veridicality of the world: ‘ordinary sense experiences are frequently thought to possess a 
presumption of veridicality ... such a presumption is not upset by the supposed fact that 
                                                 
541 William Forgie, ‘Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussion of Mystical Experience,’ in Religious 
Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 1985, p. 208. See also Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 243-44.  
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those experiences are shaped by the Kantian categories – our epistemic or evidential 
distinctions are made within the class of experiences so shaped.’542 According to Forgie, 
if forms and categories vary from one to another, it violates the veridicality of the world. 
Therefore, even though there can be minor changes within the presupposition of the forms 
and categories, the presupposition of forms and categories themselves must be understood 
as permanent and inherent in the objective world.  
 
 
II. MILBANK 
Another typical reading of Kant, which emphasizes the subjective side of Kant’s 
argument, can be found in John Milbank’s reading. For example, Milbank suggests that if 
one conceives of God only through schematizations by concepts, one cannot conceive 
God in itself: ‘pure reason demands that we regard the world ‘as if’ in a relationship of 
dependence of a highest cause, as a clock depends upon an artisan. This allows us, however, 
no room to speculate about that cause as it is in itself, and if we are forced to conceive this 
cause by reference to the schematizations involved in concepts of our experience, then this 
should involve us in nothing more than a ‘symbolic anthropomorphism’ which, as Kant 
says, ‘only concerns language and not the object’.’543 According to Milbank, the forms 
                                                 
542 Forgie, ‘Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussion of Mystical Experience,’ pp. 215-16.  
543 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, p. 8, and the quotation is from Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena 
to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science, trans. P. G. Lucas, 
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and categories for Kant are subjective in nature. When a person recognizes the world 
according to forms and categories, the person can recognize the world as if it is the real 
world. But the person never experiences the world directly, and the experience always 
remains subjective. Therefore, according to Milbank, if one follows Kant, the world is 
divided into the subjective world, which appears only though language as phenomenon, 
and the objective world, which loses any content as the world in itself.  
 
 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE CONFLICT 
   What Forgie and Milbank share as their philosophical presupposition is the idea that 
there are two kinds of incompatible interpretations of Kant’s forms and categories. If one 
chooses objective interpretation, it necessary excludes the choice of subjective 
interpretation, and vice versa.  
On the one hand, an objective interpretation takes a view that Kant’s forms and 
categories are understood as indicating the same independent reality. This view 
presupposes the fixed identity of the world, and therefore any changes brought by forms 
and categories do not violate the common reality of the world.  
On the other hand, a subjective interpretation takes a view that Kant’s forms and 
categories are understood to conceive of the world as internally related to language and to 
                                                 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962, pp. 121-28.  
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construct the world only through language. This view gives up direct experience of the 
world, and one is restricted within the various kinds of human language.  
Both Forgie and Milbank assume these two interpretations are incompatible, and to 
put these interpretations into one coherent view that does justice to each is impossible. It’s 
a matter of choice and if one view is taken, the other view has to be given up. Even though 
their positions are different, what underlies their arguments as a philosophical 
presupposition is quite similar.  
However, what has to be questioned is this philosophical presupposition. Kemp 
Smith’s interpretation of Kant can be understood as a reconciliation between subjective 
and objective interpretations.  
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2.  
An Alternative Reading of Kant 
 
 
I. NORMAN KEMP SMITH 
In the beginning of the introduction of A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure 
Reason’, Kemp Smith says that a fundamental importance for the philosophy of Kant lies 
in the problem of synthetic a priori: ‘how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?’544 
Kemp Smith starts his argument by examining the concept of a priori. 
According to Kemp Smith, the a priori, the distinguishing characteristic of which are 
universality and necessity, is not given in sense but is imposed by mind: ‘the a priori … is 
not part of the matter of experience but constitutes its form.’545 In this sense, the a priori 
can be understood to have a subjective characteristic. For example, when a human being 
acts, the action must take the form of time which comes from the past through now to the 
future. The formality of past/now/future can be understood as universal and necessary, but 
the form of time can have a meaning, or what Hick calls ‘significance,’ only from a 
particular moment, ‘now,’ which is an incomparably special moment of time which can 
                                                 
544 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxv.  
545 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxiii. 
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be experienced only by a particular subject. If there is no ‘now’ as a special moment, just 
a formality of past/now/future cannot be understood as actual duration: ‘human experience 
is a temporal process and yet is always a consciousness of meaning. As temporal, its states 
are ordered successively, that is, externally to one another; but the consciousness which 
they constitute is at each and every moment the awareness of some single unitary meaning 
by reference to which the contents of the successive experiences are organized.’546 Kemp 
Smith says that the form of time is constituted by mind, and it has a subjective characteristic.  
According to Kemp Smith, however, this same principle of universality and necessity 
also has an external characteristic: ‘the universality and necessity which Kant claims to 
have established for his a priori principles are … always extrinsic.’547 For example, if the 
form of past/now/future is understood to be able to be separated as an independent past, an 
independent now, and an independent future, the form of time becomes possible to be 
shared by other persons. It is experienced not only by oneself, but also by other persons. 
Then, the form of time becomes just possibility instead of actual duration. What is actual 
is only this particular now, and the actuality of the past and future becomes just postulation 
even though they are shared by other persons: ‘the principles which lie at the basis of our 
knowledge … have no intrinsic necessity, and cannot possess the absolute authority … 
They can be established only as brute conditions, verifiable in fact though not 
demonstrable in pure theory, of our actual experience. They are conditions of sense-
                                                 
546 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxiv.  
547 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxv.  
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experience, and that means of our knowledge of appearances, never legitimately 
applicable in the deciphering of ultimate reality … human experience, even in its 
fundamental features (e.g. the temporal and the spatial), might conceivably be altogether 
different from what it actually is, and that its presuppositions are always, therefore, of the 
same contingent character.’548 Kemp Smith says that only when the actuality of the a 
priori principle is separated from this particular oneself, does it become possibility which 
is shared by other persons. In this sense, the a priori can be understood to have an objective 
characteristic, which is independent of a personal perspective.  
Then, Kemp Smith introduces the concept of the action of synthetic judgement: 
‘awareness is identical with the act of judging, and that judgment is always complex, 
involving both factual and interpretative elements. Synthetic, relational factors are present 
in all knowledge, even in knowledge that may seem, on superficial study, to be purely 
analytic or to consist merely of sense-impressions.’549 According to Kemp Smith, the 
subjective side and the objective side of knowledge cannot be separated, because they are 
part of the same process. Only with abstraction, can one separate the particular subject and 
the universal object, but actually they are part of the same action of synthetic judgement 
which reveals the unknown aspect of reality: ‘when, by forced abstraction, particulars and 
                                                 
548 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxv. The italics is in the 
original. 
549 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p.xxxviii. The italics is in the 
original.  
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universals are held mentally apart, they are still being apprehended through judgements, 
and therefore through mental processes that involve both. They stand in relations of mutual 
implication within a de facto system.’550 For example, within the process of one’s action, 
the form of past/now/future is not separated between the subjective now and the objective 
past/future, but the now and the past/future is mutually inter-related. The acting in the 
present includes the necessity of past and future as actual duration.  
According to Kemp Smith, the a priori principle has a paradoxical character.551 A fact 
becomes actual only when experienced by a particular subject, but, at the same time, the 
fact must be shared by other persons as possibility. If one misses the paradoxical character 
of the a priori principle, one misunderstand it: ‘the a priori is of this character must be 
clearly understood. Otherwise the reader will be pursued by a feeling of the unreality, of 
the merely historical or antiquarian significance, of the entire discussion.’552  
Kemp Smith summarizes these arguments as an argument about consciousness. Kemp 
Smith first says that ‘consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning.’553 According to 
Kemp Smith, the meaning is not about any contents of the awareness. The meaning 
                                                 
550 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxviii. The italics is in 
the original. 
551 ‘There is no difficulty in accounting for analytic judgments. They can all be justified by the 
principle of contradiction. Being analytic, they can be established a priori … For Kant a priori 
concepts are merely logical functions, i.e. empty; and secondly, are always synthetic.’ See Kemp 
Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. 30.  
552 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxvi.  
553 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xli. The italics is in the 
original. 
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indicates a fact that the world has a meaning only from a particular viewpoint.554 Then, 
Kemp Smith moves to ‘the diaphanous view of consciousness … which treats 
consciousness merely as a medium.’555 According to Kemp Smith, the diaphanous view 
treats the content as being independent from a particular viewpoint. The separation 
between the universal content and the particular viewpoint results in a ‘mirror-like mode 
of representation’556 which allows the subjective realm, on the one hand, and the objective 
realm, on the other. However, according to Kemp Smith, the subjective realm and the 
objective realm cannot be separated557 and both are part of the same process: ‘not passive 
contemplation but active judgement, not mere conception but synthetic interpretation, is 
the fundamental form, and the only form, in which our consciousness exists.’558 Kemp 
Smith says that consciousness must be regarded as an activity and it consists of certain 
relational factors whose presence can be detected in each and every act of awareness.  
According to Kemp Smith, this paradoxical characteristic of synthetic a priori is not 
                                                 
554  ‘Meaning … always involves the interpretation of what is given in the light of wider 
considerations that lend it significance.’ See Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of 
Pure Reason’, p. xlii.  
555 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xli. 
556 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xli. 
557  Kemp Smith says that Kant is a founder of a coherence theory of truth, instead of a 
correspondence theory: ‘our consciousness … is always conditioned and accompanied by 
interpretative processes, and in their absence there can be no awareness of any kind.’ See Kemp 
Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xli. See also Kemp Smith, A 
Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. 36.  
558 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xlii.  
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only found in time, but also in objects in space, and self: ‘consciousness of time, 
consciousness of objects in space, consciousness of self, are the three modes of experience 
which Kant seeks to analyse. They are found to be inseparable from one another and in 
their union to constitute a form of conscious experience that is equivalent to an act of 
judgement – i.e. to be a form of awareness that involves relational categories and universal 
concepts.’559 For example, the consciousness of objects in space has meaning only at this 
actual moment from a particular viewpoint. But, at the same time, the object is made 
possible by considering it as being shared with other persons. The possibility of an object 
is transformed into necessity by one’s creative activity. Likewise, the self has meaning only 
from this specific viewpoint which enables the actual world. But, at the same time, the self 
is made possible by considering it as being shared with other persons. The possibility of 
self is transformed into necessity by one’s creative activity.560 Kemp Smith says that this 
structure can also be found in morality: ‘morality, no less than knowledge, presupposes a 
priori principles.’561 
Then, Kemp Smith says that this process of synthetic a priori is not a personal process, 
                                                 
559 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxiv.  
560 ‘I am conscious to myself of myself – this is a thought which contains a twofold I, the I as subject 
and the I as object. How it should be possible that I, the I that thinks, should be an object … to myself, 
and so should be able to distinguish myself from myself, it is altogether beyond our powers to 
explain. It is, however, an undoubted fact.’ See Immanuel Kant, ‘Concerning the Advances made 
by Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff’ in Werke, VIII, ed. Hartenstein, pp. 530-1, quoted in Kemp 
Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. li.  
561 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xxxvi.  
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but an ontological562 process: ‘our mental states … are themselves part of the natural order 
which consciousness reveals. They compose the empirical self which is an objective 
existence, integrally connected with the material environment in terms of which alone it 
can be understood. The subjective is not opposite in nature to the objective, but a sub-
species within it.’563 According to Kemp Smith, the principle to guide the ontological 
process is called regulative, because the experienced order is discovered from within the 
process of solving contradictions instead of presupposing it as determined end: ‘owing to 
the creating activities of the mind, regulative principles are active in all consciousness; and 
under their guidance the experienced order … is transformed into a comprehended 
order.’564  
   Finally, Kemp Smith explains the structure of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: ‘the 
problem of the Critique, the analysis of our awareness of meaning, is a single problem, 
and each … involves all the others.’565 According to Kemp Smith, different parts of the 
Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic, and 
Transcendental Dialectic) discuss the single problem from different angles: ‘the statement 
in the Aesthetic that space and time are given to the mind by the sensuous faculty of 
                                                 
562 ‘To eliminate the ontological implications of his theory of consciousness is … to render many 
of his conclusions entirely untenable, and in particular to destroy the force of his fundamental 
distinction between appearance and reality.’ See Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique 
of Pure Reason’, p. xlv.  
563 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. xlvi.  
564 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
565 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. liii.  
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receptivity is modified in the Analytic through recognition of the part which the syntheses 
and concepts of understanding must play in the construction of these forms; and in the 
Dialectic their apprehension is further found to involve an Idea of Reason.’566 According 
to Kemp Smith, the Idea of Reason is different from forms and categories in being not 
constitutive but regulative. The idea of reason is regulative because it reveals the infinite 
historical process of realizing the ultimate end from within the human conditions, 
especially the spatial and temporal conditions under which the aim is realized.567 
   What can be seen from the argument above is that what mediates subjectivity and 
objectivity is history. First, the world is experienced as subjective for a particular person. 
However, the same world is shared with other persons. Then, the world which has been 
known among other persons appears as objective from the viewpoint of the specific person. 
This is contradiction. Then, the personal subjectivity of the world can be recovered from 
                                                 
566 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, p. liv.  
567 Kemp Smith distinguishes the Hegelian version of Idealism (Hermann Lotze and T. H. Green) 
and the Kantian version of Idealism (Edward Caird and John Watson), and says that his reading of 
Kant is close to Caird and Watson: ‘we have … to consider what is perhaps the most serious of all 
the misunderstandings to which Kant has laid himself open, and which is in large part responsible 
for the widespread belief that his Critical principles, when consistently developed, must finally 
eventuate in some such metaphysics as that of Fichte and Hegel … This interpretation of Kant 
appears in a very crude form in James’s references to Kant … It appears in a more subtle form in 
Lotze and Green. Caird and Watson, on the other hand, have carefully guarded themselves against 
this view of Kant’s teaching.’ See Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ 
p. l. See also Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow: James 
Maclehose, 1889, and John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained, Glasgow: James 
Maclehose, 1908.  
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within one’s action and other persons’ reactions. The objectivity of what has been known 
among other persons is replaced by the subjectivity of another person’s reaction, which is 
not known by the specific person yet. In this case, the subjectivity and the objectivity is in 
the relationship of historical development. The personal subjectivity is replaced by the 
objectivity of other persons, and then the objectivity of other persons is replaced by the 
subjectivity of other persons’ reaction. Because of the replacement, the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity is understood as historical development.  
   However, historical development is not enough for the full understanding of the 
ultimate reality. Even though historical development is relevant to matters which are about 
the process governed by human being, it cannot be applied to the confirmation of the 
ultimate reality itself. 
 
 
II. JOHN OMAN 
   One of the central arguments that Oman developed in The Natural and the 
Supernatural is that the supernatural can be known only from within the natural. The 
relation between the natural and the supernatural can be found in his concept of 
environment and his reading of Kant’s concepts of the noumenon and the phenomenon.  
First, Oman’s concept of environment indicates that the ultimate reality is not different 
from one’s personal environment here and now: ‘knowing is not knowledge as an effect 
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of an unknown external cause, but is knowledge as we so interpret that our meaning is the 
actual meaning of our environment.’568 According to Oman, the ultimate reality is known 
only through human knowing and hence has no separate locus of its own which can be 
known independently of one’s personal environment.  
   Then, Oman says that the personal environment is neither purely subjective nor purely 
objective: ‘our knowledge cannot be a purely mental creation; and it cannot be a mere 
effect of an outward cause.’569 Here Oman intends to say that personal environment must 
not be understood as a result of a fixed relation between a subject and its object. On the 
contrary, personal environment is characterized by what is more than one’s expectation: ‘a 
human being’s environment is other and greater than it seems, that interpreting the natural, 
but extending behind or beyond or above it, is the Supernatural, as a larger environment to 
which men must relate themselves through the activities.’570 According to Oman, there is 
one’s engagement with the personal environment. However, the response from the side of 
environment must not be understood as a direct result of one’s engagement. The 
environment always stands over against a person, and therefore its response is always more 
than one’s expectation.571 
                                                 
568 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 175.  
569 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 110.  
570 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 58-9.  
571  Oman says that the supernatural is characterized by what is more than the natural: ‘the 
Supernatural means the world which manifests more than natural values.’ See Oman, The Natural 
and the Supernatural, p. 71.  
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   Oman says that this relation between a person and the world can also be understood as 
a relation between a person and other persons: ‘such a leaning by intercourse [with the 
world] has a parallel only in our experience of persons … all friendship is a reaching out 
to the person who is himself both the revelation and the prophecy of fuller 
manifestation.’572 Here Oman mentions other persons, because other persons always 
manifests itself as what is more than a person’s expectation.  
Furthermore, Oman says that the concept of personal environment which is more than 
one’s expectation leads to the concept of the ultimate environment as totality of the world: 
‘as they live more in accord with their environment they know it better, and as they know 
it better they can live in a larger accord … the more he is himself an independent person, 
the more his knowledge is objective. Religion differs only by reason of a higher 
environment.’573 According to Oman, what characterizes religion is totality, which can be 
found as the ultimate unity of the world: ‘what distinguishes religion from all else is the 
unique quality … of the way of thinking things together.’574 
Oman says that the ultimate environment can be understood as including all of the 
world in all of its aspects, within which all the different persons are living: ‘religion must 
be a large experience in which we grow in knowledge as we grow in humility and courage, 
in which we deal with life and not abstractions, and with God as the environment in which 
                                                 
572 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 340.  
573 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 470.  
574 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 58.  
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we live and move and have our being … This we realize, as environment is only to be 
realized, by rightly living in it.’575  
On the basis of the arguments above, Oman explains the relation between the natural 
and the supernatural: ‘the revelation of the Supernatural was by reconciliation to the 
Natural: and this was made possible by realizing in the Natural the meaning and purpose 
of the Supernatural.’576 According to Oman, the Supernatural is perceived when the 
natural world, within which different individuals are following different values, meanings 
and purposes, becomes open to its ultimate value, meaning and purpose. The Supernatural 
is not the designation of a world beyond this world; it is, rather, this natural world seen 
inclusively and as having a new evaluation made of its total significance. 
What is important to note here is that religion is not thought to be a matter of history: 
‘the origin of religion … cannot be an historical question … At the lowest stage we know, 
man is already … with his religion as a going concern in all its aspects of higher feeling, 
higher values and higher environment … a belief in the Supernatural, which, even in its 
grossest material environment, evokes a reverence and a trust not to be explained by any 
exaltation of the Natural.’577  Here Oman intends to say that religion as an ultimate 
environment is the ultimate basis to think of history, and not vice versa. According to Oman, 
religion is related with the eternal, whereas history is related with the evanescent: ‘if 
                                                 
575 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 471.  
576 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 448.  
577 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, pp. 55-6.  
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reconciliation to the evanescent is revelation of the eternal, and revelation of the eternal a 
higher reconciliation to the evanescent, that is only as we know all environment, which is 
by living in accord with it.’578 Here Oman intends to say that if there is only history, it 
remains to be arbitrary and evanescent. What lacks in history as the evanescent is a higher 
reconciliation given by the eternal. Then, according to Oman, the eternal is not only 
understood as the ultimate environment which is reached at the end of history, but also the 
personal environment here and now which is known by one’s living in accord with it.  
   This point becomes clearer with the examination of Oman’s reading of Kant’s 
concepts of noumenon and phenomenon. First, Oman says that contradiction between 
causal necessity of the phenomenal world and personal freedom of the noumenal world 
can be solved by thinking their relation as the process to be developed through one’s 
knowing of the world: ‘the necessity of the phenomenal world does not contradict the 
freedom of the noumenal world, because the necessity is only created by our way of 
knowing.’579 This process can be understood as historical progress to discover the order 
of the world: ‘when mind becomes conscious and interprets its environment by reason and 
proceeds to manage it by considered and deliberate purpose, environment is found to be 
neither adamant nor putty, but an ordered and reliable universe.’580 
                                                 
578 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 470.  
579 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 242.  
580 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 330. According to Oman, this historical progress 
is originated in a dialectical relationship between the individual and individuality. By the individual 
is meant the phenomenal character of being one person, which is common to all persons. By 
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   However, according to Oman, Kant’s argument from historical progress must not be 
understood as just a mere continuation of physical causation: ‘progress has no meaning, if 
evolution is mere adaptation to the struggle to keep physically alive in an environment of 
value only for that end.’581 What is lacking in physical causation is the sacred or absolute 
values. Oman says that personal freedom must be understood as the realization of the 
sacred values: ‘freedom, working with sacred or absolute values, is the only vantage 
ground from which we can consciously be aware that our environment is a universe.’582 
   Then, Oman says that the argument by historical progress must be complemented by 
the argument by the ultimate environment: ‘what we consciously or unconsciously mean 
by progress is advancement into a life measured as higher by ideals, which is freer and 
fuller adjustment to an environment which is also higher because of the larger scope for 
following ideals.’583 According to Oman, if there is only history, one can never go out of 
human understanding. One can endlessly develop one’s understanding, but the 
development cannot reach the ultimate reality itself. Therefore, one needs two different 
kinds of logic. On the one hand, one needs a logic of history. The logic of history can solve 
                                                 
individuality is meant the noumenal character of being one person, which makes each person 
incomparably unique. Oman says that, according to Kant, the individual’s recognition of the world 
can be understood as the process that the endless variety of individuality manifests itself from within 
forms, concepts, categories, and the ideas of reason. See Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, 
pp. 144-67.  
581 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 332.  
582 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 330.  
583 Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 332.  
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the contradiction between subject and object. However, the logic of history cannot explain 
the relation between the ultimate environment, which is reached at the end of history, and 
the personal environment here and now. Therefore, on the other hand, one also needs a 
logic of environment.  
What can be seen from the arguments above is that Oman’s argument which is based 
on the concept of environment is different from Kant’s argument which is based on the 
concept of history, even though both of their arguments can be understood as the relation 
between a person and other persons. In the case of Kant, the relation between a person and 
other persons is a relation of replacement. A person’s understanding of other persons is 
endlessly replaced by another understanding. But the replacement cannot reach the 
ultimate reality itself.  
Whereas, in the case of Oman, the relation between a person and other persons is a 
relation of integration. On the one hand, there is a personal environment. The personal 
environment is thought to be more than one’s expectation. On the other hand, there are 
other persons. The other persons are also more than one’s expectation. Then, the person 
and the other persons are integrated within the ultimate environment. The ultimate 
environment is thought to include all of the world in all of its aspects, within which all the 
different persons are living. A person and other persons are always already integrated 
within a larger environment. The environment itself does not explain the history, but the 
environment is necessary for the full understanding of the history.  
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Kant’s logic of history and Oman’s logic of environment are in a complementary 
relationship. One needs both logic for the full understanding of the ultimate reality. On the 
one hand, there must be a logic of history, which aims at the ultimate reality of the world. 
But, in this case, the ultimate reality remains to be beyond one’s personal world. Therefore, 
on the other hand, there must be a logic of environment, which secures that the ultimate 
reality is actually available for the person here and now.  
 
 
III. JOHN HICK  
Hick’s reading of Kant can be understood on the basis of Kemp Smith and Oman. For 
example, in An Autobiography, Hick says that ‘I was deeply influenced by Kemp Smith 
… He was one of the last of the Idealist philosophers and also a major interpreter of Kant 
… It was through him that I realized the immense importance of Kant … I have retained 
from Kant what today I identify as ‘critical realism’ – the view that there is a world, indeed 
a universe, out there existing independently of us, but that we can only know it in the forms 
provided by our human perceptual apparatus and conceptual systems.’584 Here Hick says 
that the independent, or ultimate, reality can be known only from within human 
understanding.  
   In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick says that the relation between human 
                                                 
584 Hick, An Autobiography, pp. 66-69. 
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understanding and the ultimate reality develops according to temporality: ‘in Kant’s 
system of thought these [categories of the understanding] are a priori and hence universal 
and invariable modes of human perception. The pure categories or pure concepts of the 
understanding (for example, substance) are schematized in terms of temporality to produce 
the more concrete categories which are exhibited in our actual experience of the world 
(Thus, for example, the pure concept of substance is schematized as the more concrete 
idea of an object enduring through time).’585 According to Hick, one’s understanding of 
substance is replaced by another, more concrete understanding of substance, and it 
endlessly continues.  
   Hick’s understanding of Kant’s concept of regulative idea can also be understood as a 
consequence of this historical progress: ‘the idea of God … functions as a regulative idea 
whereby we ‘regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of supreme 
reason.’’586 According to the logic of history, one’s understanding is endlessly replaced 
                                                 
585 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.  
586 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243, and the quotation is from Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, B714, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1958, pp. 559-60.  
Before this quotation, Hick mentions Kant’s argument about morality: ‘the categorical character 
of moral obligation presupposes the reality of God as making possible the summum bonum in which 
perfect goodness and perfect happiness will coincide … But for Kant God is postulated, not 
experienced.’ Here Hick is criticizing Kant, because Kant’s argument is only about God who is 
postulated at the end of history and not about God who is experienced here and now. See Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion, pp. 242-43.  
This argument originally comes from Faith and Knowledge. In Faith and Knowledge, Hick 
criticizes Kant as well as James and Newman, because their arguments cover only a limited field of 
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by another, and the endless progress requires the ultimate end to be reached at the end of 
history.  
   On the basis of the argument above, one can understand the influence from Oman:   
‘John Oman was probably the most original British theologian of the first half of the 
twentieth century, and his teaching concerning the relation between religion and 
environment, and the apprehension of the supernatural in and through the natural, provides 
                                                 
knowledge: ‘for the purpose of our inquiry, the main comment to be made upon this Kantian theory 
is that it leaves no room for any acquaintance with or experience of the divine … We may make a 
justifiable intellectual move to the belief that there is a God; but we cannot be conscious of God 
himself … This cannot, I think, be regarded as an analysis of the faith of the ordinary religious 
believer.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 75-6.  
   According to Hick, Kantian ethics is made of two different aspects: moral goodness and 
happiness. On the one hand, there is moral goodness, which is universal: ‘act only on that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ See Immanuel 
Kant, The Moral Law, or, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. 
Paton, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1948, p. 88, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 
First Edition, p. 71. 
On the other hand, there is happiness, which is personal: ‘to be happy is necessarily the desire 
of every rational but finite being.’ See Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and 
Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London: Longmans, Green 
and Co, 1889, p. 112, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 72.  
According to Hick, what Kant calls the highest good, the summum bonum, is the moral 
goodness with the presupposition of happiness. Then, happiness is actualized only as action which 
engages with moral goodness from within this particular moment. The actualization is understood 
as an endless process to realize happiness from within moral goodness towards the ultimate end. 
This process of actualization requires the assumption of divine existence as the ultimate end: ‘the 
compulsion to postulate divine existence is thus a compulsion to ‘assume something without which 
that cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our action,’ namely the summum 
bonum.’ See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 74, and the quotation is from Kant, Kant's 
Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, p. 89. 
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(as it seems to me) an important key to the problem of religious knowledge.’587 
   In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick also uses the concept of environment. What is 
important to note here is that Hick distinguishes non-religious environment and religious 
environment. Hick starts the argument from non-religious environment: ‘the impact of our 
environment upon our sensory equipment … comes to consciousness in forms prescribed 
by … schematized categories.’588 According to Hick, this non-religious environment can 
be understood as one’s physical world.  
   Then, Hick moves to religious environment: ‘in the religious case there are two 
fundamental circumstances: first, the postulated presence of the Real to the human life of 
which it is the ground; and second, the cognitive structure of our consciousness, with its 
capacity to respond to the meaning or character of our environment, including its religious 
meaning or character.’589 According to Hick, the religious environment can be understood 
from the two different circumstances. First, Hick says that there is the postulated presence 
of the Real. In this case, the presence of the Real is not directly experienced, but postulated 
in the infinite future. Then, Hick says that one’s consciousness which responds to the 
meaning of one’s environment also includes its religious meaning. In this case, one’s 
personal environment, which has a meaning here and now, can also be understood to 
directly embody religious meaning of the ultimate environment, which is postulated in the 
                                                 
587 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. xix.  
588 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.  
589 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 244.  
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infinite future.  
   What should be noted here is that the ‘religious’ has a special meaning for Hick which 
connects the experience here and now and the postulation of the Real in the infinite future: 
‘the ‘presence’ of the Real consists in the availability, from a transcendent source, of … 
what we call religious experience.’ 590  According to Hick, ‘the religious’, which is 
distinguished from ‘the natural’, is characterized by the direct experience of the ultimate 
environment. In religious experience, the presence of the Real is not postulated, but 
experienced directly.  
This connection between ‘the postulation of the Real in the infinite future’ and ‘the 
direct experience of the Real here and now’ can also be found in Hick’s reading of Kant’s 
concepts of noumenon and phenomenon. First, Hick says that noumenon cannot be 
directly known for a human being, because noumenon is beyond one’s recognition: ‘he 
[Kant] is not … using the term ‘noumenon’ in the positive sense of that which is knowable 
… but in the negative sense of ‘a thing in so far as it is not an object of our sensible 
intuition’.’591 According to Hick, the noumenon can only be postulated as the necessary 
requirement of the structure of human cognition: ‘the noumenal world exists 
independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal world is that same world as it 
appears to our human consciousness.’592 In this case, the noumenon is understood to be a 
                                                 
590 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 244.  
591 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 241.  
592 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 241.  
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postulation in the infinite future. 
   Then, Hick says that the postulation of the Real is not enough for the full understanding 
of religion. What is required is not only the postulation of the Real in the infinite future, 
but religious experience here and now: ‘in partial agreement but also partial disagreement 
with him, I want to say that the Real an sich is postulated by us as a pre-supposition … of 
religious experience and the religious life.’593 According to Hick, both ‘the postulation of 
the Real’ and ‘the direct experience of the Real’ is necessary for the full understanding of 
religion. On the basis of both, the religious can be distinguished from the natural by the 
direct experience of the ultimate reality.  
   According to Hick, the direct presence of the ultimate reality remains to be mysterious 
facts: ‘in the religious case there are … the ultimately mysterious facts of which we have 
to take account.’594 However, the ultimate reality is actually available here and now: ‘it is 
entirely reasonable for the religious person, experiencing life in relation to the transcendent 
… , to believe in the reality of that which is thus apparently experienced.’595 
   What can be seen from the argument above is that Kant’s philosophy of history, which 
requires the postulation of God at the end of history, must be complemented by religious 
experience, which secures the experience of God here and now. On the basis of this 
argument about Kant, the meaning of ‘the religious’ becomes clearer by placing Hick’s 
                                                 
593 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.  
594 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 244.  
595 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235.  
264 
 
argument about religious pluralism in the whole system of An Interpretation of Religion.   
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3. 
Hick’s Religious Pluralism 
 
 
I. INCOMPATIBLE READINGS OF HICK’S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
   Corresponding to the incompatible readings of Kant, there are also incompatible 
readings of Hick’s religious pluralism. On the one hand, there is an essentialist reading of 
Hick. According to this reading, Hick’s project is understood to be based on the universal 
essence of religion which can be found in every religious traditions. For example, such a 
universal essence of religion can be ethics: ‘self-sacrificing concern for the good of others 
… which we have seen to constitute the basic ethical principle of the great traditions.’596 
According to this reading, every religious tradition is based equally on the universal ethic 
of self-sacrificing concern for the good of others. Because of its emphasis on the normative 
characteristic of ethics, this interpretation is often criticised as a reduction of concrete 
narratives of different religious traditions into an abstract ideal of universal ethics.  
   Alternatively, such a universal essence of religion can be mythology: ‘we can make 
true and false literal and analogical statements about our own image of the Ultimate, truth 
or falsity here being determined internally by the norms of our tradition. But statements 
                                                 
596 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 325.  
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about the Real in itself have mythological, not literal, value.’ 597  According to the 
essentialist reading of Hick, the same structure can also be found in the case of mythology. 
According to this reading, every religious tradition is based equally on mythology. Because 
of its normative characteristic, mythology is understood as oppression of literal and 
analogical statements in different religious traditions. As in the case of ethics, this reading 
also understands mythology as an abstraction from concrete religious traditions.  
   In a similar direction, there is also a totalitarian reading of Hick. According to this 
reading, Hick’s project is characterized by its totalizing tendency which aims to include 
every different aspect of the world within the total unity of the ultimate reality. For example, 
its totalizing tendency can be found in Hick’s concept of the religious ambiguity of the 
universe: ‘the universe is religiously ambiguous in that it is possible to interpret it, 
intellectually and experientially, both religiously and naturalistically.’598 According to this 
reading, religious ambiguity of the universe is intended to include every different aspect of 
the world, such as the religious and the natural, as well as the intellectual and the 
experiential within the total unity of the ultimate reality. This totalizing tendency can also 
be criticized as an abstraction from concrete religious lives.  
   However, on the other hand, there is a cultural-linguistic reading of Hick. This reading 
emphasizes precisely the opposite aspect of Hick’s project. For example, this reading 
emphasizes the cultural-linguistic groups of religious traditions: ‘it is evident that in some 
                                                 
597 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, Second Edition, p. xxxiii.  
598 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 12.  
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ninety-nine percent of cases the religion which an individual professes and to which he or 
she adheres depends upon the accidents of birth. Someone born to Buddhist parents in 
Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone born to Muslim parents in Saudi Arabia 
to be Muslim, someone born to Christian parents in Mexico to be a Christian, and so on.’599 
According to this reading, there are a lot of different cultural-linguistic groups, and a person 
is determined by the cultural and linguistic worldview that one is born into. One’s religion 
is given to one by the religious family one is part of. If one’s culture creates one’s world, 
and if one’s language is mutually different, one’s worlds will be different to another’s.  
   According to this reading, religious pluralism is based on the plurality of religious 
traditions which actually exist in the world: ‘persons living within other traditions, then, 
are equally justified in trusting their own distinctive religious experience and in forming 
their beliefs on the basis of it … let us avoid the implausibly arbitrary dogma that religious 
experience is all delusory with the single exception of the particular form enjoyed by the 
one who is speaking.’600 There are a lot of different cultural-linguistic traditions in the 
world. If a person is determined by the cultural and linguistic traditions that one is born 
into, the other persons in other traditions are similarly justified by being determined by the 
cultural and linguistic traditions that one is born into. The initial plurality of religion cannot 
be questioned, because the choice of one religion is not based on an infallible rationality. 
Because of the arbitrariness, the authority of one religion cannot undermine the other 
                                                 
599 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 2.  
600 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235.  
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religions.  
   What can be seen from the argument above is that there are two mutually incompatible 
readings of Hick. On the one hand, there is an essentialist or totalitarian reading of Hick, 
which emphasizes the identity of religions. On the other hand, there is a cultural-linguistic 
reading of Hick, which emphasizes the difference of religion.  
 
 
II. CRITICAL REALISM AND COSMIC OPTIMISM 
   According to the argument so far, the whole system of Hick’s An Interpretation of 
Religion can better be understood as reconciliation between the two mutually incompatible 
standpoints, rather than a choice of either of them. Then, on the basis of that, two different 
kinds of logic are required for the full understanding of the reconciliation. The two different 
kinds of logic can be understood as the logic of history and the logic of environment.  
   First, there is the logic of history: ‘the particularizing factor (corresponding, in its 
function, to time in the schematisation of the Kantian categories) is the range of human 
cultures, actualizing different though overlapping aspects of our immensely complex 
human potentiality for awareness of the transcendent.’ 601  According to Hick, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language can be understood as particularization of Kant’s 
philosophy of temporality. Hick says that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language can be 
                                                 
601 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 245.  
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understood as a spatial, embodied aspect of culture, and Kant’s philosophy of temporality 
is understood as a linear, progressive aspect of development. These two aspects of culture 
and development are taken to be complementary.  
   On the one hand, according to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there are a lot 
of different kinds of cultural and linguistic traditions: ‘it is … illuminating to see the 
different traditions, movements and ideologies whose religious character is either 
generally agreed or responsibly debated, not as exemplifying a common essence, but as 
forming a complex continuum of remembrances and differences analogous to those found 
within a family.’602  Here Hick denies the common essence of religion, and instead 
proposes to understand religions as different kinds of cultural and linguistic traditions.  
Then, on the other hand, these cultural and linguistic traditions are understood to be 
developing according to Kantian categories which are developing towards the ultimate 
reality in the infinite future: ‘the pure categories or pure concepts of the understanding (for 
example, substance) are schematized in terms of temporality to produce the more concrete 
categories which are exhibited in our actual experience of the world (Thus, for example, 
the pure concept of substance is schematized as the more concrete idea of an object 
enduring through time).’603 
   This logic of history can also be found in Hick’s critical realism. According to Hick, 
religious experience embedded in culture is not closed, but related with the ultimate reality: 
                                                 
602 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 4.  
603 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.  
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‘critical realism holds that the realm of religious experience and belief is not in toto human 
projection and illusion but constitutes a range of cognitive responses, varying from culture 
and culture, to the presence of a transcendent reality.’604 What is important to realize here 
is that the different cultures as responses to the ultimate reality can be understood as 
interacting and developing according to history towards the infinite future: ‘the world is 
about to be dramatically transformed for the better, although entertained periodically 
throughout history.’605 
   According to the logic of history, the ultimate reality lies in the infinite future and, 
therefore, always remains to be ‘there’ which is outside one’s cultural-linguistic tradition: 
‘what I am calling the realist option understands such language in a basically realist way 
as referring to an object of discourse that is ‘there’ to be referred to.’606 
   However, the logic of history cannot provide the reason why the ultimate reality in the 
                                                 
604 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 175.  
605 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 207. The emphasis on history can also be found in Roy 
Wood Sellars’ evolutionary naturalism: ‘The evolutionary naturalist holds that, just as matter is 
unevenly distributed throughout the universe, so are conditions making for complicated organic 
synthesises such as life and mind … The generic category is change; at the very least, evolution is 
a kind of cumulative change … Evolutionary naturalism rests upon physical realism and the fact of 
creative synthesis.’ See Sellars, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, p. 3. 
606 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 173. The emphasis on the independence of object, which 
always remains to be outside one’s interpretation, can also be found in Sellars’ critical realism: ‘all 
sorts of facts about the thing perceived … influence our perceptual experience … Attitudes, 
expectations, memories, accepted facts, all operate interpretatively to make us regard ourselves as 
somehow aware of public, independent things.’ See Sellars, ‘A Statement of Critical Realism’, p. 
477, quoted in Hick in An Interpretation of Religion, p. 175. 
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infinite future is also available here and now. Therefore, the logic of history must be 
complemented by the logic of environment. Hick’s argument about personhood can be 
understood as a procedure to lead the logic of environment.  
   First, Hick says that the world must be experienced from a particular person: ‘we are 
not bodiless observers viewing a scene with which we have no contact, but integral parts 
of the world that we are cognizing, and we exist in continuous interaction with those parts 
of it that are adjacent to us.’607 According to Hick, the particular viewpoint is the very 
basic condition for the world to have any meanings. The particular viewpoint provide 
actuality only for a particular person in this particular world at this particular time, because 
the person and the world is inseparably intricate in this very basic case.  
   The necessity of particular viewpoint is applicable not only in the case of a person but 
also a personal religious experience embedded in a tradition: ‘our own forms of religious 
experience, together with that of the tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst 
others are not. We can of course claim this; and indeed virtually every religious tradition 
has done so, regarding alternative forms of religion either as false or as confused and 
inferior versions of itself. ’608 
   Then, on the basis of the necessity of particular viewpoint, Hick introduces the 
argument from the existence of other persons, who look like just human-like appearances 
                                                 
607 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 131.  
608 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235, quoted in Plantinga, ‘Pluralism: A Defense of 
Religious Exclusivism,’ p.191.  
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for a particular person, but it is possible for them to be other centres of the universe: ‘in the 
presence of another person two evaluators meet, so that in judging I am at the same time 
judged. Not only am I conscious of the other but I am conscious that the other is conscious 
of me. Further, he or she will have aims and interests which may support or oppose my 
own.’609 From the existence of other people, it can possibly mean that there are a lot of 
incomparably different worlds, which are corresponding to incomparably different 
persons just like one self.  
   The existence of other persons is applicable not only in the case of other persons but 
also other persons’ religious experiences embedded in other traditions: ‘persons living 
within other traditions … are equally justified in trusting their own distinctive religious 
experience and in forming their beliefs on the basis of it.’610 
   Furthermore, on the basis of the existence of other persons, Hick introduces an 
argument from Hume’s natural belief: ‘we are so constituted that we cannot help believing 
and living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world. We may be able to 
suspend our conviction during brief moments of philosophical enthusiasm; but natural 
belief … will soon reassert itself.’611 According to Hick, ordinary people in the common 
sense world naturally make a choice that the actual world exists in spite of the possible 
existence of other persons and their worlds. This natural belief, which secures the very 
                                                 
609 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 145.  
610 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 235. 
611 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213.  
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basis of reality, can be understood as a total balance of one’s environment kept by common 
sense, within which incomparably different persons are living.  
   This very basic environment can be understood as a weak kind of unity, which secures 
an imperfect but reliable balance, instead of a strong kind of unity, which imposes a 
perfectly solid foundation. For example, the distinction between weakness and strength 
can be found in Hick’s distinction between faith as trust and faith as cognition: ‘we shall 
not … be asking directly whether A’s ‘experience of existing in the presence of God’ is 
genuine …, but rather whether it is rational for A to trust his or her experience as veridical 
and to behave on the basis of it.’612 Here what Hick calls faith as trust can be understood 
as a weak kind of reliability, in contrast with faith as cognition as a strong kind of reliability. 
One’s particular cognition of the actual world has a strong kind of reliability, whereas one’s 
natural belief in the homely, balanced environment, within which other persons are living, 
has only a weak kind of reliability. This is because the existence of other persons can only 
possibly be supposed for a particular person.  
This logic of environment is a weak kind of logic, but it secures that the environment 
is not only possible in the infinite future, but actually available here and now. Then, at last, 
on the basis of the two kinds of logic about history and environment, one can understand 
Hick’s cosmic optimism: ‘what I called earlier the cosmic optimism of each of the great 
traditions is intensified when we see them all as pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly 
                                                 
612 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 212.  
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better existence and as affirming that the universe is such that this limitlessly better 
possibility is actually available to us and can begin to be realized in each present 
moment.’613  
On the one hand, there is a logic of history, which secures that different religious 
traditions can be understood as interacting and developing towards the ultimate reality. The 
different religious traditions here and now are pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly 
better existence in the infinite future. However, the logic of history cannot provide the 
reason why the ultimate reality in the infinite future is also available here and now. 
Therefore, on the other hand, there is a logic of environment, which secures that the 
ultimate reality is not only possible in the infinite future, but actually available as the 
environment here and now. The different religious traditions are actually realizing the 
ultimate reality in the infinite future from within the common environment in each present 
moment.  
 
 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF HICK’S RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
On the basis of the arguments above, John Hick’s religious pluralism can be 
understood as an imperfect but reliable standpoint rather than imposing a perfectly solid 
standpoint. First, there are different foundations of plural religious traditions, and then, on 
                                                 
613 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 380.  
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the basis of these traditions, one can think of historical process as a means to recover the 
common environment among different foundations.  
   When Hick had a claim about substantive identity or overlap among diverse religious 
traditions, the emphasis was not only on the underlying ultimate unity but also diverse 
cultural and historical settings of religions. Hick takes these two contradictory standpoints 
at the same time. When Hick emphasizes the ultimate unity of all religions, he always 
emphasizes the diverse forms of self-understanding of religion too.  
   On the basis of the presupposition of the existence of different religious traditions, Hick 
provides the two kinds of logic which secure the ultimate unity of different religious 
traditions. One is the logic of history: ‘the particularizing factor (corresponding, in its 
function, to time in the schematisation of the Kantian categories) is the range of human 
cultures, actualizing different though overlapping aspects of our immensely complex 
human potentiality for awareness of the transcendent.’614 This logic of history can be 
understood as a combination of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and Kant’s 
philosophy of temporality. According to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, a religion 
can be viewed as a kind of cultural and linguistic framework. Then, according to Kantian 
philosophy of temporality, these religious traditions can be understood as in a relationship 
between actuality and possibility. The actuality of one religious tradition is seen as 
possibility from other religious traditions, and this contradiction is continued to be solved 
                                                 
614 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 245.  
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in a course of history.  
   Then, the other is the logic of environment: ‘we are so constituted that we cannot help 
believing and living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world. We may be 
able to suspend our conviction during brief moments of philosophical enthusiasm; but 
natural belief … will soon reassert itself.’615 According to the logic of environment, the 
actuality of one religious tradition and the possibility of other religious traditions are solved 
within a common environment in which ordinary people naturally believe. This logic of 
environment is based on Hume’s philosophy of common sense.616  
   On the basis of the two kinds of logic, one can understand Hick’s cosmic optimism: 
‘what I called earlier the cosmic optimism of each of the great traditions is intensified when 
we see them all as pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly better existence and as 
affirming that the universe is such that this limitlessly better possibility is actually available 
to us and can begin to be realized in each present moment.’617 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
615 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213.  
616 Hume’s philosophy of common sense will be examined in the 6th chapter of this dissertation.  
617 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 380.  
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Chapter 6. 
 
COMMON SENSE AND HISTORY 
Two Complementary Aspects of Hick’s Philosophy 
 
 
In the 1st chapter of this dissertation, the characteristic of reliabilism was defined: (1) 
an inquiry based on the difference of plural foundations, and (2) an inquiry based on the 
historical process to form a coherent perspective among different foundations. In the 2nd 
chapter, the definition was further developed as the ethics of normality: (1) the idea of 
normality is valid only for a unique situation and it determines one’s immediate reaction 
with the world, (2) the idea of normality is a comprehensive ability of a person and is based 
on the balance of whole aspects of reality, and (3) the idea of normality has a social aspect 
and it has both creating and stabilizing functions.  
These characteristics of reliabilism can also be found in John Hick’s philosophy. For 
example, Hick’s reading of Hume’s natural belief can be understood as the belief in the 
very basis of reality, within which one can naturally act and react with other persons. This 
can be understood as a total balance of the world kept by common sense. This natural 
belief is not a consequence after a process of reasoning. However, it does not mean that 
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the process is simple. On the contrary, the naturalness can be understood to have been 
acquired on a very subtle balance that has long been kept through history.  
   Likewise, Hick’s cosmic optimism can be understood as dynamism created by a 
specific person’s unique engagement with other persons. If the total balance among 
persons is fixed and stabilized, the lively reality of the changing world is lost. Even 
though the stabilization of normality is necessary as a conventional standard for a social 
life, the conventional standard must be wide enough to accept a specific person’s unique 
engagement. 
   Therefore, John Hick’s philosophy has these two aspects: common sense and history. 
On the one hand, Hick’s reading of Hume’s natural belief can be understood as a 
philosophy of common sense: ‘we are so constituted that we cannot help believing and 
living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world. We may be able to suspend 
our conviction during brief moments of philosophical enthusiasm; but natural belief … 
will soon reassert itself.’618 On the basis of natural belief, one can naturally act and react 
with other persons as if they are real persons who are also the centre of the universe, just 
like oneself. This natural belief, which secures the very basis of reality, can be understood 
as a total balance of one’s world kept by common sense, within which incomparably 
different persons are living.  
                                                 
618 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213.  
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What is presupposed in Hick’s philosophy of common sense can be understood as the 
logic of integration.619 According to Hick, the world is experienced as actuality only for a 
particular person. Then, the same world is shared with other persons, and it is theoretically 
possible to doubt the existence of the world and other persons, because they appear for the 
specific person as just possibility. However, for ordinary people, the common sense world 
presupposes the necessary existence of the world. Therefore, the other persons, who 
appear for the specific person not to be known yet, are actually living in the same world, 
which has been known for ordinary people. In this case, the actuality of a specific person 
and the possibility of other persons are integrated within a necessary existence of the whole 
world, which ordinary people naturally presuppose. Because of this integrity, common 
sense realism is understood as total balance among different persons. 
On the other hand, Hick’s cosmic optimism can be understood as philosophy of 
history: ‘what I called earlier the cosmic optimism of each of the great traditions is 
intensified when we see them all as pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly better 
existence and as affirming that the universe is such that this limitlessly better possibility is 
actually available to us and can begin to be realized in each present moment.’620 What 
Hick intends by cosmic optimism is a dialectical relationship between the actual and the 
possible, and the dialectical relationship necessarily includes an historical process towards 
the infinite future.   
                                                 
619 See also the 5th chapter of this dissertation.  
620 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 380. 
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What is presupposed in Hick’s philosophy of history can be understood as the logic of 
replacement.621 According to Hick, the world is experienced as actuality for a particular 
person. However, the same world is shared with other persons. The world which has been 
known among other persons appears just as possibility from the viewpoint of the specific 
person. However, the personal actuality can be recovered from within one’s action and 
other persons’ reaction to it. The possibility of what has been known among other persons 
can be replaced by the actuality of one’s action and other persons’ reaction to it. Then, 
through the process between one’s action and other persons’ reaction to it, the existence of 
the world can be recovered as necessity. In this case, the actuality and the possibility is in 
the relationship of replacement. Personal actuality is replaced by the possibility of other 
persons, and then the possibility of other persons is replaced by the actuality of one’s action 
and other persons’ reaction to it. From within the process of replacement, the necessary 
existence of the world is continued to be extended in a wider basis. Therefore, cosmic 
optimism is understood as an historical process from what has been known in the past, 
through one’s present stage, towards the future ideal in which one would have the whole 
truth, or at least a close approximation. Because of this continued movement of 
replacement, cosmic optimism can be understood as the process of historical maturation.  
   Both natural belief and cosmic optimism can be understood as the process to recover 
personal actuality. If the person, the other persons, and ordinary people are understood in 
                                                 
621 See also the 5th chapter of this dissertation.  
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a relationship of integrity, it takes the form of balance. If the person and the other persons 
are understood in a relationship of replacement, it takes the form of history. These two 
kinds of logic, common sense and history, are necessary results of the contradiction 
between the actual and the possible, or the particular and the universal. 
   Then, from the viewpoint of reliabilism, natural belief, based on the philosophy of 
common sense, and cosmic optimism, based on the philosophy of history, can be 
understood as mutually complementary aspects of one’s total recognition of the world. 
Natural belief, which secures the very basis of reality, can be understood as a stabilizing 
aspect of one’s total recognition of the world. Cosmic optimism, which includes an 
historical process towards the infinite future, can be understood as a creating aspect of 
one’s total recognition of the world.  
On the basis of the consideration above, the first section will examine Hick’s 
philosophy of common sense in his reading of Hume. After the examination of Hick’s 
reading, Norman Kemp Smith’s and John Milbank’s readings of Hume will be examined. 
The second section will examine Hick’s philosophy of history in his theodicy, eschatology, 
and soteriology. The third section will examine the relation between common sense and 
history.  
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1.  
Philosophy of Common Sense: Hume 
 
 
I. JOHN HICK 
   John Hick’s philosophy of common sense can be found in his reading of Hume.622 
For example, in The New Frontier of Religion and Science, Hick situates his philosophy 
in the tradition of British Empiricism: ‘we believe that there is a surrounding world which 
impinges from moment to moment on our senses, so that through the continuous operation 
of enormously complex neural circuitry we have a generally reliable awareness of that 
                                                 
622 See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 124-5. Hick, Arguments for the Existence of 
God, p. 110. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213. Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of 
Religion, pp. 6-7. Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, pp. 128-9. Hick, An 
Autobiography, p. 314. 
   In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick relates Kemp Smith’s interpretation of Hume’s ‘natural 
belief’ with Richard Swinburne’s ‘the principle of credulity’: ‘what one seems to perceive is 
probably so. How things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things are.’ See Hick, 
An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214.  
   In Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, Hick further relates his argument with Alvin 
Plantinga’s ‘properly basic beliefs’: ‘this holds that there are ‘properly basic beliefs,’ which are 
foundational and thus not in need of external justification, and that belief in God is of this kind … 
Thus ‘I see a tree before me’ is properly basic if I am having the experience of seeing what appears 
to me to be a tree before me. And ‘I am in God’s presence’ is properly basic if I am experiencing 
what seems to me to be God’s presence.’ See Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 6-7.  
283 
 
world as it appears to animals with our perceptual equipment, and are thus able to act 
appropriately within it. We all believe that it exists, and yet we cannot prove any logical 
argument to back up this belief, because any argument will appeal to the evidence of the 
senses, thus begging the question by assuming what it is trying to prove. This anomalous 
epistemological situation was progressively clarified in the developing British empiricist 
tradition.’623 According to Hick, the arguments of Locke and Berkeley had an orientation 
towards solipsism, the idea that everything and everyone of which I am aware exists only 
in my mind. Then, Hume radically changed the terms of the discussion by claiming that 
we believe in the reality of the external world simply because it is our nature to do so and 
not as a result of, or justified by, philosophical arguments.624  
According to Hick, one’s mind simply acknowledges what is forced upon it, namely 
that most of its perceptions come with a distinctive and irresistible force and forms ‘a single 
ordered system which we call ‘reality’ or ‘the world’’625. One perceives a world in which 
                                                 
623 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 127. In An Autobiography, Hick says that ‘I 
[am] more in the tradition of the English empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume and, in the 
twentieth century, Russell and others.’ See Hick, An Autobiography, p. 314.  
624 ‘Nature has not left this to [our] choice, and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great 
importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What 
causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But ‘tis vain to ask, Whether there be body or 
not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.’ See Hume, Treatise of 
Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section ii, ed. Selby-Bigge, 1896, p. 187, quoted in Hick, The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 128, and also in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 
p. 449.  
625 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 128.  
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one lives and no amount of philosophical reasoning can either establish or refute this: ‘to 
trust one’s senses is a matter of what can be called natural belief, or pre-philosophical 
common sense.’626 Hick says that this natural belief is a pragmatic necessity. If one does 
not act on it, one would soon perish.627 
   On the basis of Hume’s natural belief, Hick tries to extend it into the existence of God. 
For example, in Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, Hick says that ‘the basic principle 
that it is rational to base beliefs on our experience, except when we have positive reasons 
not to, applies impartially to all forms of putatively cognitive experience, including 
religious experience.’628 Likewise, a similar argument can be found in An Interpretation 
of Religion: ‘it is no more possible to prove the existence of God than the existence of a 
material world but … theistic belief arises, like perceptual belief, from a natural response 
of the human mind to its experience. All that we can say of a form of natural belief, whether 
                                                 
626 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 129.  
627 To support his argument, Hick also mentions G. E. Moore’s ‘A Defense of Common Sense’: ‘I 
know, with certainty … [that] There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This 
body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not 
without undergoing changes … [T]he earth has existed also for many years before my body was 
born …’ See G. E. Moore, ‘A Defense of Common Sense,’ in Contemporary British Philosophy, 
Series 2, ed. J. H. Muirhead, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925, quoted in Hick, The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science, p.129. 
   According to Hick, G. E. Moore supports Hume at this point and insists that the ordinary 
knowledge that everyone share, and express in the ordinary language that everyone have in 
common, neither needs nor is able to be backed up by philosophical arguments. See Hick, The New 
Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 129.  
628 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 6.  
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perceptual, moral or religious, is that it occurs and seems to be firmly embedded in our 
human nature.’629 
   However, what is important to realize here is that Hick is aware of the difference 
between Hume’s defence of natural belief and his application of it into the field of religion: 
‘within the basic epistemological similarity between perceptual and religious experience-
and-belief there are important dissimilarities.’630 When Hick argues about religious belief, 
which is distinguished from the natural belief, Hick presupposes his own argument about 
the natural, the ethical, and the religious. The difference among the natural, the ethical and 
the religious is argued in An Interpretation of Religion631, but the same argument is already 
made in Faith and Knowledge.  
In Faith and Knowledge, Hick starts the argument from the natural significance of the 
world: ‘the level of natural significance … is the significance which our environment has 
for us as animal organisms seeking pleasure and survival and shunning pain and death.’632 
According to Hick, in building houses, cooking food, avoiding dangerous precipices, 
whirlpools, and volcanoes, and generally conducting oneself prudently in relation to the 
material world, one is all the time acting on the basis of the innate tendency to believe in 
the natural significance of the world. This argument about the natural is already the same 
                                                 
629 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214.  
630 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214.  
631 See the 4th chapter of this dissertation.  
632 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 122.  
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as Hume’s natural belief (‘we have a generally reliable awareness of that world as it 
appears to animals with our perceptual equipment, and are thus able to act appropriately 
within it’633). 
   Then, Hick moves to the philosophical necessity of interpretation: ‘it is a familiar 
philosophical tenet, and one which may perhaps today be taken as granted, that all 
conscious experience of the physical world contains an element of interpretation.’634 
According to Hick, from the philosophical viewpoint, the natural world is not natural at all, 
but is a result of the continuous activity of interpretation. Therefore, one’s action is always 
selecting, relating and synthesizing, and experiencing the environment through 
interpretation. Through the interpretative activity, one can recognize a three-dimensional 
room, or a particular configuration of colored patches within that field as a book lying on 
a table.  
   However, according to Hick, the interpretation cannot prove the existence of other 
persons, because ‘there is no event within our phenomenal experience the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of which is relevant to the truth or falsity of the solipsist hypothesis.’635 
Hick says that what philosophy can prove is that there would be only one person in 
existence, and other persons would be just human-like appearances. It is a necessary 
                                                 
633 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, p. 127.  
634 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 122.  
635 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 123.  
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consequence of philosophical thinking that only one’s own world exists and that 
everything and everyone of which one is aware exists only in one’s own world.  
   Then, according to Hick, on the basis of the natural belief in the existence of the 
world,636 one can also believe in the existence of other persons, who are incomparably 
unique like oneself: ‘given the initial rejection of solipsism (or rather given the 
interpretative bias of human nature, which has prevented all but the most enthusiastic of 
philosophers from falling into solipsism) we can, I think, find corroborations of an 
analogical kind to support our belief in the unobserved continuance of physical objects and 
the reality of other minds.’637 According to Hick, what is important to note here is that 
both the common sense presupposition of the natural world and the philosophical 
assumption of solipsism are necessary for the support of the existence of other persons. 
This is because, in the common sense world, the existence of other persons are just 
presupposed and taken for granted, instead of being apprehended as independent centres 
with incomparable uniqueness. Only after philosophical solipsism can one realize that the 
other persons are also incomparably unique just like oneself. The philosophical solipsism 
                                                 
636 ‘As Hume noted, nature has not left this to our choice, ‘and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair 
of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, 
What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body [i.e., matter]? but ’tis vain to ask, Whether 
there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.’’ See 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, pp. 187-8, quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First 
Edition, pp. 124-5.  
637 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 123.  
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is in this respect right, but is unable to provide the reason why ordinary people naturally 
believe in the existence of other persons. 
   Therefore, one needs both common sense realism and philosophical solipsism. Then, 
on the basis of the natural belief in the existence of the world, one can recognize the 
personal interactions with one another: ‘it is characteristic of mankind to live not only in 
terms of the natural significance of his world but also in the dimension of personality and 
responsibility.’638 Within personal interaction, one finds the necessity of responsibility to 
treat other persons as one would wish to be treated oneself. This is what Hick calls the 
ethical significance of persons.  
   At last, Hick says that on the basis of the natural and ethical significances, one can 
think of the religious significance: ‘as ethical significance interpenetrates natural 
significance, so religious significance interpenetrates both ethical and natural. The divine 
is the highest and ultimate order of significance.’639 According to Hick, the religious 
significance can be understood as a necessity of the ultimate environment within which 
incomparably unique persons are living. In spite of the incompatible uniqueness, all of 
them naturally recognize the common world. Then, because of the uniqueness and the 
commonality, each person can be seen as recognizing the same divine presence and 
purpose. When one treats other persons as oneself, one can realize that not only oneself but 
also the other persons are incomparably unique, and then the assumption of the 
                                                 
638 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 125.  
639 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 127.  
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incomparable uniqueness of other persons requires the necessity of the common existence 
of God: ‘entering into conscious relation with God consists in … to see the world as being 
ruled by a divine love which sets infinite value upon each individual and include all men 
in its scope … ‘What determines their faith is not a theory of the Supernatural, but an 
attitude towards the Natural, as a sphere in which a victory of deeper meaning than the 
visible and of more abiding purpose than the fleeting can be won … and this was made 
possible by realizing in the Natural the meaning and purpose of the Supernatural.’’640 
Therefore, when Hick says that ‘all that we can say of a form of natural belief, whether 
perceptual, moral or religious, is that it occurs and seems to be firmly embedded in our 
human nature,’641 Hick is fully aware of the distinction between the natural, the ethical 
and the religious.  
From the argument above, it can be seen that what Hick added, on the basis of Hume’s 
natural belief, is a personal dimension. From the introduction of the philosophical necessity 
of solipsism, Hick arrives at the mutual recognition of unique personality in the common 
sense world. Then, from the mutual recognition of unique personality, Hick concludes the 
possibility of the existence of God, who is shared by everyone. Hick says that it is 
theoretically possible to doubt the existence of God, but, as an alternative choice, one can 
choose to enter into the personal relationship with God which will finally lead to the 
                                                 
640 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, pp. 129-130, and the quotation is from Oman, The 
Natural and the Supernatural, p. 448.  
641 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 214.  
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ultimate perfection at the end of history. The existence of God is a necessary consequence 
of the initial premise of the natural significance of the world, and therefore it is open to 
decide whether it is rational or irrational. What Hick intends by the existence of God can 
be understood as the belief in the very basis of reality, within which one can naturally act 
and react with other persons. From the viewpoint of reliabilism, it is a total balance among 
unique persons kept by the very basic kind of common sense. 
 
 
II. NORMAN KEMP SMITH  
   Even though they do not focus on the uniqueness of persons, Kemp Smith’s and John 
Milbank’s reading of Hume can also be understood as the recovery of the very basic kind 
of reality. In the case of Kemp Smith, his intention lies in the recovery of reality in 
philosophical and scientific causal inference. According to Kemp Smith, causal inference 
is not independent by itself, but is actually grounded by lively imagination in the vulgar 
world. By recognizing its connection with the vulgar world, causal inference can recover 
its lively reality.  
Hick’s reading of Hume comes from Norman Kemp Smith’s reading of Hume in The 
Philosophy of David Hume.642 According to Kemp Smith, in section 2 of Part IV in the 
                                                 
642 ‘We thus come to rest in something like the ‘natural belief’ that Hume – according to Norman 
Kemp Smith’s interpretation … – adumbrated.’ See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 213.  
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first volume of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume raises a twofold question that (1) why 
we suppose objects to have an existence distinct from the mind and from perception; and 
(2) why we attribute a continued existence to them, even when they are not present to the 
senses.643 
   As an answer to this question, Hume divides the two systems: the vulgar system and 
the philosophical system. Hume starts the argument from the vulgar system.644 The vulgar 
system takes the existence of objects for granted. The vulgar system is based on natural 
belief in the common sense world. However, according to Kemp Smith, Hume does not 
totally agree with the vulgar system. Hume dissents from the vulgar system and agrees 
with the philosophical system in one fundamental respect that the objects of immediate 
                                                 
643 ‘’Tis certain, that almost all mankind and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of 
their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is 
intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence. ’Tis also certain, that this very 
perception or object is suppos’d to have a continu’d uninterrupted being, and neither to be 
annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought into existence by our presence. When we are absent 
from it, we say it still exists, but that we do not feel, we do not see it. When we are present, we say 
we feel, or see it.’ Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1896, pp. 206-7, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 450.  
644  ‘Nature breaks the force of all skeptical arguments … and keeps them from having any 
considerable influence on the understanding … Nature has not left this to his choice, and has 
doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and 
speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But ’tis 
in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all 
our reasonings.’ Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 1-2, pp. 186-7, quoted in Kemp Smith, 
The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 448-9. The italics is in the original.  
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consciousness are in all cases internal and perishing existences.645 In spite of the necessity 
of internality, we do believe – the ‘we’ being the philosophical no less than the vulgar – 
that objects exist and persist independently of our experience of them.  
   This is a fundamental contradiction. The vulgar system has misunderstood the 
necessity of subjectivity. The philosophical system is in this respect right, but is unable to 
provide the reason why both of them naturally believe in the existence of objects. Then, 
according to Kemp Smith, Hume tries to defend the philosophical system from within the 
vulgar system. The method to connect the vulgar system and the philosophical system is 
the concept of imagination.  
Kemp Smith says that one of Hume’s central doctrines is that mental processes, which 
have hitherto been credited to understanding, are due to a quite different type of faculty, 
the imagination. So-called causal inference is not inference at all, but natural belief 
operating in and through the imagination. For example, the objects towards which the 
mind is directed in causal inference are ‘what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, 
or stone, or any other impression, convey’d to him by his senses.’646 Imagination has gone 
                                                 
645 ‘When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, 
and one half of them to be remov’d from their common and natural position. But as we do not 
attribute a continu’d existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we 
clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our 
nerves and animal spirits … and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind … we 
learn that our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence.’ Hume, 
A Treatise of Human Naure, I, iv, 2, pp. 210-11, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David 
Hume, pp. 451-2.  
646 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, p. 202, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of 
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to the determination of these objects; so that the imagination continues in what it has 
already been doing in natural belief when it operates also in causal inference. First, there 
is the natural belief in the existence of object, and imagination is already working in the 
common sense world. Then, imagination continues to work in causal inference, and 
develops the natural belief through the gradual discovery of the unknown objects with 
‘error and deception’647.  
Therefore, the causal inference developing with imagination is ‘the monstrous 
offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once 
embrac’d by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other.’648 On the 
one hand, there is a philosophical principle, and it teaches that objects can be fallible and 
corrigible in the particular modes in which they occur.649 The part that lies open to 
correction is the part for which natural belief is not responsible, viz. the part which is 
determined by the internal and perishing experiences. On the other hand, there is a vulgar 
principle, and it teaches that, in its general import as natural belief, objects can impose 
themselves upon the mind in a way which does not allow of being questioned.650 The part 
                                                 
David Hume, p. 453.  
647 Hume, A Treaties of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, p. 189, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of 
David Hume, p. 454.  
648 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, p. 215, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of 
David Hume, p. 483.  
649 ‘Even when we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken.’ See Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature, I, iv, 2, p. 190, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 467.  
650 ‘We can humour our reason for a moment, when it becomes troublesome and solicitous; and yet 
upon its least negligence of inattention can easily return to our vulgar and natural notions.’ See Hume, 
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of the vulgar principle which one has no option save to accept is the part that falls to natural 
belief. On the basis of both the philosophical system and the vulgar system, the 
contradiction between the particular and the general can be solved as the process to reveal 
the unknown aspect of objects.  
In the end, Kemp Smith concludes that natural belief through imagination takes two 
contradictory forms, as belief in continuing and therefore independent existence, and as 
belief in causal inference. These two forms are not reconcilable, and one cannot adjust the 
two principles to one another, and also may not prefer either to the exclusion of the other. 
Both are natural to the mind, and both are necessary for its proper functioning; and it is 
through the balancing of each against the other, with an interdict against the universalizing 
of either of them, that Nature preserves in health and equilibrium the complex economy 
of one’s human constitution: ‘not being able to reconcile these two enemies … we 
endeavor to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each 
whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, 
that has all the conditions it desires.’651 
From the argument above, it can be seen that the central intention of Kemp Smith lies 
in the recovery of reality in philosophical and scientific causal inference. According to 
                                                 
The Treatise of Human Nature, p. I, iv, 2, p. 216, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David 
Hume, p. 491.  
651 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 2, p. 215, quoted in Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of 
David Hume, p. 490.  
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Kemp Smith, causal inference is subjective and, because of its subjectivity, it can develop 
with error and deception. It is a positive aspect of causal inference. However, the positive 
aspect of causal inference can also become its negative aspect as abstraction from reality. 
Therefore, causal inference must be grounded by lively imagination in the vulgar world. 
By recognizing its connection with the vulgar world, causal inference can recover its lively 
reality. From the viewpoint of reliabilism, it can also be understood as a recovery of a 
stabilizing balance in philosophical and scientific developments by recognizing its 
continuity with vulgar kind of common sense. 
 
 
III. JOHN MILBANK 
Hick and Kemp Smith are not the only philosophers who read Hume’s philosophy as 
the recovery of the very basic kind of reality. Even though his religious and philosophical 
position is different from them, John Milbank’s reading of Hume can be understood as a 
critical successor of Hick’s and Kemp Smith reading of Hume.  
As in the case of Kemp Smith, Milbank’s intention also lies in the recovery of reality 
in rational thinking. For example, in Beyond Secular Order652  and ‘What Lacks is 
Feeling’653, Milbank says that Hume’s intention lies in the recovery of ontological reality 
                                                 
652 Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, pp. 88-99. 
653 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling: Hume versus Kant and Habermas’ in Faithful Reading: New 
Essays in Theology in Honour of Fergus Kerr, ed. Simon Oliver, Karen Kilby, and Thomas 
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in rational thinking about causation, substance, etc.654 According to Milbank, rational 
thinking is nothing but the continuation of fiction making, and it cannot reach the reality 
itself. What is required for the recovery of reality is the recognition of its connection with 
everyday habit. By recognizing its connection with everyday habit, rational thinking can 
recover its lively reality.  
Milbank starts the argument from a negative aspect of Hume’s philosophy: ‘with 
respect to the empirical investigation of human understanding … all that is given is 
fictional association, and the only law which governs this givenness is ‘the law of 
association’. But this means … that our awareness of what governs our nature leaves us 
powerless to rectify this nature according to law, since the law denotes only the rule of a 
seemingly mad anarchy … our being aware of this can never cause us to give up fictioning, 
since this is the very substance of our human lives.’655 Milbank says that, according to 
Hume, human understanding cannot grasp the causation of nature, and what human 
understanding can do is just continue to make fiction. This is because nature is made of 
incompatibly diverse contingencies and what human understanding can do is just project 
infinitely possible associations between them. Human understanding can only construct 
                                                 
O’Loughlin, London: Bloomsbury, 2012, pp. 1-28. 
654 ‘Hume never denies the full ontological … reality of causation, substance, personal identity or 
the soul: he doubts them all, but in the end finds a new way to affirm them.’ See Milbank, ‘What 
Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 14.    
655 Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, p. 90. Milbank refers to David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, ed. E. C. Mossner, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, I. IV. ii., p. 259.  
297 
 
possible ideas to connect arbitrary impressions, but it never reaches the actuality of nature 
itself.  
Then, Milbank moves to a positive aspect of Hume’s philosophy. Milbank says that 
the positive aspect comes from Hume’s concept of habit: ‘Hume is clear that even constant 
conjuncture is something ineffably felt and established according to habitual imagination 
and not something rationally known. This mode of empirical connection is for him in the 
end extra-rational.’656 Milbank says that what secures the very basic reality of nature is 
everyday habit. In the common sense world of everyday habit, ordinary people are 
naturally feeling the actual existence of the world.657 
As an example of everyday habit, Milbank discusses time. According to Milbank, 
what rational thinking can offer as the result of its skepticism is only the eternal now which 
consists of infinite probability. However, ordinary people in the common sense world are 
naturally presupposing the necessity of time which flows from the past through now to the 
future: ‘habitual imagination … performs a mysterious work in excess of rational 
probability by assuming that an absolutely novel instance will fall into the same ‘historical’ 
sequence of cause and effect as instances have been taken to so fall in the past.’658 Here 
                                                 
656 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ pp. 13-14.  
657 ‘Our ontological categories (like ‘power’ and ‘cause’) and ethical values (like ‘honesty’ and 
‘courage’) are but the ‘facts’ of the way our passionate responses to reality work according to the 
force and vividness of habitual non-identically repeated impressions.’ See Milbank, Beyond Secular 
Reason, p. 90.  
658 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 14.  
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Milbank says that, for ordinary people, the absolute novelty, which comes from the future, 
is naturally taken to fall into the past. They presupposes the necessity of the flow of time. 
This is fundamentally different from the assumption of rational thinking, which can only 
project infinite probabilities within which even the flow of time loses its sense.  
Milbank says that what is important for keeping the common sense world is one’s self-
experience, and the self-experience comes from one’s feeling, habit, and imagination: 
‘even though he [Hume] takes it that we are but part of a chain of natural causation, he says 
that the best clue to the nature of the latter lies within our own self-experience. But within 
ourselves, the experience of our own consecutive causal action is a matter of feeling, habit 
and imagination.’659 
   Then, Milbank says that what is distinctive in Hume’s argument is the relation between 
rational thinking and everyday habit. Hume does not reject rational thinking, but tries to 
recover it from within everyday habit: ‘reflection cannot seriously break with habit and 
that even the most basic assumed stabilities (substance, the self, and causation) depend 
upon habit … But … in being slaves to habit, human beings must acknowledge the 
workings of a natural power constituted through time that exceeds our capacity to observe 
it.’660 Milbank says that rational thinking with regard to substance, the self, and causation, 
                                                 
659 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 14.  
660 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 16. Milbank also says that ‘this … reverses his skepticism 
not only with regard to causation but also with regard to constitutive relation. Reason can only make 
sense of individual items that are shifting and unstable but utterly isolated, and in no way intrinsically 
connected with anything else. The same must be true, rationally speaking, of our ‘impressions’; yet 
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cannot give the actuality of independent reality. However, according to Milbank, feeling, 
habit, and imagination should not be understood as the denial of rational thinking. On the 
contrary, feeling, habit, and imagination recover rational thinking from within the objective 
reality of the common sense world: ‘Hume, then, is saying that all thought is feeling and 
that reason is tempered feeling; that we must trust at least some of our most constant 
feelings and that there may be something ‘like’ feeling already in pre-human nature.’661 
   At last, Milbank’s emphasis on Hume’s concept of sympathy can also be understood 
as a result of common sense realism: ‘in the case of Hume, ‘sympathy’ at times seems to 
be a self-grounding end in itself and the sympathetic links between people to be something 
that reason itself cannot really grasp.’662 Milbank says that ordinary people in the common 
                                                 
we ‘feel’ certain unshakeable links between them in various ways. The feeling of association that 
sustains the link between cause and effect in our experience of thought then leads to a legitimate 
projection of intrinsic association also into the world of things … Hence while the denial of internal 
relation lies at the heart of Hume’s thought insofar as it is a merely rational empiricism, a certain 
‘internal’ … relation returns within his thought insofar as it is an extra-skeptical empiricism of 
feeling that even points us back towards a metaphysical realism in the broad sense of affirming a 
structure to objective reality that is independent of our perceptions of that reality.’ Here Milbank says 
that rational thinking with regard to causation, constitutive relation, and impressions, can be 
understood from within the common sense world of independent reality, which is sustained by 
feeling, habit, and imagination. See Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 15.  
661 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling,’ p. 16. In Beyond Secular Reason, Milbank says that ‘in the 
case of Hume he does not think of imagistic impressions and ideas as a screen within our minds … 
but as the one and only reality … with which we have to deal.’ See Milbank, Beyond Secular Reason, 
p. 98. Here Milbank says that rational thinking through imagistic impressions and ideas can be 
understood as the one and only reality of the common sense world.  
662 Milbank, ‘What Lacks is Feeling’, p. 12. 
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sense world naturally presuppose the existence of other persons. The presupposition must 
have become certain after the long accumulation of reciprocal bonds of everyday 
sympathy, but which is also irreducible to any rational thinking. Therefore, according to 
Milbank, Hume’s concept of sympathy can also be understood as part of his common 
sense realism.  
From the argument above, it can be seen that the central intention of Milbank lies in 
the recovery of reality in rational thinking, and this argument is similar to Norman Kemp 
Smith’s. Also, Milbank further extends the recovery of reality into Hume’s argument 
about sympathy. Norman Kemp Smith did not examine the social implications of Hume’s 
natural belief, but Milbank suggests that sympathetic links between people can be 
understood as an extension of their everyday habit. In this respect, Milbank’s argument 
goes beyond Kemp Smith and is closer to John Hick. For both Hick and Milbank, Hume’s 
common sense realism is understood as a recovery of a shared worldview, which connects 
different kinds of persons. From the viewpoint of reliabilism, it can also be understood as 
a stabilizing balance among different persons kept by the very basic worldview given by 
common sense.  
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2.  
Philosophy of History: Theodicy, Eschatology, and Soteriology 
 
 
I. THEODICY 
John Hick’s theological arguments, which are made within a limitation of Christian 
worldview, can also be understood as his philosophy of history. For example, in Evil and 
the God of Love, Hick defends his theodicy on the basis of his reading of Against Heresies 
by Irenaeus.663 According to Hick, a distinctive characteristic of Irenaeus’ argument 
comes from his recognition of the fundamental paradox in human nature, which is 
different from the one of Gnosticism which clearly divides the world into two realms of 
the good and the evil. Against this division of the world into two realms, Irenaeus suggests 
that the universality of the good manifests itself only from within the process to overcome 
the particularity of the evil.664 
                                                 
663 Hick also mentions Irenaeus in other books. See Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 
46. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 53, 67, 70, 157, 174, 191, and 197. Hick, Death and 
Eternal Life, pp. 47-8. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 118-9. Hick, Problems of Religious 
Pluralism, pp. 62 and 138. Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 109. Hick, The Fifth 
Dimension, pp. 131-49. Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 7-9. See also Cheetham, 
John Hick, pp. 40-66.  
664 Hick relates the Irenaean Type of Theodicy with the concept of ‘the vale of Soul-making’ by 
John Keats: ‘The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and superstitious is ‘a 
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   Hick begins the argument by Irenaeus’ distinction between the image (εἰκών) and the 
likeness (ὁμοίωσις) of God: ‘the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the 
outpouring of the Spirit, and this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God. 
But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and 
being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his 
formation, but not receiving the likeness through the Spirit.’665 Hick says that, in Biblical 
terms, the image means one’s bodily nature, whereas the likeness means one’s final 
perfection by the Holy Spirit. Then, according to Hick, if they are understood in 
contemporary terms, the image means one’s nature as personal. Because the finite personal 
                                                 
vale of tears’ from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary interposition of God and taken 
to Heaven – What a little circumscribed straightened notion! Call the world if you please ‘The vale 
of Soul-making’ … Do you not see … how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an 
Intelligence and make it a Soul?’ See Keats, The Letters of John Keats, Fourth Edition, ed. M. B. 
Forman, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 334-5, quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of 
Love, p. 295.  
Also, it is worth noting that Pringle-Pattison mentions the same passage of John Keats to explain 
Kant’s philosophy as an education of the human race for a never-ending progress towards the ideal: 
‘the use of the world, as Keats finely said, is to be ‘the vale of soul-making’ … So to Kant the world 
becomes ultimately intelligible as a spiritual process.’ Furthermore, Pringle-Pattison says that his 
reading of Keats comes from Bernard Bosanquet: ‘I believe that a consideration of Professor 
Bosanquet’s position is likely to prove especially helpful, because in both his Gifford volumes he 
adopts Keats’s description of the world as ‘the vale of soul-making’.’ See Pringle-Pattison, The Idea 
of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, pp. 29 and 256. See also Bernard Bosanquet, The 
Principle of Individuality and Value: the Gifford Lectures for 1911 delivered in Edinburgh 
University, London: Macmillan, 1912. Bernard Bosanquet, The Value and Destiny of the Individual: 
the Gifford Lectures for 1912 delivered in Edinburgh University, London: Macmillan, 1913. 
665 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, V. vi. 1, quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 217.  
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creature is in a personal relationship with his Maker, the creature is in a process of growing 
towards the perfect being whom God is seeking to produce. Therefore, the likeness means 
the final culmination, towards which the process of growth and development in God’s 
continuing providence is moving. Hick says that the image, within which the human being 
is made finite, and the likeness, towards which the human being is moving, are two aspects 
of the same process. Because the human being is made finite, one is growing towards the 
final culmination. This is God’s self-revealing activity in history, who manifests himself 
from within the spiritual growth of humanity.666  
   Hick says that Irenaeus expresses this spiritual growth of humanity as two kinds of the 
knowledge of what is good. On the one hand, there is the final realization of the ultimate 
goodness. But, on the other hand, the ultimate goodness manifests itself only as temporal 
goodness which is mixed with temporal evil. This paradoxical nature of the good is what 
Irenaeus calls two kinds of the knowledge of what is good: ‘just as the tongue receives 
experience of sweet and bitter by means of tasting, and the eye discriminates between 
black and white by means of vision, and the ear recognises the distinction of sounds by 
hearing; So also does the mind, receiving through the experience of both the knowledge 
                                                 
666 ‘Man, a created and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated 
God – the Father planning everything well and given His commands, the Son carrying these into 
execution and performing the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishing and increasing [what is 
made], but man making progress day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is, 
approximating to the uncreated One’ See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV. xxxviii. 3, quoted in Hick, 
Evil and the God of Love, p. 219.  
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of what is good, becomes more tenacious of its preservation, by acting in obedience to 
God ... But if any one do shun the knowledge of both kinds of things, and the twofold 
perception of knowledge, he unawares divests himself of the character of a human 
being.’667 Hick says that, for Irenaeus, good and evil are always mixed, and this mixture 
is the condition for manifesting the ultimate divine goodness from within the spiritual 
growth of humanity. Because a human being is created as an imperfect creature, a human 
being can undergo spiritual development towards the perfection intended for one by one’s 
Maker.  
   Hick develops this reading of Irenaeus in Death and Eternal Life and The Metaphor 
of God Incarnate. In Death and Eternal Life, Hick proposes to read the theodicy of 
Irenaeus as a two-stage conception of the divine creation of the human being: ‘Irenaeus 
distinguished between what he called the image of God and the likeness of God, and 
suggested a two-stage conception of the divine creation of man.’668 According to Hick, 
the first creation of the human being can be understood as a creation of a specific person 
in the image of God, and this can be extended into one’s society and one’s culture. Then, 
the second creation of the human being is fundamentally different from the first, and it can 
be understood as the ongoing creation of the shared world from within different persons. 
From the standpoint of the second creation, the first creation is finite. But from within finite 
                                                 
667 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV. xxxix. 1, quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 220.  
668 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, p. 47.  
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actions and responses, human beings can realize that the existing world is actually the place 
to manifest ongoing creation towards the divine likeness.  
   Hick says that this theodicy has an eschatological implication: ‘such a religious 
interpretation of human existence is teleologically and indeed eschatologically 
oriented.’669 According to Hick, the final meaning of a human’s life lies in the future state 
to which, in God’s purpose, he is moving. From the divine viewpoint, a human being’s 
finite nature is not in contradiction with their ultimate destiny. From a human viewpoint, 
it is theoretically possible to think that the existence of different persons indicates the denial 
of the ultimate destiny, because different persons are following different paths. However, 
as a matter of fact, human beings have an innate tendency to understand the existence of 
other persons as living within the same world and, accordingly, referring to the same 
ultimate destiny. Therefore, according to Hick, the difference among persons in the world 
can be understood as part of the same process of the manifestation of ultimate divinity 
from within the finality of human being.  
   In The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Hick further proposes to read the theodicy of 
Irenaeus as an interpretation of the trinity: ‘on this view the Spirit of God has always been 
active within the human spirit, inspiring men and women to open themselves freely to the 
divine presence and to respond in their lives to the divine purpose. This continuous creative 
activity means that ‘God has always been incarnate in his human creatures, forming their 
                                                 
669 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, p. 48.  
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spirit from within and revealing himself in and through them’ … We must accordingly … 
speak of this continuum as a single creative and saving activity of God the Spirit towards, 
and within, the spirit of man, and of his presence in the person of Jesus as a particular 
moment within that continuous creativity.’670  Hick says that, according to Irenaean 
theodicy, the incarnation of Jesus Christ can be understood to indicate the paradoxical 
nature of divinity. The finality of God’s appearance in a life involving suffering and violent 
death is not a contingent event, but a necessary revelation of God to show that the ultimate 
goodness manifests itself only from within the suffering of humanity. The Son of God, 
although he was perfect, passed through the state of suffering which is shared with the rest 
of mankind. What is shown in the process of incarnation is that human beings can receive 
the divine goodness only from within finite suffering. Direct reception of the divine 
goodness is not allowed for human beings. Only from within the finite point of view, 
human beings are allowed to make a progress towards the ultimate fulfilment of the divine 
purpose.  
   From the examination above, it can be seen that Hick’s philosophy of history can be 
found not only in his theodicy but also in his eschatology and his understanding of trinity. 
Unlike his philosophy of common sense, the characteristic of Hick’s philosophy of history 
lies in the availability of the ultimate reality in the infinite future. Irenaeus emphasizes the 
finality of human beings, because finality is necessary for the human being’s spiritual 
                                                 
670 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 109.  
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development toward the final culmination of divine perfection in the infinite future. Here 
the intention of Irenaeus always remains in the infinite future. On the contrary, in the case 
of Hick’s philosophy of common sense, disclosed in his reading of Hume, the ultimate 
reality is already available here and now and shared by ordinary, vulgar people. The whole 
structure of Hick’s philosophy shows that these two aspects of common sense and history 
are mutually complementary, and both are necessary for the full understanding of reality.  
 
 
II. ESCHATOLOGY 
   John Hick’s eschatological verification can be understood as his answer to the question 
of Antony Flew: ‘what would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute … a disproof 
of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’671 Hick says that, under the influence from 
logical positivism and Karl Popper, Flew required to express religion in a form of 
proposition which denies something. This is because, if an assertion is to amount to 
anything, it must carry its denial with it. A genuine assertion, as a putative statement of fact, 
must lay itself open to correction and refutation. In order to say something which may 
                                                 
671 Antony Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification’ in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 98-99, 
quoted in Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 149.  
Hick develops his eschatological verification in his other books. See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 
pp. 207-10. Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, pp. 80, 99, and 111-25. Hick, An Interpretation 
of Religion, pp. 178-80. Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, pp. 72-6.  
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possibly true, we must say something which may possibly false. If a proposition p is to 
constitute a true or false assertion, the state of the universe which satisfies p must differ 
from any state of the universe that satisfies not-p.  
   As an answer to this requirement, Hick first says that any factual evidence cannot be a 
disproof of the existence of God: ‘theism is not an experimental issue. There is no test of 
observation, no crucial instance such that if A occurs theism is shown to be true, while if B 
occurs theism is shown to be false.’672 This is because theism is about how the world 
appears as incomparably unique for a person. Any fact can appear for the person as being 
unique and, therefore, any fact cannot be a disproof of the existence of God for the person. 
Even if there is the worst kind of evil and pain in the world, it is not about the question why 
the world has a meaning only for a particular person. Therefore, any factual evidence 
cannot be a disproof of one’s personal faith in the existence of God. Theism is compatible 
with whatever may occur.  
   Then, however, Hick says that it is possible to express theism in the form of a factual 
assertion, because theism is not only about personal faith in the existence of God, but also 
about the process of personal faith developing through history. Then, Hick proposes to 
express theism in the form of personal faith in spiritual survival after bodily death. Hick 
says that, according to the survival claim, one can distinguish two rival accounts of the 
universe. One is naturalism: ‘naturalism postulates what we may call a ‘bungaloid’ 
                                                 
672 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 145.  
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universe, on one level, within which man figures as an intelligent animal thrown up in the 
course of natural evolution and destined to extinction when his physical environment 
becomes uninhabitable.’673 The other is theism: ‘religion … asserts that this is a ‘many-
storied’ universe, and that man is not only an animal but partakes also of a spiritual nature 
in virtue of which some or all human personalities survive bodily death.’674 According to 
Hick, naturalism is based on bodily existence and, accordingly, it accepts only one level of 
bodily universe, whereas theism is based not only on bodily existence but also admits 
spiritual existence and it accepts many-stories of bodily and spiritual universe.  
   What distinguishes the factual claims of naturalism and theism is the survival claim. 
Naturalism denies the survival claim and theism defends the survival claim. However, 
according to Hick, what is important in this argument is that the survival claim is not open 
to refutation: ‘the logical peculiarity of the claim is that it is open to confirmation but not 
to refutation.’675 This is because if one survives bodily death, the one shall presumably 
know that one has survived it. But if one does not survive death, one shall not know that 
one has not survived it. Therefore, the possibility of the refutation is closed for a human 
being. This is a necessary structure of the human condition. However, the survival claim 
is at least a factual assertion and it can be distinguished from naturalism. The difference 
may not involve a difference in the objective content of each or even any of its currently 
                                                 
673 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 150.  
674 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 150.  
675 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, First Edition, p. 150.  
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passing moments, but the theist does and the naturalist does not expect that when history 
is completed it will be seen to have led to a particular end-state.  
   In Death and Eternal Life, Hick relates the survival claim to the Irenaean theology of 
‘the vale of soul-making’ and develops it as a process of not only a person but also 
humanity in general: ‘this theology prompts an understanding of the meaning of life as a 
divinely intended opportunity, given to us both individually and as a race, to grow towards 
the realization of the potentialities of our own nature and so to become fully human. Life 
is thus aptly imaged in terms of the ancient picture of an arduous journey towards the life 
of the Celestial City. This pilgrimage crosses the frontier of death; for its end is not attained 
in this life, and therefore if it is to be attained at all there must be a further life.’676 
According to Hick, if a soul-making process is taking place in this life, that process is 
seldom completed by the time of bodily death. In some people the creative process makes 
considerable progress during their earthly existence, in most only a little, and in some none 
at all or less than none. Thus, if the person-making process is ever to be carried through, it 
seems that it must necessarily continue beyond one’s bodily death toward the next life.677 
   What can be seen in the argument above is that, like Hick’s theodicy, the emphasis of 
Hick’s eschatology also lies in the infinite future. The confirmation of a human being’s 
survival claim is possible only in one’s future life, and a particular person is expected to 
                                                 
676 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, p. 210. See also Cheetham, John Hick, pp. 67-98.  
677 On the basis of this point, Hick examines different conceptions of resurrection and 
reincarnation in various religious traditions. See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, pp. 265-398.  
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gradually disclose the ultimate reality in one’s further life toward its ultimate end. Because 
of the finite nature of human being, the world is understood to be in the gradual process of 
disclosing the ultimate reality.  
 
 
III. SOTERIOLOGY  
   Not only theodicy and eschatology, but John Hick’s soteriology can also be understood 
as an historical process. When Hick defines soteriology as ‘the transformation of human 
existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness’678, this transformation can be 
understood as an historical process. Ultimate reality manifests itself only from within a 
person’s self-centred action and other persons’ reaction to it.  
   Likewise, when Hick connects ethics with soteriology, the connection can also be 
understood from Hick’s understanding of the historical process for the ultimate reality to 
manifest itself from within a person’s action and other persons’ reaction to it: ‘from a 
religious point of view we must … assume the rooting of moral norms in the structure of 
our human nature and the rooting of that nature in our relationship to Real.’679 The world 
has actuality only for a specific person, and the other persons appear only as possibility for 
the specific person. Then, the ultimate reality manifests itself only from within one’s action 
                                                 
678 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 300. See also Gillis, A Question of Final Belief, pp. 100-
28.  
679 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 312.  
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and other persons’ reaction to it. This is what Hick calls the structure of human nature. 
Moral norms between a person and other persons are rooted in this fundamental structure, 
and the interaction between a person and other persons can be understood as the historical 
process for the ultimate reality to manifest itself.  
   In The Metaphor of God Incarnate, John Hick applies his soteriology to 
Christology.680 Hick starts from a literal interpretation of incarnation: ‘Jesus was God the 
Son living a human life, being both ‘truly God’ and ‘truly man’, vere Deus, vere homo. He 
was literally (not metaphorically) God and literally (not metaphorically) human.’681 This 
is a theological doctrine reached at Nicaea and Chalcedon. Jesus was one being 
(hypostatis) and person (prosopon) in two natures (en duo phusesin). The essence of the 
doctrine lies in that the man Jesus of Nazareth was in a literal sense God.  
   However, this theological doctrine does not itself explain the reason why one person 
can have two different natures. There must be a further explanation for the general 
statement that Jesus had both a divine and a human nature. Then, Hick says that the 
dichotomy of body/mind can be a simplest possible model for such an explanation: ‘if we 
assume a body/mind dichotomy, and say that a person’s, X’s, body is a human body but 
that X’s mind is the mind of God, we should have one possible literal meaning for the 
statement that X is God incarnate.’682 According to this model, given the concepts of 
                                                 
680 See also Gillis, A Question of Final Belief, pp. 71-99.  
681 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 101.  
682 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 102.  
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divine mind, human body, and a mind being embodied, it is clearly a literal sense of divine 
incarnation.683 
   To this answer of the dichotomy, Hick says that, even though it is the simplest possible 
model as the interpretation of the incarnation, it does not provide an answer to the question 
why a human being has not only a body but also a mind, and why human beings make 
personal relationships with one another by using the mind and body. Thus, the simplest 
possible model is based on ‘a presupposition of our personal relationships with one another 
that we all have human minds as well as human bodies.’684 
   Then, Hick proposes to interpret the doctrine of incarnation as metaphor to express the 
paradox of grace.685 The difference between literal and metaphorical ways of speaking 
lies in whether it indicates a straightforward fact or a paradox: ‘the essential difference, 
then, between the literal and metaphorical ways of speaking of divine incarnation is that 
                                                 
683 According to Hick, a similar kind of dichotomy can be found in fact in the conception of 
incarnation used by St Athanasius in his De Incarnatione, even though Athanasius used another 
concept of the Word of God instead of the mind of God. Hick says that in the De Incarnatione 
(which predates his controversy with the Arians) the only meaning that Athanasius gives to 
‘incarnation’ is that of the Word of God taking a human body: ‘He took to Himself a body, a human 
body even as our own,’ ‘He assumed a body capable of death,’ ‘the Word submitted to appear in a 
body,’ ‘He takes to himself an instrument … a human body,’ ‘He manifested Himself by means of 
a body.’ See St Athanasius, On the Incarnation, London: Mowbray, and Crestwood, N. Y.: St 
Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1989, paragraph. 8, 9, 16, 43 and 54, quoted in Hick, 
The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 103.  
684 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 103.  
685 As defenders of the paradox of grace, Hick mentions Donald Baillie and Geoffrey Lampe. See 
Donald Baillie, God was in Christ, London: Faber & Faber, 1948. Geoffrey Lampe, God as Spirit, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.  
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whereas the first can (at least in intention) be spelled out as a physical or psychological or 
metaphysical hypothesis (or a mixture of these), the second cannot be so translated without 
destroying its metaphorical character.’686 The metaphor of God incarnate indicates a 
paradox, which is based on a literal interpretation of the story of Jesus: ‘the truth or the 
appropriateness of the metaphor depends upon its being literally true that Jesus lived in 
obedient response to the divine presence, and that he lived a life of unselfish love.’687 
   The first paradox of grace is that Jesus is incomparably unique and surpassing all other 
men, but, at the same time, the incomparable uniqueness is not wrought by himself but by 
God: ‘in the New Testament we see the man in whom God was incarnate surpassing all 
other men in refusing to claim anything for himself independently and ascribing all the 
goodness to God.’688 This is a paradox, because Jesus is incomparably unique and, 
therefore, fully personal, but also the incomparable uniqueness comes from God, who is 
shared by everyone as the common creator of the world. In this sense, Jesus is fully human 
and fully divine at the same time.  
   But what is more surprising is the second paradox that Jesus tries to share the 
incompatible uniqueness with other persons: ‘we see him also desiring to take up other 
                                                 
686 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 106.  
687 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 105. Furthermore, Hick says that myth is a much 
extended metaphor: ‘metaphor operates to change our way of seeing something and thus our stance 
in relationship to it; and myths, as multi-dimensional metaphors, do this in a larger and more 
comprehensive way.’ See Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 105.  
688 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 107.  
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men into his own close union with God, that they might be as he was.’689 This is a paradox, 
because Jesus tries to share what cannot be shared. The supremacy of Jesus is uniquely 
given by God, and therefore it is not something to be shared by other persons. But, in spite 
of the impossibility, Jesus tries to share the incomparable uniqueness given by God.  
   Finally, Hick says that as a response to the action of Jesus, the other persons can 
experience the paradox of grace only in fragmentary ways: ‘if these men, entering in some 
small measure through him into that union, experience the paradox of grace for themselves 
in fragmentary ways.’690 Hick says that, in the case of Jesus, the paradox is absolute and 
the life of Jesus, which indicates the perfection of humanity, is the very life of God. 
Likewise, in the case of human beings, even though the paradox is only fragmentary, they 
can respond to the divine grace and enter into union with God. Like Jesus, one can make 
personal relationships with others, and, through personal relationships, one can realize 
possible union with God. Because of its fragmentary character, possible union with God 
is only gradually actualized from within an historical development towards its final 
realization. But the final perfection is actually indicated in the life of Jesus. According to 
Hick, this is the meaning of the metaphor of God incarnate, and the paradox of grace forms 
the basis of distinctively Christian experience and faith.691 
                                                 
689 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 107.  
690 Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 107.  
691 In Christianity at the Centre, Hick says that his position as Christian is a middle way between 
conservative and radical: ‘this is a middle way between a conservative cleaving to the traditional 
structure of belief, and a radical rejection of all traditional content including the transcendent … It is 
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What can be seen from the argument above is that these theological arguments, which 
are made within the limitation of a Christian worldview, can also be understood as Hick’s 
philosophy of history which is a part of Hick’s philosophical system. According to this 
theodicy, the human being is in a process of growing towards ultimate perfection. 
According to his eschatology, this same process can be understood as including a factual 
assertion about one’s spiritual survival after bodily death. Even though one cannot know 
the confirmation of one’s spiritual survival within one’s life in this world, one can believe 
that one’s spiritual survival will finally lead to one’s spiritual perfection at the end of history. 
According to soteriology, this same process can be understood as the transformation of 
one’s existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness. As the life of Jesus indicates, 
this transformation can only be realized from within one’s personal relationships with one 
another. The philosophy of history can be understood as a dialectical relationship between 
a person and other persons’ reaction to it. Hick’s theodicy, eschatology, and soteriology 
show that personal relationships with one another are realized as an historical process 
towards the ultimate end.  
                                                 
radical in rejecting much of the orthodox system of belief. But it is conservative in affirming the 
transcendent – the reality of God, the divinity of Christ, and life after death. It is thus open to criticism 
from both sides – from the conservatives for denying the infallible inspiration of the scriptures, or 
the fall of man, or the virgin birth, of the bodily resurrection, or contra-natural miracles, or the 
sanctity of the church; and from the radicals for nevertheless stubbornly affirming the personal 
transcendent God whose love is directly manifest in the love of Christ and whose good purpose for 
mankind is ultimately to be fulfilled beyond bodily death.’ See Hick, Christianity at the Centre, p. 
16.  
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However, according to Hick, the dynamic philosophy of history towards the ultimate 
perfection must be complemented by the static philosophy of common sense, which 
secures the existence of the world itself within which personal relationship takes place. On 
the very basis of the existence of the world, one can develop one’s personal relationship 
with other persons.  
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3.  
The Reception of Idealism in Britain,  
and the Relation between Philosophy and Practice 
 
   This study has mainly focused on reconciling diverse voices of Hick’s critics that it 
could not develop properly its own interpretative position. The main problem here is the 
status of the Kantian infinite future: in what sense is this a progress, if the ultimate goal 
always recedes into further infinity. In what sense is this a cosmic optimism, if the telos 
of reconciliation can never be actualized. These questions were posed against Kant by 
another great representative of German Idealism, namely G. W. F. Hegel, who called the 
Kantian idea of the infinite progress a ‘bad infinity’: ‘bad’ precisely in the sense that it 
does not foster any progression, but, by delegating the desired end into the indefinite 
future, it merely enhances its unfeasibility.  
   From the pragmatic point of view, therefore, the Kantian ideal can lead to the two 
very different positions: 1) ‘pessimism’ which refuses to see the infinitely deferred 
reconciliation as a solution at all; and 2) ‘optimism’ which relies on the Kantian 
projection as the guarantee that there is a progress and the inter-religious dialogue slowly 
but surely heads for the better future.  
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   What are the specific normative outcomes of the Kantian idea of the infinite 
progress? One can be liberal and believe in the progressive convergence of religious 
traditions – or one can be conservative and believe in sticking to the particular differences 
defining one’s own tradition. The latter standpoint is represented historically by Johann 
Herder. Herder believes in the irreducible diversity of religious traditions here and now 
and, simultaneously, in their infinite reconciliation which can realize itself only in the 
divine mind (Herder’s famous metaphor is: where we, confronted with different persons 
and cultures, hear only cacophony – God hears sublime harmony.) Yet, in terms of the 
daily immanent practice, this position means that we can stay safely on our local 
particular level and don’s bother about understanding other traditions because God has 
done this for us already.  
   Historically speaking, this kind of argument in German Idealism was introduced into 
Britain by British Idealists. In The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Origin, 
Principle, form and Matter (1865), James Hutchison Stirling defended Hegel against 
Kant. According to Stirling, Hegel’s secret is to be found in the overcoming of Kant’s 
idea of a priori categories and in Hegel’s idea of the concrete universal. Where Kant fails 
is in believing that the a priori categories are mere subjective representations of things 
and cannot reach the objective things in themselves. This point is related to Hegel’s 
critique of Kant’s ‘bad infinity’, because ‘bad infinity’ is ‘bad’ precisely in the sense that 
it does not foster any progression, but, by delegating the desired end into the indefinite 
320 
 
future, it merely enhances its unfeasibility. According to Stirling, the central idea of Hegel 
is of an objective universal that determines its own subjective particulars.692  
   As a consequence of the acceptance of Hegelian philosophy, some British Idealists 
(F. H. Bradley, J. M. E. McTaggart, and Michael Oakeshott, etc.) went towards a more 
conservative direction and some British Idealists (T. H. Green, Edward Caird, and R. G. 
Collingwood, etc.) went towards a more liberal direction.693 The distinction of the 
conservative direction and the liberal direction concerns philosophy’s relation with 
practical life and the improvement of the condition of society.  
   As Collingwood noted in his Autobiography, T. H. Green acted as an initial powerful 
stimulus on the whole British Idealist School in the domain of moral, social, and political 
philosophy. Green’s major effect was to send out into public life ‘a stream of ex-pupils 
who carried with them the conviction that philosophy … was an important thing, and 
their vocation was to put it into practice … Through this effect on the minds of its pupils, 
the philosophy of Green’s school might be found, from 1880 to about 1910, penetrating 
and fertilizing every part of the national life.’694 Likewise, Melvin Richter says that 
‘Green converted Philosophical Idealism, which in Germany had so often served as a 
                                                 
692 See David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, British Idealism: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
London: Continnum, 2012, p. 13.   
693 David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, British Idealism, p. 129. 
694 R. G. Collingwood, Autobiography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 15-17.  
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rationale of conservatism, into something close to a practical programme for the left wing 
of the Liberal Party.’695 
   Green’s direction of British Idealism was called New Liberalism, in distinction from 
Old Liberalism of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and is characterized by a gradual 
evolution of society rather than a total revolutionary change.696 The New Liberalism 
played an important role in spreading the idea of welfare state in Britain, and it 
committed to a ‘social individualism’: the good of the individual was seen as tied to the 
good of the whole community. The atomism of the formal classical view came to be 
regarded as morally and sociologically naïve. Poverty, unemployment and illness were 
not just the concern of the single individual, but were social issues and dealing with them 
transcended individual capacities.  
The basic statement of New Liberalism can be found in T. H. Green’s essay ‘Liberal 
Legislation and Freedom of Contract’. Green argued that freedom cannot be understood 
as simply the absence of restraint or compulsion, vis-à-vis contractual relations. Green 
contended that ‘we do not mean merely freedom to do as we like. We do not mean 
freedom that can be enjoyed by one man … at the cost of a loss of freedom to others.’ 
Freedom, he continued, is ‘a positive power of doing or enjoying, and that, too, 
                                                 
695 Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age, Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press, 1996, p. 13.  
696 David O. Brink, Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. 
Green, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 77-87.  
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something that we do or enjoy in common with others.’697 Freedom is not just individual 
whim or desire, it is something more positive. The core idea of Green’s essay was that 
law and restraint were not necessarily incompatible with liberty. Thus, Green contended 
that it was justifiable, on the grounds of freedom, to interfere in the sale and consumption 
of alcohol, housing, employment, public health provisions, and education. Such action, 
although coercive, nonetheless removed unjustifiable obstacles and so provided 
conditions for the genuine exercise of freedom. Law could thus contribute to the lives of 
the underfed, ill-housed, overworked, and undereducated. 
   In Hegel’s terminology, the individual was seen to be part of an ‘ethical substance’ 
that consists of ‘law and powers’, where ‘these substantial determinations are duties 
which are binding on the will of the individual.’698 Moral obligations are seen to occur 
from within the associated norms of a civil community of which they are an element. 
   However, this basic position of British idealism was also challenged by a 
development of Scottish Idealism called Personal Idealism. Andrew Seth’s Hegelianism 
and Personality (1887) launched a sustained attack on the Hegelian system and its 
assumptions. The defect in Hegelian Absolutism, Seth contends, is that it treats the 
individual simply as a universal or a spectator of things and merged into the universal, 
occupying a universal standpoint, indifferent to the issue as to whether it is my 
personality, or another, that comprehends the world. Seth was particularly perturbed by 
                                                 
697 T. H. Green, Works, Vol. III. 1885, pp. 370-371.  
698 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Section 146 and Section 148. 
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the tendency within Hegelian Absolutism to identify the human and divine self-
consciousness. Seth complained: ‘the radical error both of Hegelianism and of the allied 
English doctrine I take to be the identification of the human and the divine self-
consciousness, or, to put it more broadly, the unification of consciousness in a single 
Self.’699 Personal Idealism, as such, thus begins dissatisfied with the place of individual 
personality in the Hegelian program. 
One should however exercise caution. It would be unwise to exaggerate the 
differences between the Personalists and the Absolutists. Indeed, Personalists insisted on 
the continuity, rather than a complete break with Absolutism. Seth differentiated himself 
in the emphasis he gave to personhood and the uniqueness of the finite individual. The 
individual could not be regarded as a mere appearance of reality. The individual person is 
an experienced certainty, foundational to all action and thought, and cannot be explained 
away. The Absolute therefore cannot negate the finite individual. In discussing Kant, Seth 
argues that the person exists only through the world, and the world only through the 
person. Person and the world are the same reality looked at from different points of view. 
The basic unity, or identity, of reality can only be grasped from the point of view of the 
subject, or a person.700  
                                                 
699 Andrew Seth, Scottish Philosophy, Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1890, p. 221.  
700 Andrew Seth, ‘Philosophy as Criticism of the Categories,’ Essays in Philosophical Criticism, 
A. Seth and R. B. Haldane (eds.), London: Longmans Green, 1883, p. 38.  
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As Wayne M. Martin discusses, Kant insists that certain fundamental ideals are bad 
infinite in structure: in principle unattainable and uncompleteable, giving rise to an 
endlessly iterated series of infinite endeavors. On the contrary, Hegel denounces such 
ideals, claiming that this form of infinitude is bad – psychologically debilitating and 
transcendentally incoherent. Martin says that ‘most important philosophical disputes end 
in just this sort of standoff. The debate between freedom and determinism, the debate for 
and against idealism, the debate between the moral egoist and the proponent of the moral 
law … We face a choice in these matters, a choice that in the last analysis concerns the 
sort of ideals that we should set for ourselves, the standards of behavior we should aim at, 
and the norms by which we should measure our success.’701 For Hegel, those goals may 
be infinite but they must be completeable – infinite totalities within reach of finite human 
beings and their institutions. The question is whether one should follow this sensible 
counsel, or stand instead with Kant, who had the conviction that what is distinctive about 
human existence and human dignity is in part the fact that one finds oneself situated with 
regard to demands that one can never finally fulfill, but which continue to exert their 
infinite authority over us. 
   Hick’s Kantianism and his emphasis on inter-personal relationship is to be read from 
within these contexts and his practice of inter-religious dialogue can be understood as an 
inheritance of New Liberalism by British Idealists. The British Idealists believed in a 
                                                 
701 Wayne M. Martin, ‘In Defense of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response to Hegel’s 
Differenzschrift’ in Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Vol. 55, 2007, pp. 168-187.  
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gradual extension of the moral community. For example, T. H. Green contends that 
rational consciousness of the unfulfilled potential of a common reason impresses upon us 
a consciousness of wider circles of people who have claims upon us and upon whom we 
may justifiably make claims. A moral person has a capacity for conceiving of a good that 
is common and of acting in such a way as to attain it. In so far as membership of any 
community is in principle membership of all communities, each person has a right to be 
treated as a free person by all other persons, and not to be subjected to force unless it is to 
prevent force. Recognizing anyone as human acknowledges they are capable of 
participating in the common good. Green argues: ‘It is not the sense of duty to a 
neighbor, but the practical answer to the question, Who is my neighbor? that has 
varied.’702 The road to cosmopolitan morality begins at home, in the family, 
neighbourhood, nation and beyond to international morality.  
   Hick has been actively involved in inter-religious dialogue ‘with Hindus in India and 
in the West, with Sikhs in the Punjab, with Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Japan, and the United 
States, with Jews and Muslims in Britain and the USA, and also with Jews in Israel’ and 
Hick ‘was a founding member of both the Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter 
group and the International Scholars’ Jewish-Christian-Muslim dialogue group.’703 This 
practice of inter-religious dialogue can be understood as embodiment of his philosophical 
position to improve of the condition of society. Especially, Hick recommends 
                                                 
702 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899, section 207.  
703 John Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, p. 120. 
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intervention in various problems of society such as human rights violation: ‘the dialogue 
should engage the pressing problems of the world today, including war, violence, 
poverty, environmental devastation, gender injustice, and human rights violations.’704  
   As David Boucher argues, ‘the British Idealists played a crucial role in the transition 
from natural rights to human rights.’705 According to Boucher, natural rights never 
strayed far away from religious foundationalism. While the British Idealists dispensed 
with the foundational element in natural rights, they did not dispense with the religious. 
Human rights develop over time, but within the context of a divine unfolding rationality.  
T. H. Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation have been described 
as ‘perhaps the finest book in the philosophy of rights written to date.’706 For Green, 
rights are those powers of an individual that are recognized by others as being necessary 
for the attainment or achievement of a good in which they all share. Rights are, for 
Green, made by recognition. This is not a sufficient condition, because rights must also 
be powers, and contribute to the common good. The possession of such powers, or 
capabilities, guaranteed by society, and those that society exercises over the individual, 
are justifiable only on the grounds that they are a necessary prerequisite to fulfilling 
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705 David Boucher. The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, 
and Human Rights in Transition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009, p. v.  
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‘man’s vocation as a moral being’707 This social conception of rights entails, for Green, 
correlative obligations.  
The determination to reconcile opponents was to lead Green to attempt the 
adaptation to liberal purposes of concepts originally developed by conservatives. Green 
insisted that the idea of common good and the positive theory of freedom could be 
reconciled with liberalism without any danger to its essential beliefs. The supreme value 
of the individual and his freedom, the obligation to remove all obstacles to merit and fair 
competition such as class privilege or religious discrimination, the necessity to make 
moral principle the criterion of political decision – these were articles of the liberal creed 
which Green claimed to have preserved.708  
When Hick says that ‘the second half of twentieth century saw both a worldwide 
development of inter-religious dialogue, coinciding with considerable east-to-west 
migration, and also a strong contrary growth of aggressive fundamentalism in powerful 
elements within each tradition. But dialogue has led to a much greater mutual knowledge 
and appreciation between the world faiths, so that it is now possible for leaders of the 
religious institutions to meet in mutual amity and respect … We offer for discussion, as 
the fruit of our deliberations, a step beyond this unstable situation’709, the defense of inter-
religious dialogue is based on his conviction that religion, if it is to have any reality, must 
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begin its real task of working with genuine humanizing effect upon the great mass of 
men living brutal and deprived lives. From the reasons above, my study suggests that 
Hick’s religious pluralism is based on ‘optimism’ to enhance dialogue and relies on the 
Kantian projection as the guarantee that there is progress and inter-religious dialogue 
slowly but surely heads for the better future.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
   As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, this dissertation has disclosed the 
philosophical system of John Hick to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of 
personhood, combined with the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume.  
   According to reliabilism, this dissertation proposed a new model of knowledge. It 
was explained as a coherent balance of plural foundations, which contains both 
stabilizing and creating processes.  
Then, Hick’s philosophy of personhood was disclosed as a basic logic of his 
philosophical system as inter-personal relationship. In his philosophy of personhood, 
Hick derived the existence of God from the contradictory relation between the actuality 
of a person and the possibility of other persons. First, the world has actuality only for a 
particular person. Second, there are other persons, who are living in the world from 
incomparably different perspectives. It possibly means that there are a lot of 
incomparably different worlds, which are corresponding to incomparably different 
persons just like oneself. Finally, the natural belief to trust the actual world is required in 
spite of the possibility of multiple worlds. On the basis of the natural belief, one can 
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naturally act and react with other persons who are also the centres of the universe, just 
like oneself. 
Furthermore, Hick’s religious pluralism was disclosed as a development of this inter-
personal relationship into inter-traditional relationship. In his reading of Wittgenstein, 
Hick understood religions as cultural and linguistic traditions. Then, in his reading of 
Kant, Hick added temporality to these religions as developing toward the ultimate reality. 
However, Kant’s argument does not provide the reason why the ultimate reality is 
available here and now. Therefore, in his reading of Hume, Hick further understood 
religion as the very basic environment which secures the existence of the world shared 
among ordinary people here and now.  
From a reliabilist viewpoint, these different components of Hick’s philosophical 
system (Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, and philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, 
and Hume) can be understood as making a coherent balance of plural foundations, which 
contains both stabilizing and creating processes. 
   Hick’s philosophy of personhood starts the argument from the specificity of a 
particular person. Then, there are other persons. As a result of the necessity of 
synthesizing the incomparably different perspectives, the shared existence of the world is 
required as a coherent balance of plural foundations. If one focuses on the coherent 
balance, it leads to the emphasis of stabilizing processes. If one focuses on the plural 
foundations, it leads to the emphasis of creating processes.  
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   On the basis of Hick’s reading of Wittgenstein (religion as cultural and linguistic 
traditions), Hick’s reading of Kant (religion as developing toward the ultimate reality) 
represents the creating process of the whole world. Then, Hick’s reading of Hume 
(religion as the very basic environment) represents the stabilizing process of the whole 
world.  
   Each chapter of this dissertation has gradually disclosed this deep structure of Hick’s 
philosophical system. The 1st chapter explained reliabilism as a coherent balance of 
plural foundations. The 2nd chapter explained reliabilism as stabilizing and creating 
processes. The 3rd chapter examined Hick’s reading of Wittgenstein. The 4th chapter 
examined Hick’s own philosophy of personhood. The 5th chapter examined Hick’s 
reading of Kant. The 6th chapter examined Hick’s reading of Hume.  
Then, on the basis of the central argument in these discussions, the whole argument in 
this dissertation can also be understood in a chronological order according to the 
development of Hick’s project. The project of Hick can be understood as a recovery of a 
pre-analytical worldview (Norman Kemp Smith, John Oman, and Roy Wood Sellars) 
from within analytical contexts (the ‘theology and falsification’ debate, Neo-
Wittgensteinian Philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology). The method of reliabilism, by 
which this dissertation has tried to situate Hick’s whole philosophy, belongs to the latest 
context which is shared with Reformed Epistemology. Outside this context, Hick 
independently offered his theological reading of Irenaeus. 
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   The argument given by Kemp Smith can be understood as chronologically the earliest 
and logically the most fundamental argument. Kemp Smith’s readings of Kant and Hume 
determined the basic directions of Hick’s philosophy as history and common sense. In the 
5th chapter of this dissertation, Kemp Smith’s reading of Kant was examined. According 
to Kemp Smith, Kant says that a fact becomes actual only when experienced by a 
particular person, but, at the same time, the fact must also be shared by other persons as 
possibility. Then, according to Kant, the actuality of a person and the possibility of the other 
persons can be understood as part of the same action of synthetic judgement which reveals 
the unknown aspect of reality. The action of synthetic judgement is not only a personal 
process, but also an ontological process. It continues to solve contradictions in reality, and 
reality reveals itself from within the infinite historical process towards the ultimate end.  
   In the 6th chapter of this dissertation, Kemp Smith’s reading of Hume was examined. 
According to Kemp Smith, Hume divides the two systems: the vulgar system and the 
philosophical system. The vulgar system takes the existence of objects for granted. The 
vulgar system is based on natural belief in the common sense world, whereas the 
philosophical system takes the objects of immediate consciousness as internal and 
perishing. Then, according to Hume, the vulgar system and the philosophical system can 
be understood as part of the same process of causal inference developing with imagination. 
First, there is the natural belief in the existence of object, and imagination is already 
working in the common sense world. Then, imagination continues to work in causal 
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inference, and develops the natural belief through the gradual discovery of the unknown 
objects with error and deception. 
   These arguments by Kant and Hume can be understood as the examination of the same 
process to develop personal as well as humanity’s knowledge in general to reveal the 
ultimate reality. In the case of Kant, the argument is directed towards the ultimate end in 
the infinite future and therefore emphasizes history. In contrast, Hume emphasizes the 
origin of causal inference in the common sense world here and now. The causal inference 
develops with the help of imagination, but the development is ultimately based on the 
common sense world. Hick uses these two types of arguments as mutually complementary 
aspects of his philosophy of religion.  
Oman’s argument, which provides the logic of environment, can be understood as a 
further development on the basis of Kemp Smith. In the 5th chapter of this dissertation, the 
argument of Oman was examined. According to Oman, Kant’s philosophy of history is 
complemented by a philosophy of environment. The logic of history can solve the 
contradiction between a person and other persons, but it cannot explain the relation 
between the ultimate environment, which is reached at the end of history, and personal 
environment here and now. Oman says that a logic of environment secures that the ultimate 
reality is actually available for a person here and now. The logic of environment explains 
that a person and other persons are integrated within a larger environment, and the ultimate 
environment includes all of the world in all of its aspects, within which all the particular 
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persons are living. The environment itself does not explain history, but the environment is 
necessary for the full understanding of history.  
   Under the influence from Kemp Smith and Oman, John Hick, in Faith and Knowledge, 
critically examines the epistemological standpoints of William James and John Henry 
Newman, and develops his own argument about the necessity of the two types of faith: the 
epistemological and the ontological. James can be understood as a typical liberal position, 
and Newman as a typical conservative position. In the 4th chapter of this dissertation, 
Hick’s readings of James and Newman and his own argument on the basis of them were 
examined. According to Hick, James does have an understanding of the two types of faith 
(epistemological faith as cognition and ontological faith as trust). However, James’ theory 
has an emphasis on the aspect of faith as cognition and it fails to give an appropriate 
position to faith as trust by interpreting it as secondary and superficial. James’s argument 
of the will to believe gives a defence of a limited field of personal choice and it is important 
as a part of the whole aspect of faith, but it does not give a defence of totality.  
   In the case of Newman, Hick argues that, in spite of Newman’s own intention to 
theorize faith as totality, Newman fails to theorize totality. This is because Newman divides 
the realm of faith as totality, on the one hand, and the realm of logic as abstraction, on the 
other hand. There is no dialectical interaction between them. By the concept of illative 
sense, Newman tries to theorize a personal capacity to see a large field of evidence as a 
whole, and it can be understood as an important aspect of faith. But, if Newman defends 
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the fixed distinction between faith and logic, Newman’s faith remains to defend only a 
limited field.  
   Against James and Newman, Hick explains his argument from the personal 
significance of the world. Seen only from a particular point of view, the world makes sense. 
However, there are other persons in the world. From a personal viewpoint, there would be 
only one person in existence, and other persons are just human-like appearances. However, 
in one’s normal mode of experience, one is naturally acting and reacting with other persons 
who are also the centres of the universe, just like oneself. This is a fundamental 
contradiction. If everyone naturally believes in the existence of other persons, this is 
because there is the absolute God behind the incomparable uniqueness of all persons. The 
world has a significance only for a particular person, but, at the same time, this significance 
will be lost without the existence of the divine environment, within which incomparably 
particular persons are living. This is what Hick means by the necessity of the two types of 
faith: the epistemological and the ontological.  
On the basis of the argument above, Hick’s eschatological verification in Faith and 
Knowledge can be understood as an answer to the ‘theology and falsification’ debate begun 
by Antony Flew. The eschatological verification was examined in the 6th chapter of this 
dissertation. According to Hick, it is possible to express theism in the form of factual 
assertion. Theism can be expressed in the form of personal faith in the spiritual survival 
after bodily death. According to the survival claim, one can distinguish two rival accounts 
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of the universe: naturalism and theism. What distinguishes the factual claims of naturalism 
and theism is the survival claim. Naturalism denies the survival claim and theism defends 
the survival claim. What is important in this argument is that the survival claim is not open 
to refutation. If one survives bodily death, then one shall presumably know that one has 
survived it. But if one does not survive death, one shall not know that one has not survived 
it. Therefore, the possibility of refutation is closed for a human being. However, the 
survival claim is at least a factual assertion and it can be distinguished from naturalism.  
   From the second edition of Faith and Knowledge, Hick includes Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy in his argument about the two types of faith. In the 3rd chapter of this 
dissertation, Hick’s reading of Wittgenstein was examined. According to Hick, on the one 
hand, faith necessarily involves interpretation which is culturally and linguistically 
determined through one’s community and upbringing. In this aspect, Hick defends 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. However, on the other hand, faith also involves 
with the factual nature of religious language, which leads to the encounter with the ultimate 
reality. Hick says both faith as interpretation and faith as the encounter with the ultimate 
reality are necessary for the full understanding of the existence of God, within which 
different cultures and languages are understood to be mutually enhancing within the whole.  
In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick develops his reading of Wittgenstein into his 
critical reading of D. Z. Phillips’ Wittgensteinian philosophy, and, in contrast, Hick defends 
Roy Wood Sellars’ critical realism instead of Phillips’s non-realism. In the 3rd chapter of 
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this dissertation, Hick’s reading of Phillips and Sellars were examined. For Phillips and 
Wittgenstein, the meaning of words and concepts is not autonomous but always mediated 
by their context. When Hick defends faith as interpretation, Hick shares this with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. However, according to Hick, what is lacking from 
Phillips’ position is a holistic integrity, and it must be required to introduce historical 
change, heterogeneity, and mutual interaction within the whole.  
Hick tries to read Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language within the critical realism of 
Roy Wood Sellars. On the one hand, Sellars says that human knowing is a direct knowing 
of an object. In this sense, Sellars defends realism. However, on the other hand, Sellars 
says that the objects can be known for a subject only as appearance, and the appearance is 
known differently for different subjects. Therefore, diverse appearances reveal various 
kinds of essences for different subjects. Then, Sellars says that the contradiction between 
the direct knowing of the object and the diverse appearances is solved as an historical 
process to find a better solution through trial and error. Thought cures its own difficulties 
by showing how new distinctions satisfy old conflicts. This is what Sellars calls critical 
realism.  
   Then, in various places such as Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion and An 
Autobiography, etc., Hick tries to develop his responses to ‘Reformed Epistemologists’ 
such as William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga, and ‘theologians of religions’ such as 
George Lindbeck, Gavin D’Costa, and S. Mark Heim. However, Hick’s responses look 
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underdeveloped. Therefore, on behalf of Hick, this dissertation proposed to introduce a 
classification of foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism, which is proposed by 
Ernest Sosa. From the viewpoint of reliabilism, Alston and Plantinga can be understood as 
weak foundationalists. Lindbeck, D’Costa and Heim as well as Wittgenstein and Phillips 
can be understood as coherentists.  
   In the 1st chapter of this dissertation, the classification of foundationalism, coherentism, 
and reliabilism was examined. The central idea of foundationalism is that all knowledge is 
founded on what is ultimately given. For example, for rationalist, only rational intuition 
can give a secure foundation, and only deduction can build further knowledge of 
superstructure on that foundation. Here, the model of knowledge is the axiomatic system, 
with its self-evident axioms and its theorems derived through logical deduction. Therefore, 
a foundationalist admits a particular foundational knowledge which grounds all the other 
kinds of knowledge.  
   A coherentist rejects the notion of foundation in favour of the one that one’s body of 
knowledge is a raft that floats free of any anchor or tie. What distinguishes a coherence 
theory is the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another 
belief. What justifies belief is not that it can be an infallible belief with an indubitable 
objects, nor that it has been proved deductively on such a basis, but that it can cohere with 
a comprehensive system of beliefs. A coherence theory can be summarised as a view 
according to which there are no basic or foundational beliefs and at least the primary basis 
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for justification is the fact such beliefs fit together and support each other in a variety of 
complicated ways, thus forming a coherent system of beliefs, or perhaps more than one 
such system.  
   Ernest Sosa proposes the alternative of reliabilism as a reconciliation between the 
radically different standpoints of foundationalism and coherentism. The method of 
reliabilism can be understood as the combination of two radically different kinds of 
inquiry: (1) an inquiry based on the difference of plural foundations, and (2) an inquiry 
based on the historical process to form a coherent perspective among different foundations. 
Reliabilism grants the narrow scope of perfect knowledge, and turns to imperfect but 
reliable knowledge. Then, in the 2nd chapter of this dissertation, reliabilism was further 
examined as the ethics of normality: (1) the idea of normality is valid only for a unique 
situation and it determines one’s immediate reaction with the world, (2) the idea of 
normality is a comprehensive ability of a person and is based on the balance of the whole 
aspects of reality, and (3) the idea of normality has a social aspect and it has both creating 
and stabilizing functions. 
From a reliabilist viewpoint, the arguments given by Reformed Epistemologists can 
be understood as weak foundationalism. In the 2nd chapter of this dissertation, Reformed 
Epistemologists such as William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga were examined. Alston’s 
contribution to philosophy of religion lies in his theorization of a reliability of a particular 
religion. What is shown in Alston’s argument is a reduction of certainty and an emphasis 
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on the uniqueness of personal choice. According to Alston, a characteristic of faith is a 
choice of something uncertain which does not have demonstrative evidence. It’s uncertain 
but there is a strong motivation for the personal choice of it, so it has its own kind of 
reasonability. 
Alston and Plantinga make a similar argument about the reliability of a particular 
religion. Like Alston, Plantinga also argues that Christianity does not directly conclude the 
truth or falsity of a proposition, but implies a certain kind of rationality which comes from 
a certain kind of cognitive faculty. But there is a subtle difference between them, and it is 
shown in Plantinga’s attitude about religious plurality. Plantinga keeps the awareness of 
the world’s religious plurality throughout his argument, and this awareness is taken as a 
necessary requirement of coherence in the current religious situation. In this sense, 
Plantinga further developed Alston’s position, and Plantinga gives a more nuanced version 
of weak foundationalism, which presupposes the idea of coherentism. 
This dissertation proposed to read the arguments of George Lindbeck, Gavin D’Costa, 
and S. Mark Heim as a basically similar line of coherentist arguments, which is shared also 
by Wittgenstein and Phillips. In the 1st chapter of this dissertation, the argument of George 
Lindbeck was examined. According to Lindbeck, a religion can be viewed as a kind of 
cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. 
An individual identity is not individual at all, but is determined by the communal and 
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religious worldview that one is born into. Therefore, there is nothing that can be truly 
declared common to all religions.  
   In the 2nd chapter of this dissertation, the arguments of Gavin D’Costa and S. Mark 
Heim were examined. Both D’Costa and Heim presuppose the cultural-linguistic 
standpoint and, on the basis of it, D’Costa chose a more conservative direction, whereas 
Heim choose a more liberal direction. D’Costa explains his view of religion in contrast 
with modernity. According to D’Costa, there is, on the one hand, the cultural-linguistic 
group of Catholic Christianity, and, on the other hand, the cultural-linguistic group of 
modern liberalism. In the name of Catholic Christianity, D’Costa defends the richness of 
the life of community and the virtue of narrative. What is implied in them is a defence of 
the European tradition which allows much plasticity in accepting what is unknown. When 
D’Costa defends the European tradition, it means the order of a Christian worldview 
within which each partial practice of religious life gets a special meaning. There is a unique 
kind of reality that can be acquired only within the bigger framework.  
   In contrast, Heim rejects such a bigger framework, and instead focuses on what 
escapes a certain categorization. As the cultural-linguistic thickness of religion, Heim 
defends diversity of actual practice and constant current of exchange. Heim finds more 
reality in excess, margin, and process, and these kinds of reality cannot fit in a closed 
tradition. These kinds of reality can be discovered throughout history, but can be 
particularly revealed within modern society. Modern society is a unique society that 
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focuses on the technological advancement towards excess, margin, and process. For Heim, 
technological advancement is not something added to the original nature of human being. 
On the contrary, the technological advancement actualizes what is hidden within the 
original nature of human being. 
   This dissertation proposed to read Hick’s argument in An Interpretation of Religion 
from the viewpoint of reliabilism. In the 1st chapter of this dissertation, a reliabilist aspect 
of Hick’s argument was examined. From the reliabilist viewpoint, Hick’s argument is 
better understood as an imperfect but reliable standpoint rather than a perfectly solid 
standpoint. When Hick has a claim about substantive identity or overlap among diverse 
religious traditions, the emphasis was not only on the underlying literal unity but also on 
diverse cultural and historical settings of religions. A subtlety of Hick’s method lies in his 
method to take these contradictory standpoints at the same time.   
   Then, on the basis of the argument above, this dissertation further examined Hick’s 
cosmic optimism and philosophy of religious pluralism in An Interpretation of Religion. 
In the 4th chapter of this dissertation, Hick’s cosmic optimism was examined. Hick 
explains cosmic optimism on the basis of his philosophy of personhood, which he 
developed in Faith and Knowledge. According to Hick, the world has significance only 
for a particular person. Then, from the viewpoint of a particular person, the other persons 
look just human-like appearances. There is no direct confirmation of whether the other 
persons are really persons or not. Theoretically, one cannot distinguish a person from a 
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mere appearance. In spite of this theoretical ambiguity, ordinary people naturally believe 
that the other persons are actually persons just like oneself. Then, if ordinary people are 
naturally presupposing the incompatible uniqueness of other persons, there is a common 
recognition of the world. This natural belief in the existence of the world is based on trust, 
instead of cognition.  
   On the basis of the argument above, Hick’s cosmic optimism can be understood. 
According to Hick, a person can confirm the existence of the world only from within 
dialectical relationship between the actuality of a person and the possibility of other 
persons. Then, this personal interaction is expected to be realized only in the infinite future. 
However, according to cosmic optimism, one can see the personal interaction not only as 
pointing to the possibility of a limitlessly better existence, but also as affirming that the 
universe is such that this limitlessly better existence is actually available to a person and 
can begin to be realized in each present moment.  
   In the 5th chapter of this dissertation, Hick’s philosophy of religious pluralism in An 
Interpretation of Religion was examined. Hick’s philosophy of religious pluralism can be 
understood as a combination of three different standpoints (Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language, Kant’s philosophy of temporality, and Hume’s philosophy of common sense) 
on the basis of his own philosophy of personhood. First, according to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language, there are a lot of different kinds of cultural and linguistic traditions. 
Hick denies the common essence of religion, and instead proposes to understand religions 
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as different kinds of cultural and linguistic traditions. Second, according to Kant’s 
philosophy of temporality, these cultural and linguistic traditions are understood to be 
developing towards the ultimate reality in the infinite future. However, Kant’s philosophy 
of temporality cannot provide the reason why the ultimate reality in the infinite future is 
also available here and now. Third, therefore, according to Hume’s philosophy of common 
sense and Hick’s philosophy of personhood, a person in a religious tradition and other 
persons in other religious traditions are understood to be integrated within a common 
environment in which ordinary people naturally believe. The different religious traditions 
are actually realizing the ultimate reality in the infinite future from within the common 
environment in each present moment. From the viewpoint of reliabilism, the combination 
of these standpoints as a whole can be understood as a coherent balance of plural 
foundations which has both creating and stabilizing functions.  
In addition to these philosophical arguments, John Hick also developed his reading of 
Irenaeus in his more theological arguments in Evil and the God of Love, Death and Eternal 
Life, and The Metaphor of God Incarnate. In the 6th chapter of this dissertation, Hick’s 
reading of Irenaeus was examined. In Evil and the God of Love, Hick begins the argument 
by Irenaeus’ distinction between the image and the likeness of God. The image means 
one’s nature as personal. Because the finite personal creature is in a personal relationship 
with his Maker, the creature is in a process of growing towards the perfect being whom 
God is seeking to produce. The likeness means the final culmination, towards which the 
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process of growth and development in God’s continuing providence is moving. The image, 
within which the human being is made finite, and the likeness, towards which the human 
being is moving, are two aspects of the same process. This is God’s self-revealing activity 
in history, who manifests himself from within the spiritual growth of humanity. 
   Hick develops this reading of Irenaeus in Death and Eternal Life and The Metaphor 
of God Incarnate. In Death and Eternal Life, Hick says that theodicy has an eschatological 
implication. The final meaning of man’s life lies in the future state to which, in God’s 
purpose, he is moving. From the divine viewpoint, the human being’s finite nature is not 
in contradiction with one’s ultimate destiny. From a human viewpoint, it is theoretically 
possible to think that the existence of different persons indicates the denial of the ultimate 
destiny, because different persons are following different paths. However, as a matter of 
fact, a human being has an innate tendency to understand the existence of other persons as 
living within the same world and, accordingly, referring to the same ultimate destiny. 
Therefore, the difference among persons in the world can be understood as part of the same 
process of the manifestation of the ultimate divinity from within the finality of the human 
being. 
   In The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Hick says that, according to Irenaean theodicy, the 
incarnation of Jesus Christ can be understood to indicate the paradoxical nature of divinity. 
The finality of God’s appearance in a life involving suffering and violent death is not a 
contingent event, but a necessary revelation of God to show that the ultimate goodness 
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manifests itself only from within the suffering of humanity. The Son of God, although he 
was perfect, passed through the state of suffering which is shared with the rest of mankind. 
What is shown in the process of incarnation is that the human being can receive the divine 
goodness only from within finite suffering. Only from within the finality is the human 
being allowed to make a progress towards the ultimate fulfilment of the divine purpose. 
   What is shared in all of these theological arguments is a historical awareness towards 
the ultimate end. These theological arguments, which are made within a limitation of 
Christian worldview, can also be understood as Hick’s philosophy of history which is a 
part of Hick’s philosophical system.  
In the field of religious pluralism, this dissertation has disclosed Hick’s philosophical 
system to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with the 
philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. By introducing the method of reliabilism, 
this dissertation has classified philosophical presuppositions hidden in various criticisms 
against Hick, and tried to rehabilitate Hick’s religious pluralism by disclosing the deep 
structure of his philosophical system. Throughout the argument, this dissertation has also 
situated Hick’s project in the history of philosophy of religion and understood his project 
as a recovery of a pre-analytical worldview from within analytical contexts.  
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